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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers a theoretical tradition which is concerned with how adult literacies 
education might not always serve to socialise students into existing society, instead 
encouraging possibilities for desirable alternatives to it. Without this possibility, adult 
literacies education might only be understood as a socialising machine that slots 
students into society as it stands and where the role of research is to describe its 
operation. My research describes a long-standing refusal by educators, researchers and 
students to accept this possibility and my thesis continues this tradition. 
 
Through the analysis and interplay of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, James Paul Gee, 
Paulo Freire, Jacques Rancière, I distinguish between empowerment and emancipation 
in the context of literacies education. I set out the assumptions that Bourdieu and Gee 
make, how they understand power, identity, discourse and oppression, and what this 
means for the practice of an empowering adult literacies education. I also present 
assumptions made by Freire and Rancière, how they understand equality and 
oppression, and how an emancipatory literacies education might be understood and 
practiced. In particular, I describe how education for ‘empowerment’ encourages 
practices underpinned by the assumption that ideological processes prevent students 
from understanding how oppression is manifested. In contrast, I describe how an 
emancipatory education implies enacting educational relationships that are not reliant 
on this assumption, whilst exerting a social response to societal oppression.  
 
I make three claims. Firstly, that the idea of an emancipatory literacies education has 
come to be neglected or conflated with the idea that literacies education might 
empower, which has come to hold great sway. In so doing, I critique Freire’s work 
v 
 
whilst reclaiming it as an emancipatory project. Secondly, that the educational practices 
associated with adult literacies for empowerment can be understood to encourage the 
socialisation of students into society as it stands. This emphasises the importance of 
distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation in the context of adult 
literacies education. Finally, that emancipation is a notion that must continue to be 
questioned and explored if educators, students and academics are to take responsibility 
for the practice of adult literacies education and its consequences. An emancipatory 
literacies education cannot be reliant upon the assumption that discourse is inherently 
ideological. Instead, it is predicated upon teachers and students assuming that 
emancipation is possible and acting on that assumption.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Summary of research 
This research considers theory and ideas associated with the understanding and practice 
of adult literacies education with attention given to a tradition that links education to 
notions of empowerment or emancipation. This tradition aims to describe an adult 
literacies education that might create possibilities other than training adults in literate 
skills and practices in order to assimilate them into society as it stands. Or to put it 
another way, it is a literacies education orientated towards the possibility of 
emancipation from the current social order and the creation of desirable alternatives to 
it.  
 
This idea is particularly associated with the educational ideas and practices of the 
Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (e.g. 1970, 1972, 1986) who theorised how education 
might encourage ‘emancipation’. It is also associated with some of the educational 
practitioners and theorists of education who are broadly associated with what has 
become known as the ‘social practice’ model of adult literacies education. Here 
education is associated with the notion of ‘empowerment’ (e.g. New London Group, 
1996, Gee, 1996; Lankshear; 1999, Lankshear and McLaren; 1993a, 1993b, Crowther, 
Tett and Hamilton, 2003; Janks 2010).  My research draws upon all of these ideas.   
 
If the possibility of an empowering or emancipatory education could not be assumed, 
adult literacies education might only be understood as a form of socialisation that slots 
students into society as it stands. Education would be part of a socialising machine that 
could be described and understood but with no prospect of any alternative to it. The 
‘emancipatory’ or ‘empowering’ tradition in adult literacies education refuses to accept 
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this, instead assuming that either an ‘emancipatory’ or ‘empowering’ education is 
possible. Working in this tradition my research also makes this assumption. 
 
The idea of ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ seem to draw upon contrasting 
conceptualisations, suggesting different educational purposes and practices, implying 
that a distinction might be made between the two notions. Exploring this distinction is a 
main aim of my research. In addition I explore a range of issues and problems that have 
previously been set out by educators and researchers who have given attention to the 
possibility of an empowering or emancipatory adult literacies education.  For example 
there is a wide body of discussion that has criticised Freire’s ideas and educational 
practices for ‘emancipation’. There is also a range of debate amongst ‘social practice’ 
researchers that raises unresolved problems associated with adult literacies and 
‘empowerment’.  
 
Having this body of criticism and debate to draw upon means that the problems and 
issues that my project seeks to explore have arisen from an existing tradition that has 
questioned the purpose of adult literacies education; they do not originate with me. The 
purpose of my research is to encourage the continuance of this questioning by exploring 
old routes that have been neglected or new ones that bring alternative ways of 
understanding unresolved problems that have already been described. The purpose is 
not to arrive at definitive conclusions as to how an emancipatory literacies education 
should be understood or practised. Instead I make three claims that point towards the 
importance of questioning and exploring the emancipatory potential of adult literacies 
education by educators, students and researchers. Firstly I argue that the idea of an 
emancipatory literacies education has come to be neglected or conflated with the idea of 
3 
 
a literacies education that might empower, which has come to hold great sway. 
Secondly, I claim the possibility that educational practices associated with 
understandings of adult literacies for ‘empowerment’ might encourage the socialisation 
of students. This suggests that a distinction between empowerment and emancipation 
must be made if literacies education is to be understood to serve anything other than a 
socialising function. I go on to consider ways that theorists of education have attempted 
to explore the possibility of emancipation. Contextualising this discussion within the 
practice of adult literacies education encourages my final claim, which is that 
emancipation is a notion that must continue to be questioned and explored if educators, 
students and academics are to take responsibility for the practices associated with adult 
literacies education and their consequences.  
 
To make the case for these claims my research takes the form of setting up and 
initiating an exploration that questions ideas about emancipation or empowerment in the 
context of adult literacies education, whilst still assuming that emancipatory alternatives 
are possible. To contextualise the exploration with reference points that might enable a 
meaningful discussion, I describe, define and detail some ways in which empowerment 
and emancipation have been understood previously. I do this by selecting theorists who 
have been influential in the context of adult literacies education and exploring and 
comparing their ideas in the fashion of setting up a conversation. I then introduce the 
ideas of theorists who have not yet been influential into the discussion in order to 
further explore the emancipatory potential for adult literacies education. This takes the 
conversation into new or perhaps forgotten territory. My intention is not to reach 
definitive conclusions about how an emancipatory literacies education should be 
understood. Instead, the intention is to argue the need for the discussion to continue by 
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initiating a conversation that might have the potential to continue beyond the confines 
of my research project. 
 
I have already alluded to how the prospect of distinguishing between adult literacies 
education for empowerment and adult literacies education for emancipation is integral 
to the main aim of my research and the associated objectives. I have also mentioned 
how this arose from the existing discussions and ideas of educators, students and 
researchers who have given attention to the purpose of adult literacies education. In this 
chapter I introduce my project by summarising some of the history of understandings 
about adult literacies education (which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2), and 
how this links with the aim and objectives of my research. I then go on to introduce the 
research design that serves to meet these objectives. Finally I summarise the findings of 
my research and the claims that I make. But I start by outlining a brief history from 
which I contextualise my aims and objectives. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
Historically, literacy education has been associated with the idea that being able to read 
and write has wide-reaching and predetermined consequences for both individuals and 
society as a whole, which is an old notion with unknown origins. Gee (1996) speculates 
that the idea may have arisen amongst the first writers to write about writing, such as 
Plato. The idea is associated with what academics would describe as ‘functional’ 
understandings of literacies education (e.g. see Street, 1984), where it is assumed that 
learning to read and write has repercussions beyond enabling someone to function more 
effectively in a particular situation. For example the research of classics scholars and 
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anthropologists backed up the idea that learning to read and write promoted different 
ways of thinking about and understanding the physical and social world (e.g. Havelock, 
1986; Goody and Watt, 1988; Ong, 1988). An ‘illiterate’ was presumed to be incapable 
of understanding abstract ideas, ordering information or constructing arguments. 
‘Illiteracy’ was even linked directly to criminal activity and literacy education, which 
was defined as reading and writing only, was thought to promote desirable ways of 
behaving to the benefit of society as whole (see Hamilton, 1996, pp. 146-47, Webb, 
1955, p. 15, Lankshear and Knobel, 2003, p. 4).  
 
These ideas continued to be prevalent amongst academics and educators until the 1970s 
when they were countered and discredited by empirical researchers such as Scribner and 
Cole (1981) and Graff (1979). In the UK context they were also countered by educators 
and students (see Street 1984, or Frost and Hoy, 1980) with some influence from Paulo 
Freire (e.g. 1972, 1970, 1986) and perhaps Raymond Williams (e.g. 1993, 1993a, 
1993b). 
 
The academic work of Scribner and Cole and Graff demonstrated empirically that there 
were no wide-ranging or predetermined consequences of learning to read and write in 
terms of the psychological development of individuals, opening the way for wider 
definitions of literacy. Understandings of literacy education moved away from 
psychological theory that placed emphasis on the cognitive development of individuals 
and towards sociological theory and linguistics (Lankshear, 1999), described by Gee 
(2000) as the ‘social turn’. This gave rise to ‘social practice’ understandings of literacies 
education alongside an orientation in academic research which became known as New 
Literacies Studies (e.g. Street, 1984; Barton, 1994; Gee, 1996; Crowther, Tett & 
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Hamilton, 2003). The ‘social practice’ understanding of literacies assumed there were 
no predetermined consequences of reading and writing. Rather, any consequence was 
assumed to be rooted in the social contexts in which literacies are used, including 
contexts of power, with some (but by no means all) researchers giving particular 
attention to how power and empowerment might be understood (e.g. Crowther, Tett & 
Hamilton, 200; Gee, 1996). 
 
The ‘social practice’ understanding of adult literacies education raised the question of 
the purpose of adult literacies education. Educators and researchers holding to 
‘functional’ understandings assumed that the purpose of adult literacies education was 
to achieve the predetermined and predictable outcomes of being able to think abstractly, 
construct arguments, to categorise etc. as well as being able to function effectively in 
specific roles in work or family life. However, as this notion had been discredited there 
was some level of discussion as to what the purpose of adult literacies education might 
be (e.g. Scribner, 1988; Lankshear, 1999; Hamilton and Hillier, 2006). 
 
Those who have given attention to adult literacies education and the question of purpose 
(e.g. Hamilton & Hillier, 2006; Scribner, 1988; Gee, 1996; Lankshear, 1999) have 
generally described three overlapping domains or dimensions. Firstly literacies 
education aimed at giving people skills required for everyday life including the 
workplace; secondly the literacies skills required for the continuation of cultural 
traditions such as the arts or religious ritual where the written word might be given 
intrinsic value. Thirdly, the idea of a ‘critical’, ‘powerful’, ‘emancipatory’ or ‘radical’ 
literacies, described in terms of ‘empowerment’ or ‘emancipation’. It is this third 
domain or dimension that attempts to describe a literacies education that might not serve 
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to socialise students, instead raising the possibility of more desirable ‘emancipatory’ or 
‘empowering’ alternatives. It is this third strand that my research seeks to explore in the 
context of adult literacies education.  
 
As I have already mentioned, the ‘emancipatory’ notions of adult literacies education 
are strongly associated with the work and ideas of Paulo Freire (see Scribner, 1988; 
Gee, 1996; Hamilton & Hillier; 2006). Understandings about the possibility of an 
‘empowering’ literacies education have been developed amongst researchers whose 
work can be associated with the ‘social practice’ tradition (e.g. Crowther, Hamilton & 
Tett, 2003; Gee, 1996; NLG, 1996; Janks, 2010; Lankshear, 1997).  
 
Taking the latter first, literacies education for ‘empowerment’ tends to be associated 
with understandings about how relationships of power are reproduced and replicated in 
society. Power is defined with reference to inherently undetectable processes by which 
people’s identities are formed through the production of ‘discourse’, where the 
assumption is that discourse is inherently ideological in character.  This leads to the idea 
that students might alter existing power hierarchies by authoring new identities. An 
empowering literacies education would involve teachers equipping students for this task 
by delivering the correct knowledge about how discourse operates and orchestrating 
situations where proficiencies in a given discourse might be picked up.  In the first 
instance this raises questions as to what is meant by the terms ‘discourse’, ‘identity’ and 
‘power’, suggesting that understanding these concepts might be necessary to a 
meaningful discussion about the possibilities for an empowering literacies education. 
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In contrast, adult literacies education for ‘emancipation’ relies upon different 
understandings and is not reliant upon defining power in relation to identity or 
discourse, or understanding how power operates ideologically. Instead, emphasis is 
placed upon the character of the relationship between teachers and students and their 
relationship to symbolic human artefacts such as writing or photographs (e.g. see Freire, 
1972, or Rancière, 1991). For example, Freire (1970, 1972) conceptualises how 
educational relationships might enact emancipation, promoting social ways of reflecting 
and acting upon the ‘world’ that allow people to be ‘free’, where the idea of freedom is 
rests upon the assumptions he makes about the qualities that contribute to the expression 
of what it means to be human. This raises questions as to what is meant by ‘freedom’, 
‘equality’, ‘oppression’ and being ‘human’ (or a ‘human subject’), where again, 
understanding and defining these concepts is necessary if literacies education for 
‘emancipation’  to be discussed meaningfully.  
 
I will show that the idea of literacies education for empowerment is distinctively 
different from education for emancipation, suggesting a demarcation might be made 
between the two. My arguments will centre on understanding this distinction, in the 
context of adult literacies education, with the potential to initiate a discussion that might 
continue beyond the confines of my research project. This is the main aim of my project 
and in the next section I demonstrate the link between this main aim and the associated 
objectives as well as how these sit with the research design which I set out in Chapter 3. 
 
1.3 Aim and objectives  
 
As I have already mentioned, all the issues and problems that I explore in my research 
have already been raised by educators, students or academic researchers who have given 
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attention to the idea that adult literacies education need not always serve to socialise 
students into society as it stands. In other words, I have drawn from the ideas of those 
who assume that an emancipatory or empowering adult literacies education might be 
possible. This means that the assertions emerging from the literature review are integral 
to the emergence of the main aim of my project, the objectives, the research questions 
and the strategies employed to meet them. As with many PhD projects the first objective 
was to undertake a literature review that maps out understandings and issues relating to 
adult literacies education, which I set out in Chapter 2. Given the importance of the 
literature review to my research I will discuss its design along with other design aspects 
below. But first I contextualise and describe the other objectives associated with the 
main aim of my research. 
 
As described in the previous section, the main aim is to explore whether it is possible to 
distinguish meaningfully between adult literacies education that might contribute 
towards empowerment and adult literacies education that might create possibilities for 
emancipation. This aim emerged my reading of my academics and educators who refuse 
to accept that adult literacies education can only lead to the socialisation of students. 
Instead their work assumes that an ‘empowering’ or ‘emancipatory’ purpose is possible 
and so my research aims to continue this tradition by furthering an exploration of this 
possibility. At the same time I have raised the issue that unless or until the concepts of 
‘identity’, ‘discourse’, ‘power’, ‘oppression’, ‘equality’, ‘human subject’ etc. are 
described in more detail, it would be difficult to sustain a meaningful discussion that 
further explores ‘empowering’ or ‘emancipatory’ purposes for adult literacies 
education. The second and third objectives of my research are designed to address this 
issue so that some reference points might be created to inform a meaningful further 
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exploration. To do this, I set the objective of undertaking and analysis of the work of 
theorists who are particularly associated with defining assumptions and concepts upon 
which the notions of empowerment and emancipation are understood. I consider what 
one theorist’s work implies for the theory of another, setting then against and within 
each other. In particular I consider the theorists’ work in the context of the educational 
problems that I identify in the literature review. 
 
Considering literature from the ‘social practice’ tradition that has given attention to the 
idea of empowerment as a purpose for adult literacies education, two theorists hold 
great sway. Firstly, there is James Paul Gee, who has influenced Lankshear (1997), 
Crowther, Hamilton and Tett (2001), NLG (1996) and Janks (2010). Secondly, the 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu, whose influence can be found amongst Luke and Freebody 
(1997b), Janks (2010), Fairclough (2000), Heath (1983) and Gee (1996). This lays the 
basis of the second objective of my research which is to analyse and explore the work of 
Bourdieu and Gee in relation to how the notion of literacies education for empowerment 
might be understood and practised and what the implications might be for defining 
literacies. The results of this analysis are set out in Chapter 4. 
 
The idea of adult literacies education for ‘emancipation’ is influenced most strongly by 
the ideas of Paulo Freire (e.g. 1970, 1986, 1972), as suggested by Scribner (1988), 
Hamilton and Hillier (2006) or Gee (1996). His influence is found in education projects 
associated with movements of political liberation in Latin America (Archer and 
Costello, 1990) or in approaches to teaching writing to adults in the England (see Frost 
and Hoy, 1980). There is also a wide body of criticism of Freire’s ideas (e.g. Taylor, 
1993; Ellsworth; 1989, Coben, 1997; Gee, 1996; Luke, 1992; Gur-Ze’ev, 1998), again 
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indicating the scale of his influence. Given this context it would be strange not to 
include Freire in any exploration of the ideas that have influenced adult literacies 
education and emancipation.  
 
However, Freire’s work is typically cited in relation to discussions about empowerment 
or resisting power as a purpose for education (e.g. see Scribner, 1988; Hamilton & 
Hillier, 2006; Oughton, 2007; Rocha-Schmidt, 2010; Tagoe, 2008; Stromquist, 2006; 
Brookfield, 2005; Barton, 1994; Luke, 1991; Ellsworth, 1989; Archer and Costello, 
1990; Biesta, 2010a; Inglis, 1997
1
), where the idea of emancipation is either lost or 
conflated with the idea of empowerment. This thesis can be understood, in part, as 
serving to rediscover Freire’s work as an endeavour to understand and practice 
education as emancipation rather than empowerment, simultaneously disentangling the 
conflation of the two notions. 
 
Alongside Freire, I bring a theorist of emancipatory education with little influence in the 
context of literacies education into the analysis. Like Freire, Jacques Rancière (1991, 
1999, 2007, 2010) theorises ‘emancipation’ as an educational process and I claim that 
he attempts to discuss and explore very similar problems to those set out by Freire. I 
demonstrate this by reconstructing the ideas of both theorists and the results of this 
analysis are set out in Chapter 5. This lays the basis of the third objective of my 
research which is to reconstruct and explore the work of Paulo Freire and Jacques 
Rancière in relation to how the notion of literacies education for emancipation might be 
understood and practised and what the implications might be for defining literacies. 
                                                          
1
 Indeed Inglis goes further by defining the resistance or transgression of power as ‘emancipation’. 
However, my research suggests that that the ‘emancipatory’ educational practices that Inglis associates 
with this aim would effect socialising outcomes. I make this argument in Chapter 4, where I describe 
Inglis’s ‘emancipation’ as ‘empowering’ rather than ‘emancipatory’.  
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I read the theories of Gee, Bourdieu, Freire and Rancière describing the assumptions 
that they make and what this means for educational practices and purposes. Also, whilst 
reading, I make the assumption that an emancipatory education is possible (and I 
engage with what I mean by this in Chapters 3, 6 and 7). My reading allows me to offer 
a more detailed setting out of how adult literacies education for ‘empowerment’ or 
‘emancipation’ might be understood and practised and I discuss how I undertook the 
analysis below. My reading of the theories demonstrate how terms such as ‘identity’, 
‘discourse’, ‘equality’ or ‘oppression’ might be defined in different ways. This creates 
reference points that can inform a continuing discussion that might bring in the ideas of 
other theorists and educators who have given attention to the possibility of 
emancipation or empowerment in the context of education. My detailed analysis of Gee, 
Bourdieu, Freire and Rancière also brings to the fore criticisms, issues and concerns that 
have been raised about the ways that adult literacies education for empowerment or 
emancipation has been conceptualised and practised.  
 
This sets the scene for the meeting of the fourth and final objective of my research, 
which I set out in Chapters 6 and 7. This is to draw upon the discussions I have set out 
in order to develop an argument that has the potential to continue beyond the bounds of 
the research, exploring how adult literacies education might serve emancipatory 
purposes. In Chapter 6 I explore how education for empowerment might be 
distinguished from education from emancipation, addressing the central aim of the 
project. In doing so, I describe how a literacies education for empowerment can be 
understood to be inherently problematic as it implies practices that serve to socialise 
students. This highlights the importance of making a distinction between empowerment 
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and emancipation in the context of existing discussions amongst researchers and 
educators where the two notions are often conflated.  
 
As well as distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation in terms of what 
they imply for educational practice, I also consider their implications for the criticism of 
the theory and practice of education. There are implications here for the methodology 
that underpins this research including questions about the extent to which research 
activities might reinforce inequalities (e.g. as raised by Schostak and Schostak, 2008). I 
discuss this in Chapter 7 alongside an exploration of the emancipatory potential of adult 
literacies education. 
 
Before going on to outline how the design of my research sits with the emergence, 
description and meeting of the aim and objectives, I summarise them again: 
 
Aims 
 
To explore whether it is possible to distinguish meaningfully between adult literacies 
education that might contribute towards empowerment and adult literacies education 
that might create possibilities for emancipation. 
 
This is a theoretical study with no empirical element and such the research activity 
consisted of writing a series of interconnected essays. I did not start out with three or 
four overarching questions, rather I commenced with an aim and strategised how to 
meet it through a series of essays, each answering a different question. This means that 
the questions were identified as the study evolved, each informed by the findings of 
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essays that preceded it, though they are not presented chronologically in this text.  It 
also means that the literature review was significant to the emergence of the research 
aim, as well as the design and methodology, and so I make explicit the questions that 
drove the literature review here in this section. I discuss the design and methodology in 
detail in Chapter 3.  
  
Objectives  
1. To conduct a literature review that maps out the ideas, problems and issues that 
have arisen from those who have given attention to the purpose of adult 
literacies education. 
Associated research questions: 
i. What are the ideas that have informed and defined adult literacies 
education historically? 
ii. What was the context in which adult literacies education evolved as a 
formal part of the education system in the UK? 
iii. How has the purpose of adult literacies education been understood by 
academics, educators and students? 
iv. How has the possibility of non-socialising purposes for adult literacies 
education been understood or practiced by academics, educators and 
students? 
v. What problems have been raised by academics, educators and students 
about the understanding and practice of adult literacies education? 
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2. To consider the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John Paul Gee in relation to how 
the notion of literacies education for empowerment might be understood and 
practised, and what the implications might be for defining literacies. 
Associated research questions 
vi. How do Bourdieu and Gee conceptualise an empowering literacies 
education? 
vii. How are the notions of ‘power’, ‘identity’ and ‘discourse’ understood in 
the context of literacies education? 
viii. How do the problems and issues associated with the practice of an 
empowering literacies education arise from the assumptions that the 
theorists make?  
 
3. To consider the work of Paulo Freire and Jacques Rancière in relation to how an 
adult literacies education for emancipation might be understood and practised, 
and what this implies for defining literacies. 
Associated research questions 
ix. What are the assumptions that Freire and Rancière make? 
x. How do Freire and Rancière conceptualise ‘equality’ and ‘oppression’? 
xi. How do Freire and Rancière conceptualise an emancipatory education? 
 
4. To draw upon discussions amongst academics, educators and students, as well as 
the ideas of theorists of education including Bourdieu, Gee, Freire, Rancière and 
Gur-Ze’ev, to distinguish education for empowerment from education for 
emancipation and describe why this distinction matters. 
Associated Research Questions 
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xii. What do the ideas of Bourdieu, Gee, Freire and Rancière imply for how 
an empowering education might be distinguished from education that 
creates possibilities for emancipation? 
xiii. How can criticism of Freire’s ideas taken from an empowerment 
perspective be contrasted with criticism raised by those who attempt to 
describe an emancipatory education? 
xiv. How might education as a process of subjectification be understood and 
how does this sit with understandings of education for empowerment? 
 
5. To develop an argument that has the potential to continue beyond the bounds of 
the research, that considers how adult literacies education might serve 
emancipatory purposes. 
Associated research questions 
xv. What do understandings about the possibility of an emancipatory 
education imply for research methodology? 
xvi. How can an adult literacies education for emancipation be understood? 
 
1.4 Design 
 
As I have already mentioned, the issues and problems that this research seeks to explore 
have already been raised by those who have given attention to the idea of an adult 
literacies education for ‘empowerment’ or ‘emancipation’ and the design of the 
literature review was integral to both the emergence of the aim, as well as the objectives 
of my research and the strategies employed to meet them.  
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Selection and analysis of literature 
 
I have also mentioned that where attention has been given to the possible purposes of 
adult literacies education, three overlapping dimensions of purpose have been described 
(Hamilton & Hillier, 2006; Scribner, 1988). The first two dimensions refer to literacies 
for employment or for participation in cultural traditions, both of which might be 
understood as forms of socialisation. The third dimension of purpose is the idea of 
‘critical’, ‘powerful’, ‘emancipatory’ or ‘radical’ literacies, described in terms of 
‘empowerment’ or ‘emancipation’. I utilise three-dimensional conceptualisations of 
purpose to structure the literature review in three ways. Firstly, I use the three-
dimensions to situate the history of the practice of adult literacies education in the UK 
and its associated ideas in its historical context. To do this I utilise Raymond Williams’ 
three-dimensional conceptualisation of the history of adult education in Britain. I use his 
strands of ‘Industrial Training’, ‘Old Humanism’ and ‘Public Education’ to select and 
structure literature that describes the history of the emergence of adult literacies 
education as a formal part of the education system in Britain. This also encourages 
emphasis to be placed upon the activity and ideas of educators and students who have 
given attention to the possibility of adult literacies education as empowerment or 
emancipation.  
 
Secondly, the three-dimensional conceptualisations orientate me towards literature that 
questions the purpose of adult literacies education and its emancipatory or empowering 
potential and suggested routes to me for drilling down into it. I commenced with no 
prejudgements as to how an empowering or emancipatory education might be 
recognised or understood and had no way of selecting literature on these grounds. The 
three-dimensional conceptualisations of purpose afforded me a strategy for selecting 
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literature for review. In the first instance I selected on the basis that the literature gave 
attention to the broad idea that adult literacies education need not always socialise 
students. This raised a range of literature which I could examine to gain an impression 
of how these ‘non-socialising’ alternatives were understood. It was from this analysis 
that the orientations of ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ were identified and so the 
main aim of the research project emerged.  
 
At this point, terms such as ‘oppression’, ‘equality’, ‘the human subject’, ‘discourse’ 
and ‘power’ were raised as did the necessity for these to be defined and understood in 
more detail for any further exploration to be meaningfully described and discussed. It 
was from this need that the objectives of the research emerged. But what’s important 
here is that the three-dimensional conceptualisations were key in enabling the 
judgements that I made in selecting literature for review and so determining the aim and 
objectives of my research.  The three-dimensional conceptualisations were themselves 
raised by researchers and educators associated with adult education, which is significant 
in demonstrating again that it is issues raised by other researchers that have influenced 
the formulation of my research. 
 
Biesta’s (2010, p. 5, p. 21) three-dimensional conceptualisation was influential in 
developing strategies for drilling down into the literature that had given attention to 
questions of empowerment or emancipation so that the two might be distinguished. 
Biesta, who has given attention to the possibility that education might emancipate (e.g. 
2006, 2010; Biesta and Bingham, 2010) describes three overlapping domains that might 
inform discussion about educational purpose or function. The three domains are 
qualification which is education aimed at being able to do something, be it cooking or 
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passing examinations; secondly, socialisation, where the purpose is to incorporate 
students into existing cultural traditions; and thirdly, subjectification which is not about 
slotting students into existing society, but rather education orientated towards a notion 
of freedom that raises possibilities for emancipatory alternatives to existing society. 
Whilst Biesta’s first two domains are broadly congruent with those described by 
Scribner, Freebody and Lo Bianco, Hamilton & Hillier and Williams, the third domain 
is concerned with subjectification, as a process of being and becoming a human subject, 
which he associates with the notion of emancipation.  
 
Of course this raises questions as to how subjectification might be understood and why 
the notion of subjectification is important or necessary to understanding education as 
emancipation. For the purposes of this research exploring these questions whilst 
assuming that an emancipatory education is possible has influenced my approach to 
analysing the ideas of Gee, Bourdieu, Freire, Rancière and to a lesser extent Gur-Ze’ev. 
It has obliged me to undertake a deep level of engagement with ideas and concepts 
without which ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ could not have been distinguished 
meaningfully in the context of education. In this sense, exploring emancipation as 
subjectification has been key to my undertaking of this thesis and meeting its central 
aim. 
 
The strategy that I employed to analyse the literature, particular that of Gee, Bourdieu, 
Freire and Rancière, needed to furnish me with reference points to allow a more 
meaningful exploration of the issues. It also needed to initiate a developing process of 
argument and conversation that might have the potential to gain momentum and 
20 
 
continue beyond the bounds of the research. To accomplish this I examined the theories 
in pairs; Bourdieu and Gee and then Freire and Rancière.  
 
For both pairs I consider the theories in parallel, detailing the assumptions that each 
theorist makes. I then describe how the assumptions inform each theorist’s 
understanding of oppression. Finally I describe how each theorist’s understanding of 
oppression informs their conceptualisation of a literacies education that might overcome 
oppression, either through processes understood to empower (as with Gee) or through a 
process of emancipation (as with Freire or Rancière). This approach is justifiable on 
various counts. Firstly, it emphasises the assumptions that theorists make about human 
beings, demonstrating that these are just assumptions and cannot be taken as immovable 
certainties.  It also demonstrates how assumptions are linked to how empowerment or 
emancipation can be understood and ultimately related to understandings about how 
literacies education might be practised, showing how the practices teachers employ 
might be associated with the assumptions that they make about people.  
 
Whilst my approach to analysis shows there is no definitive way of understanding 
education, it does demonstrate how empowerment or emancipation might be 
understood, creating some reference points for the continuance of meaningful 
discussions. It also foregrounds the problems that have been raised historically about 
understandings of empowerment or emancipation, including those identified in the 
literature review and in the critique of Freire’s work. Again this shows how these issues 
might be connected to the assumptions that the theorists have made.  
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Considering the theories in pairs and in stages also demonstrates that understandings of 
empowerment and emancipation inform different approaches to criticism. 
Empowerment and emancipation can be distinguished by what they imply for the 
critique of ideas and practices pertaining to education and this enables me to set up a 
conversation between the theories, encourages opportunities for raising further issues 
and problems. As the aim of my project implies, the purpose is not to come up with a 
definitive understanding of an emancipatory literacies education, rather to commence an 
exploration about the potential of emancipatory literacies education, driven by a refusal 
to accept that education can only serve to socialise students into society, with a 
momentum that could enable its continuance beyond the confines of my project.  
 
1.5 Discussion and claims 
 
My analysis of the work of Gee and Bourdieu (in Chapter 4) results in a more detailed 
description of how an adult literacies education for ‘empowerment’ might be 
understood. Both theorists define power in relation to processes by which people are 
identified or labelled. They both argue that the ways that people write, speak or create 
other symbols such as facial expressions contributes to the reproduction of power 
hierarchies in society. Importantly, they argue that these processes are not recognisable 
to people who engage in them. This means that teachers and students might engage in 
educational activity that reproduces power hierarchies without being able to understand 
their own part in it and against their best intentions, through processes that are 
understood to be ideological in character (see Eagleton, 1991; 2-3, 198). Bourdieu and 
Gee also link power reproduction to people’s ability to access ‘goods’, so that literacies 
education can be seen to influence issues of fairness in how goods are distributed 
amongst people. Whist Bourdieu seems to offer no way out of this situation, Gee 
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suggests the possibility of an empowering literacies education that might counter these 
processes. This is reliant upon teachers giving students skills and knowledge about how 
discourse operates so that they may deliberately intervene in its production and alter 
existing hierarchies of power, perhaps even influencing access to ‘goods’ in society.  
 
In my analysis I claim that Gee and Bourdieu’s definition of power reproduction as 
being inherently undetectable by the people who participate in it has problematic 
repercussions for how an ‘empowering’ literacies education is understood. Most 
importantly, the conceptualisation of empowerment seems to necessitate educational 
practices that encourage students to be dependent upon teachers for their own 
empowerment. The assumption is that students cannot understand the power 
relationships that they are a part of and must always be reliant on experts, be they 
teachers or researchers, to pass them knowledge about this. The result is a paradox 
where empowerment rests upon students remaining dependent upon teachers, seemingly 
replicating existing power hierarchies rather than altering them. It is also a notion which 
implies that revealing how power operates might contribute to changing its operation 
for once processes of power replication are detected, they are weakened. But this is 
entirely reliant upon experts from the outside where empowerment might be delivered 
through improved programs and policies.  A second issue is that empowering literacies 
education is predicated upon the idea that students might identify or label themselves in 
different ways. However, there seems to be no adequate way to decide whether any new 
identifications and new power relationships are more desirable than those they replace. 
Thirdly, literacies for empowerment relies upon understandings that are underpinned by 
a definition of inequality, where equality is yet to be. This makes empowerment a 
23 
 
situation to be worked towards and achieved in the future the concern being that it 
might be forever over the horizon, never to be realised.  
 
Taken together, the issues I described above suggest that the understandings upon which 
the idea of an empowering literacies education are predicated imply educational activity 
that serves to socialise students into society as it stands, whilst neglecting or denying the 
idea that emancipation is possible. In response, I don’t accept that understandings about 
the sociological reproduction of power, identity and discourse must be taken as the 
starting point for discussions about the possibilities for creating educational alternatives. 
Instead I take theories of education as a starting point, such as those of Freire and 
Rancière, which might describe possibilities for an emancipatory literacies education. 
This re-orientates the discussion away from ‘identity’, ‘discourse’ and ‘power’ and 
towards ‘equality’, ‘the human subject’ and ‘emancipation’, where subjectification 
might be considered as an educational process that does not map onto the domain of 
socialisation (Biesta, 2010).  
 
Distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation, my analysis of the work of 
Freire and Rancière (in Chapter 5) describes how, unlike empowerment perspectives, 
emancipation isn’t a state to be worked towards in the future, but an assumption to be 
taken and enacted in the present. This suggests that emancipation is temporary and 
fleeting, described by the quality of active relationships between teachers, students and 
the educational materials that they use. Whilst the idea of literacies for empowerment is 
underpinned by a definition of inequality, emancipation as an educational process relies 
upon a definition of equality, where oppression is understood as the enactment of 
relationships between teachers and students that undermine equality. Such oppressive 
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relationships are understood to encourage knowledge transmission between teachers and 
students, whilst an emancipatory educational relationship encourages equality by 
dismantling this process.    
 
The very possibility of an emancipatory education relies upon the assumption that there 
can be a release or break from the current social order, as there might be new ways of 
being and doing that have yet to be identified. This links understandings of education as 
emancipation to questions about what it means to be an active and speaking human 
subject, described as a process of subjectification, which I describe in Chapter 6. Unlike 
Bourdieu and Gee, Rancière and Freire do not rely upon notions of identity and 
discourse. Drawing upon Rancière and also Gur-Ze’ev, in Chapter 6 I attempt to 
describe subjectification as a process of ‘dis-identification’ or ‘anti-identification’ with 
repercussions for how an emancipatory literacies education might be understood, which 
I set out in Chapter 7
2
. 
 
I explore Freire as a theorist who has given much attention to literacies education and 
the possibility of emancipation. In Chapter 5 I claim that both Freire and Rancière 
attempt to describe emancipatory education, providing a basis for making judgements 
about whether the outcomes of education are desirable whilst avoiding the problem of 
creating dependency between students and teachers for knowledge. However, as I have 
already mentioned, there is a large body of criticism of Freire’s theory and its practical 
repercussions for teachers and students. I detail this discussion in Chapter 6 where I 
distinguish criticism of Freire taken from the perspective of empowerment from 
                                                          
2
 The distinction I make between empowerment and emancipation, in the context of 
education, contrasts with other attempts to demarcate the two notions (e.g Inglis, 1997; 
Wildemeersch and Olesen, 2012) which I critique in Chapters 4 and 6. 
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criticism raised through assuming the possibility of emancipation as a purpose of 
education, drawing upon the work of Biesta, Rancière and Gur-Ze’ev. This encourages 
my claim that empowerment perspectives tend to limit criticism to questions about how 
power has been accounted for in the context of ideas and understandings of education 
and its associated activity. However, taking the possibility of emancipation as  a starting 
point raises a depth and breadth of discussion which question the grounds that make 
education possible and expresses concern for the continuance of human qualities that 
are integral to being and becoming an active human subject, such as responsibility, 
intellectual freedom, human love or trust. Exploring education for emancipation doesn’t 
mean giving attention to an impossible and therefore irrelevant notion, rather, it could 
expand and give depth to discussions and debates whilst firmly rooting them in the 
problems and concerns of students, educators and researchers.  
 
In my concluding chapter I discuss what understandings of education as emancipation 
imply for the research methodology underpinning this project as well as addressing the 
title of my project by exploring the emancipatory potential of adult literacies education. 
I claim that research activity designed on the basis of assumptions about the ideological 
character of discourse and power might be understood to replicate inequality and I 
attempt to describe how my own project gets around this problem. I also reflect upon 
how my own research has consisted largely of analysing literature, be it the writings of 
educators, students and researchers, or the seminal works of theorists and philosophers, 
demonstrating that there are limits to what this type of research activity might achieve 
in the context of a project that seeks to understand emancipatory education.  
 
26 
 
In exploring the emancipatory potential of adult literacies education, firstly I claim that 
it cannot be enacted through educational programs or improvements in policy which 
means that my conclusions cannot take the form of instructions to teachers and students 
that they might follow to achieve emancipation. I also claim that an emancipatory 
literacies education cannot be predicated upon students gaining a particular literate skill, 
or take the form of students’ story telling or exerting a cultural identity. I claim that an 
emancipatory literacies education cannot be reliant upon the assumption that discourse 
is inherently ideological, rather that it is predicated upon teachers and students assuming 
that emancipation is possible and acting on that assumption. It seems that a distinction 
must be made between empowerment and emancipation if the possibility of an adult 
literacies education that does not serve to socialise students is to assumed and enacted. 
This means that possibility of an emancipatory education must continue to be assumed 
and discussed if teachers, students and researchers are to continue to take responsibility 
for the purpose and function of adult literacies education.  
 
1.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have described how the main aim of this research has arisen from 
historical discussions amongst researchers, educators and students who have questioned 
the purpose of adult literacies education. I described their ideas, including the idea of 
there being three dimensions or domains of purpose for adult literacies education which 
I utilised to structure a literature review from which the objectives of my research 
emerged. I have described the objectives and the main strategies employed to meet them 
and I have briefly outlined the discussion and claims which are integral to my 
exploration. I now commence describing all of this in more detail as I embark upon 
27 
 
meeting the first objective of my research, which is to set out the issues and problems 
associated with adult literacies education as part of a review of literature. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I meet the first aim of this thesis, which is to map out the issues and 
problems that have been raised by academics, educators and students who have given 
attention to how adult literacies education might be understood and practised. In so 
doing I address the first five research questions. Firstly I present the ideas that have 
informed and defined adult literacies education historically. Secondly, I consider the 
historical context of the development of adult literacies education as a formal part of the 
education system in the UK. I then outline the purpose of adult literacies education as it 
has been understood historically by academics, educators and students, introducing the 
idea that education might have a purpose other than socialising students into existing 
society. I examine the purpose of adult literacies education in more detail, considering 
the work of researchers who have given attention to this question. Here I describe the 
possibility of non-socialising purposes for adult literacies education as they have been 
understood or practiced by academics, educators and students. Finally, I map out the 
problems have been raised by academics, educators and students about the 
understanding and practice of an adult literacies education. 
 
To address the topics outlined above, I explore three areas of literature. I commence by 
describing the ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ models around which understandings 
about adult literacies education tend to orientate. I discuss how the development of the 
‘social practice’ model has drawn from a range of academic disciplines, in particular 
sociological understandings which allow the power contexts of literacies education to 
considered. This approach allows readers new to research in adult literacies education to 
become familiarised with how the field is typically presented by researchers, before I 
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take it into different territory. It also allows readers already familiar with this context to 
start their journey through my research and its arguments from a place of common 
understanding. Secondly, I utilise a three-dimensional conceptualisation of adult 
literacies education informed by Raymond Williams. This allows me to introduce the 
idea of there being distinct purposes for education, including the possibility of education 
for emancipation or empowerment. It is also an approach which contextualises ideas 
about education which have arisen from educators and students as well as academics, 
drawing out their pertinence to my research and so justifying their inclusion. Finally, I 
employ several three-dimensional conceptualisations of education, allowing the 
question of education purpose to be considered in more detail, raising the idea that 
empowerment and emancipation are associated with distinct understandings and 
educational practices in the context of adult literacies education. 
 
My strategy enables the articulation of problems and issues as raised by researchers, 
educators and students so that they might be explored in later chapters, giving rise to the 
main aim, objectives and research questions. It also contextualises these discussions 
within understandings about the possible purposes of adult literacies education.  
 
Broadly, the issues raised are of two types. Firstly there is the issue of whether it is 
possible to distinguish between education that socialises students into the existing social 
order and education that might encourage the creation of alternative and more desirable 
social formations. The review of the literature suggests that this issue is closely linked 
to the idea that literacies education for empowerment must be demarcated from 
literacies education for emancipation, an idea that shapes and informs the main aim of 
my research and the objectives explored in subsequent chapters (see Sections 1.5 and 
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3.1). Secondly, there are issues relating to how the terms empowerment or emancipation 
are used by educators, students and academics. Notions such as ‘empowerment’ and 
‘emancipation’ are linked to other concepts such as ‘power’, ‘identity’, ‘discourse’, 
‘oppression’, ‘equality’, ‘socialisation’, ‘justice’ and the notion of the ‘human subject’, 
raising questions about how these might be understood. Again, raising and seeking to 
address this issue informs the formulation of my research objectives. 
 
The design of this literature review is instrumental to the design and justification of the 
research project itself and I discuss this in Chapter 3, when I consider the 
methodological underpinning of this thesis. But first I set out the literature review that I 
outlined above.  
 
2.2 Ideas that have informed adult literacies education historically 
 
In this section I describe the ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ models of understanding 
adult literacies education around which academic discussions tend to orientate. The 
terminology of ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ models of literacies was developed in 
the 1980s and 1990s as part of the emergence of a strand of scholarship now known as 
New Literacies Studies (NLS).  However ideas that correspond with these two models 
can be dated back to earlier decades. For example, a ‘functional’ understanding of 
literacies can be found in the United States’s army’s definition of literacies for soldiers 
in the 1940s (Harman, 1970). Similarly, understandings associated with the ‘social 
practice’ model could be found in the work of literacies educators and students in 
England in the 1970s and early 1980s (Street, 1984), before New Literacies Studies was 
established. This section describes the emergence of the understandings associated with 
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how the two models emerged historically, including the development of New Literacies 
Studies itself.    
 
 ‘Functional’ Literacies 
 
The concept of functional literacy is associated with the reading and writing skills 
required for people to function effectively within society, perhaps in relation to specific 
forms of employment or particular social functions such as parenthood. The notion of 
functional literacy also incorporates the idea that there are predetermined and wide 
reaching consequences of learning to read and write with predictable repercussions for 
individuals, social groups and society at large. In this section I explore these ideas in 
historical context, starting with the first formal definition of functional literacy which 
states that: 
 
‘A person is functionally literate when he [sic] has acquired the knowledge and 
skills in reading and writing which enable him to engage effectively in all those 
activities in which literacy is normally assumed in his culture or group’  
(Gray, 1956, p. 24) 
 
This definition was produced after consideration of the ideas of fieldworkers engaged in 
literacies projects around the world in the 1950s, who Gray had researched under the 
auspices of UNESCO. UNESCO has promoted adult literacy campaigns in ‘developing’ 
countries since 1948. ‘Developed’ nations were not included because countries with 
compulsory schooling, as in Western Europe, automatically returned statistics to 
UNESCO recording a zero for illiteracy rates (Hamilton and Hillier, 2006).  
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Gray described a prevalent notion at that time, where the ability to read and write was 
directly linked with being able to acquire an understanding of the world where ‘Only as 
such understanding develops will they [the students] be able to acquire keener insight, 
more rational attitudes and improved behaviour patterns’ (Gray, 1956, p. 19). Here the 
purpose of adult literacies education, which refers to reading and writing only, is to 
encourage people’s chances of slotting into what was considered to be a well-
functioning society. The first students tended to be people who were regarded as 
dysfunctional, such as teenage mothers, prisoners and those with ‘inferior psychic 
health’ (see Lankshear and Knobel, 2003, p. 4). 
 
This sits with the British history of literacies education where the earliest contexts for 
teaching adults were the army and prisons. Army tutoring commenced on an ad hoc 
basis in 1846, undertaken by a teaching corps set up to educate the children of higher 
ranking career soldiers. Reading and writing was also a focus for nineteenth century 
prison reformers, such as Elizabeth Fry, where crime was linked directly to lack of 
education and illiteracy in particular (see Hamilton, 1996, pp. 146-47, Webb, 1955, p. 
15).  
 
Literacy rates (i.e. for reading and writing) amongst the working class population as a 
whole in Britain had grown during the first half of the 19
th
 century though varying 
greatly across the country with reading rates ranging from less than 10% in areas of 
high rural or urban poverty to almost 100% in lowland Scotland (Webb, 1955, pp. 15-
20). There was a mushrooming of popular reading matter from the late 18
th
 century, 
from gossip sheets through to political philosophy. For example, Thomas Paine’s’ The 
Rights of Man sold 200 000 copies in 1793, with abridged versions selling for less than 
33 
 
a shilling (ibid, p. 38). In England working people placed value on paying school fees 
so that their children might attend a wide variety of mainly charitable provision 
including Sunday schools (ibid, p. 15-20) and school attendance in England doubled 
between 1833 and 1853. In Scotland during the same period literacy rates were lowest 
in the towns and cities where the rapidity of industrialisation had created extremes of 
poverty and squalor, whilst in the Highlands the oppression of the Gaelic language, 
mass emigration and neglect made for a similar but more complex situation. However, 
in the lowland and borders areas of Scotland there was a strong system of parish 
schooling and almost universal literacy rates (ibid).  
 
The main influences that encouraged participation in schooling in England during the 
19
th
 century were the role of religion in the creation of church funded schools, coupled 
with state intervention coinciding with the enactment of legal restraints on child labour 
(Mitch, 1992, p. 1). But there was also the idea that the gaining of ‘knowledge’ through 
reading might be crucial to political struggles based around class consciousness (see 
Webb, 1955, p. 15). There is debate amongst historians about the extent to which 
working people’s literacy influenced both the gaining of political enfranchisement of 
working men in 1867 and the introduction of compulsory and universal primary school 
education in 1870 (see Hamilton, 1996, p.  143). For example, Webb (1955, p. 63) 
argues that compulsory education was legislated primarily to control and tame working 
class literacies that were understood to promote assertive political struggle. Webb 
claims that thinkers such as J.S. Mill held some sway, as they emphasised the need for 
education to support industrial production rather than ‘free enquiry’ (ibid). But the 
general point here is that reading and writing was assumed to have wide reaching 
consequences, desirable or otherwise, by many working people, government authorities, 
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industrialists, church people and perhaps even amongst some historians of literate 
practices. 
 
An early formal definition of what academics refer to as ‘functional literacy’ was 
produced by the US army during World War II to describe specifically the literacies 
needed for soldiers to function effectively in the carrying out of basic military tasks 
(Harman, 1970).  Again, the important notion here is that learning to read and write was 
expected to have consequences beyond gaining the ability to function in a particular 
circumstance. Though the primary purpose of teaching a soldier to read was to improve 
their ability to function as a follower of military orders, it was assumed that there might 
be other predetermined repercussions influencing behaviours and ways of thinking that 
were taken to be necessary to a well-functioning society.  For example, learning to read 
and write was associated directly with being able to understand abstract concepts, to 
think sequentially and to construct arguments, where the purpose of literacies education 
was also to achieve such outcomes.  
 
These understandings backed up the idea of their being a strong causal link between 
reading and writing and economic and societal progress with a 40% literacy rate quoted 
as a ‘critical mass’ necessary to developing a nation state out of poverty (Barton, 1994, 
p. 192; Lankshear and Knobel, 2003, p. 4) and where literacies education has been 
deemed necessary to the creation of modern states (see Hamilton and Pitt, 2009). These 
ideas may also be indicative of colonialist intentions for literacies programs, 
reminiscent of when Britain extended territorial control through the three ‘R’s of 
‘Rifles, railways and writing’ (see Archer, p. 2003; p. 33).  
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The idea that universal and predetermined consequences of reading and writing allows 
literate societies to be differentiated from those that are non-literate, with the latter 
understood to be primitive, underdeveloped, or lacking in progress, is described by 
Street as the ‘Great Divide’ theory (1984). Graff (1979) and Gee (1996) discuss this 
notion as a ‘literacy myth’, which is often accepted as an undisputed fact in contexts 
which are always political and never neutral. The origins of the myth are unknown. Gee 
surmises that it might date back as far as the invention of writing itself and to writers 
such as Plato, as one of the first to write about writing (ibid). Havelock (1986) describes 
how academic discussion about the consequences of literacy has continued since the 
18
th
 Century, but in 1963 there was a watershed when several authors from the 
anthropological tradition published in the same year. These were Levi-Strauss, Goody 
and Watt, McLuhan, Mayr as well as Havelock himself and collectively they made 
literacy into a live issue for academics. This research tended towards backing up the 
Great Divide theory and focussed on two main areas; firstly, the anthropological study 
of societies where people generally do not read and write (e.g. Colwell, 2003; Goody 
and Watt, 1988) and secondly, the scholarship of ancient writings (e.g. Havelock, 1986; 
Ong, 1988).  
 
One of the earliest anthropological studies was undertaken by Luria who was associated 
with large scale literacies campaigns in the USSR in the 1930s (see Lankshear and 
Knobel, 2003, p.7; Colwell, 2003). Schooled and non-schooled peoples in Siberia and 
Uzbekistan were tested for cognitive abilities, producing arguments that the unschooled 
and ‘illiterate’ lacked the ability to reason, think logically and to categorise. Goody and 
Watt’s anthropological studies in Western Africa came to similar conclusions backing 
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arguments that the consequences of reading and writing were wide sweeping for both 
individuals and society (Goody and Watt, 1988).  
 
In the scholarship of ancient writings (e.g. by Havelock, 1986 and Ong, 1988) particular 
attention was given to Homeric poems assumed to have been composed before the 
invention of alphabetic scripts, but transcribed by scribes through a process of oral 
dictation. These writings were assumed to hold clues about people’s thought processes 
and ways of understanding the world in pre-literate times. Speculations were made that 
literacy had wide reaching consequences where it was key to the development of the 
modern epoch of science and philosophy. As with the anthropological studies this 
included the idea that reading and writing had facilitated the development of rational 
thought, forms of reasoning and people’s ability to separate themselves from the 
consequences of their actions. Other surmised consequences included the ability to 
order and catalogue information, to think abstractly and to construct arguments such as 
syllogisms.   
 
However the study of ancient texts can produce alternative understandings about how 
modern society might have developed. Needham (1969) speculated about why scientific 
and technological discovery had progressed at different rates during different epochs 
when comparing China with Europe. He drew upon the thesis of Edgar Zilsel (2003) 
who, like Havelock, was informed by the scholarship of ancient Greek texts. The 
argument was that the emergence of modern science was a consequence of the bringing 
together of the inductive thought of philosophers and the empirical practices of 
craftspeople. A similar argument is also made by Sagan (1980) when explaining the 
historical rise and demise of scientific activity in ancient Ionia. Sagan explains how an 
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early atomic theory arose from studying the workings of a vacuum operated water 
carrier; an example of scientific thought arising from familiarisation with every day 
tools. Here the invention of the alphabet is not pivotal in the development of society. If 
anything the opposite argument could be made, that modern scientific activity resulted 
in the invention of alphabetic scripts.  
 
Havelock (1986) claims that his assumed consequences of literacy are attributes of all 
people within literate societies. For example, though he argues that the capacity to think 
abstractly arose as a consequence of the invention of alphabetic scripts, he also assumes 
that this ability is now universal, even amongst individuals who cannot read and write. 
But this is not reflected in prevalent understandings of literacy in literacy programs in 
the latter half of the 20
th
 century. For example, A UNESCO Regional Report on 
Literacy from 1972 states that “The illiterate man’s thought...remains concrete, he 
thinks in images and not in concepts. His thought is, in fact, a series of images, 
juxtaposed or in sequence, and hence it rarely proceeds by induction or deduction’ (see 
Scribner and Cole, 1981, p. 13). 
 
Though the ideas of Goody and Watt or Havelock would not support this statement, 
they might back some other general arguments about the consequences of reading and 
writing. For example, that people who write in non-phonetic scripts such as Chinese 
might think differently from those who use phonetic alphabets, such as Russian, Arabic 
or French.  Similarly, that the rise in the popularity of mass media that does not involve 
printed text, such as radio or films, might promote a regression in people’s reasoning 
abilities and ability to understand the world. For example, Havelock refers to Hitler’s 
early use of television broadcasting to promote ‘the oral ages of the past’ (Havelock, 
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1986, p. 31). A contrary argument is made by Illich and Sanders (see 1988, pp. 106-
118) who claim that reading and writing can limit people’s ability to think for 
themselves, so encouraging injustice, exemplified by the language of ‘Newspeak’ in 
Orwell’s fictional account of a totalitarian state. This notion is found amongst educators 
associated with the deschooling movement (informed by Illich, 1971), who oppose the 
emergence of formal school education because it is denies folk understandings of the 
natural world (e.g. see Prakash 1994; Bowers, 2003; Prakash and Esteva, 2008;) and 
where literacy education is claimed to encourage ‘textual’ ways of thinking (e.g. 
Fasheh, 2003).  But regardless of whether reading and writing is deemed desirable or 
not, arguments have been made by anthropologists, classics scholars, historians and 
commentators of there being wide reaching societal consequences of literacy.  
 
The ‘literacy myth’ of the Great Divide was refuted through on-going research by 
anthropologists and historians that I discuss in the following sections. Their findings 
demonstrated no universal or predictable consequences of learning to read and write. 
Instead they pointed towards wider definitions of literacy, beyond reading and writing, 
where literacy and literacies education can only be understood in societal contexts. In 
tandem with this a new model for understanding literacies education was developed in 
opposition to ‘functional’ understandings, known as the ‘social practice’ model. 
 
Social practice models and New Literacies Studies 
 
‘Literacy is not simply knowing how to read and write a particular script but 
applying this knowledge for specific purposes in specific contexts of use. The 
nature of these practices, including, of course, their technological aspects, will 
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determine the kinds of skills (“consequences”) associated with literacy’  
(Scribner and Cole, 1981, p. 236) 
 
This is the first definition of literacy which countered the idea that there are 
predetermined and universal consequences of learning to read and write, instead 
describing a ‘social practice’ model. The key idea that Scribner and Cole express is that 
there are no predetermined functional outcomes of teaching reading and writing because 
literacy has no effects or meaning aside from the particular cultural contexts in which is 
it used (see Gee, 1996, p. 59).  
 
Scribner and Cole produced this definition following research amongst the Vai people 
of Liberia who speak and write in three languages. At that time in the 1970s, English 
was taught at school and was used to deal with the bureaucracy of the colonial legacy 
whilst Arabic was learnt through religious instruction as part of the Islamic faith. A 
third language, Vai, also has its own script and was learnt informally outside of school, 
through family and friends and used as part of these familial relationships. These 
different contexts of literacy learning allowed Scribner and Cole to differentiate 
between the consequences of schooling and the consequences of learning to read and 
write. As psychologists, Scribner and Cole were concerned that understandings about 
literacy in the 1970s had become overly reliant upon the study of ancient texts (ibid, p. 
7). In response, the study employed methods for testing the development individuals’ 
cognitive processes in relation to reading, writing and schooling, as well as 
incorporating ethnographic methods to gain understanding of the varying contexts in 
which the three languages were used. 
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However, the psychological assessments that Scribner and Cole employed found no 
connection between literacy and cognitive development, where the consequences of 
learning to read and write were confined to the acquisition of very specific skills such as 
those relating to the coding and decoding of symbols. Instead, the social contexts in 
which literacies were used were found to influence whether people learnt to read or 
write and the types of literate practices that they employed. This suggested that 
ethnographic research methods were significant for research aimed at understanding 
literacies and literacies education rather methods drawing from psychology. The 
empirical findings laid the basis for the new definition of literacy that contextualised 
reading and writing in people’s social and cultural relationships with texts and 
schooling. The definition, which discredited functional understandings, was the first to 
describe what is now known as the ‘social practice’ model of literacies. Historical 
studies backed this new understanding of literacies, for example Graaf (1979), who 
studied the effects of literacy through the examination of 19
th
 century birth certificates 
and census data.  Graaf found that being able to read and write made little difference to 
the types of employment that individuals were able to gain nor associated income 
levels. Comparing countries with historically high literacies rates such as Sweden, 
alongside countries with lower rates such as Italy, he found little evidence of significant 
differences in the country’s economic progress that could be attributed to literacy levels.  
 
All these developments contributed to the emergence of a new area of academic 
scholarship which became known as New Literacies Studies (NLS). New Literacy 
Studies consists of a series of writings, in both research and practise that treat language 
and literacy as social practices rather than technical skills to be learned in formal 
education. As the founders of this tradition, Hamilton, Barton, Gee, Heath and Street 
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developed the ‘social practice’ or ‘social literacies’ conceptualisation of literacies. Here, 
the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and linguistics were drawn from to create 
frameworks for understanding literacies as it is practised at home, work or in the 
community (Kelder, 1996; Street, 2005; Tagoe, 2008).  
 
New Literacies Studies assumes that: 
 
‘literacy studies is best understood in terms of academic/scholarly/research 
activities that understand literacy as socio-cultural practice, to build on these 
understandings ethically, politically and pedagogically, and to advance them 
conceptually and theoretically.’  
(Lankshear, 1999, p. 210) 
 
The research of anthropologists formed the backbone of NLS as it emerged. For 
example the anthropologist Brian Street developed the idea of there being ‘autonomous’ 
and ‘ideological’ views of literacies (Street, 1984) which broadly coincide with the 
descriptions of ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ models that I have already described 
above.  The ‘autonomous’ notion defines literacies as a series of skills to be taught 
independently from context, whilst the ‘ideological’ understanding of literacies assumes 
that literacy can only be defined and understood in the social context where they are 
used, where such contexts are never neutral (Street 1984, Kelder, 1996). Street used 
these ideas to make judgements about the existing provision of adult literacies education 
in England and asserted a need for anthropological research to be utilised in the 
development of a theory of ‘literacies practice’ (Street, 1984, p. 127).  
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Shirley Brice Heath (1983) is also of foundational influence in New Literacies Studies. 
She conducted ethnographic studies in schools and communities in Appalachia, 
revealing how literacies education replicated hierarchies of power, in particularly those 
associated with socio-economic class in American society. She also drew upon 
sociological understandings in the work of Pierre Bourdieu to reveal how social and 
cultural differences create different meanings for reading and writing, where some 
children’s literate experiences at home fit with expectations at school allowing them to 
succeed where children from other groups are set up to fail. This explained differences 
which impacted future lives linking literacy to power and identity.  
 
The experience of international literacies initiatives informed researchers associated 
with the ‘social practice’ tradition, an example being how foundational NLS researchers 
including Barton (1994) have considered UNESCO’s work. UNESCO has been 
engaged with international literacies projects since 1948 (Hamilton and Hillier, 2006) 
and its work enacted and informed ‘functional’ understandings of literacies education 
(see Gray, 1956; Scribner and Cole, 1981, p. 13; Barton, 1994, pp. 192-199). It has been 
seen as an external agency imposing literacy on others through top down approaches 
which don’t take account of social contexts of literacies use (Hamilton and Hillier, 
2006; Barton, 1994; Wickens and Sandlin, 2007). UNESCO came to acknowledge that 
its functional approach was problematic after it had failed to meet targets for increasing 
literacy rates during the 1960s (e.g. UNESCO, 1976; Barton, 1994, pp. 194-195). In 
1990, International Year of Literacy, UNESCO’s Jomtien conference gave a high 
profile to Paulo Freire’s ideas in its proceedings with later approval from the World 
Bank, the single largest funder of international literacies projects. Regardless of these 
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declarations their programs continued to adopt ‘functional’ approaches throughout the 
1990s (Barton, 1994, pp. 194-195).   
 
As well as being involved with the historical development of literacies studies as an 
academic discipline, anthropologists still undertake research to study the impact of 
literacies projects internationally (e.g. Maddox, 2007, Dyers, 2008, Holland and 
Skinner, 2008, Robinson-Plant, 2008) and have contributed to their design (e.g. Street, 
2005). However NLS draws upon a range of disciplinary influences and theoretical 
underpinnings aside from anthropology. Gee, another foundational NLS researcher, 
describes how NLS arose alongside a ‘heady mix’ of movements drawing from a range 
of academic disciplines which he summarised as the ‘social turn’, where there was a 
move away from researching and understanding the behaviour of individuals and 
towards understanding social and cultural interaction (see Gee, 2000, pp. 180-183). This 
‘social turn’ movement included the development of ‘cultural models theory’, 
‘ethnomethodology’, ‘cognitive linguistics’, ‘new science and technology studies’, 
‘narrative studies’, ‘modern sociology’ and ‘post-structuralist’ and ‘post-modernist’ 
work (ibid), with overlaps between all of these movements and the development of New 
Literacies Studies.   
 
It would be inaccurate to suggest understanding power and empowerment has been a 
major preoccupation amongst all researchers in the ‘social practice’ tradition of adult 
literacies education. For example, the work of Street (1984) and Barton (1994) is not 
orientated exclusively in this direction, instead focussing more on utilising 
anthropological research methods to counter functional understandings of literacies 
education and establishing ‘social practice’ understandings in broad terms. However, 
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according to Lankshear, NLS assumes that ‘understanding literacy as sociocultural 
practice means that reading and writing can only be understood in the context of the 
social, cultural, political, economic, historical practices to which they are integral; of 
which they are a part’ (see Lankshear, 1999, p. 210). He summarises the emergence of 
NLS as a move away from functional interpretations of reading and writing which are 
rooted in developmental psychology and towards understandings rooted in sociology, 
where the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and Basil Bernstein, have held great sway (See ibid, 
p. 65 or see Kelder, 1996). Here the uses and meanings of literacy are always embedded 
in relations of power. In particular, research has placed emphasis on understandings of 
‘discourse’ as ways of speaking, acting and writing which create meanings that can 
include or exclude people from social formations (see Gee, 2000, p. 183). Research 
arising from the NLS tradition does draw upon a range of disciplinary influences, 
including the work of Gee (1996), the New London Group (1996), Lankshear and 
McLaren (1993), Lankshear and Knobel (2003), Janks (2010) and Crowther, Hamilton 
and Tett (2003). However, as Lankshear suggests, they also have a commonality in that 
they all draw upon sociological conceptualisations that allow literacies education to be 
contextualised in understandings of power and I shall return to this shortly when I 
summarise the ideas of some of these academics. 
 
Summary – ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ literacies 
 
So far I have briefly described how academics and educators have described two 
conceptualisations of literacies. Firstly, ‘functional’ understandings where literacies are 
defined by the skills required to read and write so that an individual might function 
effectively in society. Here it is assumed that there are wide reaching consequences of 
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learning to read and write both for individuals and society as a whole, typically 
expressed in the form of improved ways of thinking and behaving that might contribute 
to a successfully functioning society. Secondly, I have briefly described the emergence 
a ‘social practice’ model for understanding literacies, where the definition of literacy 
might be widened beyond reading and writing and where literacies is only meaningful 
in the context in which it is used, including contexts of power. The ‘social practice’ 
model has formed the basis for an emerging academic interest in literacies studies 
orientated towards anthropology, sociology and linguistics known as New Literacies 
Studies (NLS). 
 
Below I will consider how academics associated with this tradition have given attention 
to the possibility of an empowering adult literacies education and have raised problems 
and issues associated with attempts to conceptualise this possibility. The problems and 
issues were raised in direct reference to the practise of adult literacies education as 
revealed through empirical research. For this reason, I commence by giving some 
attention to how adult literacies education has been practised and how it has developed 
as a distinct part of the formal education system.  
 
I give primary attention to adult literacies education and its purpose, as it has evolved in 
the UK, both in its historical policy development and the activity of educators, students 
and academics. To accomplish this I introduce a three-dimensional approach to 
considering the purpose of adult literacies education, as utilised by Raymond Williams 
in his description of the history of adult education in Britain (Williams, 1993, 1993a, 
1993b). This allows me to link the historical emergence of adult literacies education to 
wider developments in adult education. It also brings to my attention the activity of 
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educators and students who were concerned about empowering or emancipatory 
possibilities for education, raising questions, issues and problems about how this might 
be understood and practised, including the questioning of Williams’s own 
conceptualisations.  
 
2.3 Adult literacies education in Britain and educational purpose 
 
Williams (1993, 1993a; see Steele, 1997, pp, 183-184) describes three entwined strands 
or overlapping dimensions that have constituted the development of adult education in 
Britain. He describes the ‘Old Humanists’ education that developed from religious 
traditions where the purpose of education, as a minority pursuit, was to uphold cultural 
traditions which are taken to be intrinsically valuable. Here the written word is given 
respect and invested with power. This power transcends politics or economics where the 
literate person may derive meaning from intellectual activity made possible by the 
written word and where education is a repository for values. A second strand is 
education as ‘Industrial Training’ where the purpose of education is to fit people into 
the workplace and the activity of earning a living through the gaining of relevant 
vocational skill and knowledge.  
 
Williams described twentieth century adult education in Britain as a shotgun marriage 
between these two traditions, neglecting a third tradition of ‘popular’ or ‘public 
education’. Williams summarises ‘public education’ as having two parallel traditions in 
Britain, spoken with two voices. The first argues that the public are depraved, setting up 
funds for education by pointing to the depravity of the working classes where ‘then it 
was drink, now it is television’ (Williams, 1993, p. 229). This sentiment is expressed in 
(pre-television) late nineteenth century Britain with the emergence of the University 
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Extension Movement and its counterpart the British Association of Settlements. 
Influenced by Christian socialists, the Extension Movement was founded in 1873 by 
James Stewart, with the intention of spreading the ‘democratic’ traditions of the Scottish 
Enlightenment across the Britain by encouraging women and working class people to 
participate in university education through extra-mural classes (see Cooke, 2006, p. 
118). The Workers Educational Association emerged in 1903, also supporting these 
aims, but developing its own network of provision (Hamilton and Hillier, 2006). These 
developments were part of a movement which went on to establish Ruskin College in 
Oxford for working people in 1899, with several other residential labour colleges 
emerging in association with universities around Britain (Williams, 1993b, Fieldhouse, 
1996). In contrast the University Settlement Movement brought the university into 
working class neighbourhoods, missionary style, through the acquisition of buildings or 
‘settlements’ in those areas (McIlroy, 1996, Waugh, 2009, Lankshear, 1999) with the 
aims of ‘humanizing and refining’ people (see Williams, 1993, p. 259). The fear was 
that the intrinsically valuable traditions of ‘Old Humanism’ might be destroyed by a 
working class who did not understand them as they acted out their anger at the injustices 
of Victorian society through revolutionary activity.  Both the Extension and the 
Settlement movement had the implicit intention to diffuse such oppositional responses 
by incorporating working class people into existing cultural traditions through an 
education system (Waugh, 2009, Cooke, 2006, pp. 118-119).  
 
Williams describes the possible second voice of public education, where ‘all education 
depends on the acknowledgement of an ultimate human equality’ (see William, 1993, p. 
124) and where students ‘aren’t given the conclusion of arguments, instead reaching 
their own’ (see ibid, p. 262). Aspects of this notion might have been expressed in some 
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of the responses to the University Extension Movement and the Labour Colleges by 
working class students (see Waugh 2009; McIlroy, 1996). Ruskin College was the site 
of unrest in 1909 when the students declared opposition to being ‘sandpapered’, a term 
used about them by the dons when describing their wish to defuse the students’ aims of 
‘human liberation’ and turn their contempt for the existing college traditions into 
respect (Waugh, 2009). They went on strike demanding to be ‘unsandpapered’ through 
an end to exams, changes to essay writing and the translation of foreign language texts, 
including Marx, so that they could read them for themselves (Plebs League 1909). They 
proceeded to found an educational organisation called ‘The Pleb’s League’ and perhaps 
the notion of education as ‘unsandpapering’ was further developed in early editions of 
their journal. Their founding of an associated Central Labour College in London formed 
the basis of what became known as the Independent Working Class Education 
movement (McIlroy, 1996). In Scotland, a parallel Scottish Labour College was 
founded (Cooke, 2006, p. 134) which ran classes in algebra, grammar, public speaking 
and Esperanto, as well as politics and Marxist economics.  
 
Williams also criticised this tradition in British adult education, associated with the 
organisation of industrial workers, describing a danger where education might become 
orientated towards delivering students ‘some kind of boiled-down pap which would 
indicate some already decided course of action to them’ (Williams, 1993, pp. 263-4).  
For Williams, Public Education’s second voice had to acknowledge that it is not 
acceptable to ‘get away with speaking to people other than as equals’ (Williams, 1993, 
p. 230) an idea he believed to have been undermined by people’s relationships with 
modern communications, alongside the problematic notion of ‘mass’ culture, which 
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denies the idea of equality, leaving adult education by and large to the Old Humanists 
and the Industrial Trainers.  
 
However, I can’t explore how Williams’ idea of a ‘Public Education’ might be further 
understood at this point; I return to this in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.3). Rather, I note in 
general terms that Williams raises the possibility that education might acknowledge and 
encourage equality as well as prepare people for employment or incorporate them into a 
particular cultural tradition. Later in this chapter I describe the ideas of educators and 
academics who raise similar possibilities in the context of adult literacies education.  
 
I continue to utilise Old Humanism, Industrial Training and Public Education as useful 
notions in which to contextualise the emergence of adult literacies education as a formal 
part of the education system in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. Again, when it comes to 
describing adult literacies education as Public Education, this raises questions about 
what ‘equality’ might mean and how it might be understood and practised, which is the 
intention of this literature review, that I address in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Old Humanists  
 
In England in 1972, around 5000 literacies students studied in the army, prisons and 
hospitals or in Local Education Authority (LEA) funded classes which were sustained 
and appreciated by small numbers of pioneering field-workers and tutors. However, in 
only three years, ‘illiteracy’ was transformed from a non-issue to that of a major social 
problem (Levine, 1986, pp. 150-151) or literacies crisis (Lankshear and Knobel, 2003, 
50 
 
p. 6). This change coincided with ‘literacies’ being used widely as a concept, replacing 
the terminology of ‘reading and writing’ (ibid). 
 
The British Association of Settlements (BAS) was instrumental in the lobbying of the 
UK government in the early seventies that successfully achieved central funding of 
adult literacies education in England for the first time. It was in the Settlements that 
BAS members gained first-hand experience of illiteracy, defined as not being proficient 
in reading and writing (Levine, 1986), with involvement in literacy education reputed to 
commence when an individual came into a London Settlement asking for help to read a 
document (Withnall, 1994). Literacies education was organised with one to one tuition 
and volunteer tutors under the assumption that students would (or perhaps should) be 
embarrassed and wish to keep their ‘illiteracy’ a secret (ibid).   
 
In 1973 the BAS organised a conference entitled Status Illiterate – Prospects Zero 
which contributed to a coalition of voluntary agencies and lobbyists who established a 
partnership with the BBC. The relationship between the BAS and the BBC publicised 
the issue of literacies education through a popular television campaign from 1974 
including a telephone referral service. The government was obliged to respond by 
distributing £1 million for literacies education, allocating the money from an under 
spend in the university budget, with delivery through Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs). The result was that between 1972 and 1976 the number of students receiving 
literacies tuition trebled from 5000 to 15000 marking the beginning of the expansion of 
literacies education where its requirement was elevated to that of a major social problem 
(see Hamilton and Hillier, 2006, p. 9).  
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Industrial Training 
 
Post-industrialism was also integral to the creation the aforementioned ‘literacy crisis’ 
where the decline of manufacturing industry in the UK required a restructuring of the 
labour market. The workforce was seen as being poorly prepared for employment in the 
expanding service sectors (Lankshear and Knobel, 2003, p. 6). Government reports 
showed that universal free school education, which had been statutory since 1870, was 
no guarantee of a literate population. Here two Department of Education and Science 
(DES) reports were influential (Levine, 1986, 150 -151); Start and Wells (1972) who 
reported that 3-4% of 15 year olds had a reading age of nine years and the reporting of 
the Russell Committee on Adult Education (1973) which raised literacy as an issue. In 
Scotland, the Alexander Report (1975) highlighted a problem where the ‘disadvantaged’ 
had effectively been excluded from adult education through poverty, age, disability or 
rural isolation (Cooke, 2006, p. 158).  These reports contributed to the development of a 
strong vocational driver behind the mushrooming of literacies education in the Thatcher 
years of high unemployment in the 1980s.  
 
This was a period when literacies education was developed and substantially supported 
by LEA Adult Education Services and voluntary organisations with leadership and 
development of a new national agency, the Adult Literacy and Basic Skills Unit 
(ALBSU) which oversaw what was known as Adult Basic Education (ABE) (Hamilton 
and Hillier, 2006). In 1980 this expanded to include ‘numeracy’, a term first coined in 
the UK government’s Crowther Report (1959) on education (see Coben, 2003). 
Statutory provision increased during the 1980s in tandem with training programs 
intended to lower the unemployment figures. Literacy education was delivered through 
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Department of Employment (DoE) initiatives via its agencies, such as the Manpower 
Services Commission (MSC), with additional funding from the European Union and the 
Department of Education.  The focus on employability also caused tensions between the 
agencies and educators and students who sometimes engaged in innovative and 
controversial teaching approaches which I describe below. When the funding for 
literacies was eventually cut back in the late 1980s and accreditation was standardised, 
it was these innovative approaches that tended to lose out (e.g. see Woodin, 2008).  
 
In Scotland, the Alexander Report resulted in adult literacies education being 
incorporated into an existing well established youth and community service in the late 
1970s, which led to adult literacies education being isolated from continuing education 
opportunities in further and higher education. Initially there was also a decrease in adult 
education classes in the 1970s, though by the mid-nineties a quarter of a million adults 
were participating in community education classes annually (Cooke, 2006).  
 
The vocational strand in literacies education has continued to dominate in England 
through the 1997 Labour government’s Skills for Life initiative (SfL) which was 
launched in 2001 (DfES, 2001). SfL was informed by the Moser Report (1999) into 
adult literacy and numeracy in England and Wales which drew on IALS (International 
Adult Literacy Surveys) conducted under the auspices of the OECD
3
. Moser concluded 
that with regard to the UK: 
 
‘Something like one adult in five is not functionally literate’…‘it is one of the 
                                                          
3
 See Wagner, 2003; Boudard and Jones, 2003 for discussions of these tests and Kirch, 2003 for details 
about their design 
53 
 
reasons for relatively low productivity in our economy, and it cramps the lives of 
millions of people’.  
(Moser, 1999, p. 1). 
 
SfL aimed at addressing this issue by bringing more than a million adults into literacies 
education provision.   
 
Moser also concluded that the empirical data backing the claim that 20% of adults are 
‘not functionally illiterate’ arose from the administering of inadequate test instruments, 
particularly those aimed at measuring numeracy attainment (see Moser, 1999, p. 7). The 
response was to design and implement further tests under the Skills for Life (SfL), 
drawing upon IALS and PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment, 2001) 
assessment designs.  
 
There has been some acknowledgement that the conduct of national and international 
surveys has served to raise the profile of other academic research into adult literacy, in 
particular numeracy (Swain et al, 2008) and to legitimise what has been an under 
researched field (Hamilton and Hillier, 2007). However, the SfL assessments have been 
controversial on two main counts. Firstly, on the difficulty of creating tests that can 
assess literate skills with validity and without excluding important aspects of literacy 
(Coben et al, 2007, Swain et al, 2008, Hamilton and Barton, 2000, p. 386). There is 
research dating back to the 1970s (e.g. Lave et al, 1982) suggesting that people who are 
able to perform literate tasks in real situations, e.g. household budgeting, fail to perform 
them correctly in test situations even if the tests are constructed to simulate everyday 
life experience. Also, relating to this, there are no suitable tests for assessing areas of 
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literacy such as problem solving, making judgements about probabilities and 
likelihoods, or the presence of causal relationships in everyday life (Condelli, 2006). 
The problem here is that if curricula are based upon testable outcomes, important 
aspects of literacy might be excluded. 
 
Secondly the very concept of testing is understood to support ‘functional’ 
understandings of literacy education, where literacies can be pinned down to a set of 
independent skills which can be taught separately from the contexts in which they are 
used with the expectation of predetermined outcomes (Hamilton and Barton, 2000, p. 
387). This is illustrated by how the SfL literacy and numeracy curriculum is defined as 
a list of testable skills (Learning and Skills Improvement Agency, 2012).  Surveys 
conducted by the National Research and Development Centre for Adult Literacy and 
Numeracy (NRDC) sit with this understanding by making direct links between people 
with levels of literacy categorised as ‘low’ and their ability to deal with ‘stumbling 
blocks’ in life (Parsons and Bynner, 2008). An NRDC survey also suggests a direct link 
between adults assessed as having low literacy levels and impediments to the cognitive 
development of their children (De Coulon et al, 2008).  Both survey teams define 
literacies by the aforementioned list of testable skills and they assess cohorts of adults 
against these as part of the research. There is an implicit idea here, which is that if these 
discrete literacy skills were taught and learnt then this might result in the alleviation of 
the aforementioned problems.  
 
Alarm has been raised by academics who advocate for the ‘social model’ of literacies 
that SfL courses and policy discourse might encourage literacies teachers to orientate 
towards functional approaches to the teaching of literacies (Riley and Torrance, 2003; 
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Oughton, 2007; Fulford, 2010). What’s more, students might be deemed personally 
responsible for predicaments such as unemployment if they fail to take up the life-long 
learning opportunities offered by the SfL initiative (Hamilton and Pitt, 2009).  
 
Whilst adult literacies education policy in England holds to ‘functional’ definitions with 
emphasis placed upon the teaching of skills through predefined courses, Scotland holds 
to a ‘social practice’ model in its adult literacy policy, a development associated with 
how adult literacies education continues to be delivered through informal community 
settings (Cooke, 2006). This provision is organised through local council youth and 
community services rather than through colleges of further education and takes place in 
settings such as libraries and community centres. The policy that guides this provision 
draws upon a ‘social practice’ model of literacies, defining literacy as:  
 
‘The ability to read, write and use numbers, to handle information, express ideas 
and opinions, make decisions and solve problems, as family members, workers, 
citizens and lifelong learners.’    
(Scottish Executive, 2001, p7, my italics) 
 
This definition highlights literacy as being contextualised in people’s lives as family 
members, citizens and workers rather than as a series of predetermined skills. The 
Scottish Qualification Authority (SQA, 2008) does offer a testable definition of 
literacies as ‘core skills’ which maps onto the national curriculum framework and the 
Scottish curriculum for schools identifies literacies in a similar fashion (Scottish 
Executive, 2004). However assessment of these may be accomplished through the 
building of a portfolio of evidence rather than formal testing (see ibid, 127). For 
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literacies educators in community settings there is no compulsion to use formal tests for 
any purpose. Instead, the literacies curriculum and associated assessment rests on the 
possibility of a relationship between teacher and student where the students’ 
employment, family concerns or hobbies can be discussed and a unique individualised 
literacies curriculum devised and documented by the tutor in terms that are meaningful 
to both. This process of negotiation is also required to set goals for the student’s 
literacies education and to decide whether these have been met (Scottish Executive, 
2001).  
 
However, there are still broad similarities between the policy and delivery of adult 
literacies education across the UK.  Like England, Scottish policy is still justified by 
data obtained from the IALS Survey which concludes that 23% of the adult population 
in Scotland have low literacy and numeracy skills (ibid) and the White Paper on adult 
education in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2011) states ‘employability’ as a primary 
purpose of adult literacies education. In terms of policy enactment, research has 
demonstrated that tutors in Scotland typically do not negotiate and devise unique 
contextualised curricula with students (Tett et al, 2006), whilst in England a wide range 
of educational activity has been observed in adult literacy classroom settings, regardless 
of government policy (e.g. see Coben et al, 2007). Despite this, there has been a 
tendency to imply that Scotland has a more progressive adult literacies education than 
England because of the policy adherence to a social practice model (e.g. see 
Maclachlan, 2009) perhaps indicative of how academic discussion about literacy 
education has a tendency to orientate towards discussing the ‘functional’ versus ‘social 
model’ divide (as described by Maddox, 2007). 
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So far I have presented a history of some of the understandings that have informed adult 
literacies education as well as a brief history of the policy context, contextualised in 
Williams’ three dimensions of educational purpose of adult education in Britain. I have 
described how the development of literacies education has been strongly influenced by 
the overlapping dual purposes of incorporating working class people into cultural 
traditions that are valued by existing society (Old Humanism) and the need to educate 
them so that they can operate effectively in work environments, often described as 
employability (Industrial Training). Next I describe examples of the third dimension of 
public education. I have mentioned Williams’ notion that public education should 
encompass an ‘acknowledgement of an ultimate human equality’ (Williams, 1993c, p. 
124). As I have stated already, this idea alone raises questions about what an education 
for equality might mean, what it might involve and how it might be understood or 
enacted. The purpose of this next section is to consider how similar notions have been 
raised by educators, students and academics in the context of adult literacies education. 
This will invite further questions about what public education might mean and how it 
might be enacted which will be addressed in later chapters. So the main purpose of the 
next two sections is to raise questions for later exploration.   
 
Public education?  
 
The third dimension of purpose in the development of adult literacies education in the 
UK is linked to the advent of New Literacies Studies (NLS). Here academics have 
attempted to understand an adult literacies education that might create possibilities 
described variously as emancipation, empowerment or liberation (e.g. Freire, 1972; 
Lankshear and McLaren, 1993; Luke and Freebody, 1997; New London Group; 1996; 
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Gee, 1996; Crowther, Hamilton & Tett, 2001) and I return to this the latter part of this 
chapter. But perhaps the third dimension originates with teachers, fieldworkers and 
students as the enactment of adult literacies education in Britain is ultimately driven by 
grassroots activism and commitments to social justice (see Hillier, 2009, p. 548).  
 
Much of the work of pioneering field workers and students in prisons, the army and 
Local Education Authorities remains unknown. Though early academic interest in adult 
literacies education tended towards functional understandings that supported ‘Great 
Divide’ theories, it cannot be assumed that pioneering educators and students engaged 
in educational activity that followed suit. Street (1984, pp. 215-228) described how 
‘social practice’ models of literacies education were already evident in Britain, 
particularly through the activity of student publishing (see below). It seems that a 
‘social practice’ model of literacies education was practised in Britain before NLS 
academics had defined it. 
 
In the early years of central funding of adult literacies education in England, in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the government had no specific literacies policy which meant 
that educators had some free reign to develop their own ideas. Organised educational 
activity depended on local authorities and the pressure groups that lobbied them, with 
formal approaches to teaching being developed by local networks of practitioners 
(Hamilton and Hillier, 2006, p. 10). Here evidence can be found of educators and 
students holding a concern for an adult literacies education for social transformation 
rather than socialisation.  The most significant development was the student publishing 
movement in the 1980s, where student writers published for a student readership 
including Write First Time and those published by Gatehouse Books (see Woodin, 
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2008). This movement was particular to the UK literacy scene, which means there is an 
archive of student writing, unavailable in other national settings, which might offer 
insights into students’ experiences, opinions and motivations in relation to literacies 
education (see Hamilton, 1996, p. 143). 
 
Gatehouse still publishes under the ethos of ‘a beginner reader is not a beginner thinker’ 
(Gatehouse, 2012) a phrase coined by Peter Goode (Goode, 1980), a literacies student 
who wrote with a scribe. Scribes were commonly employed, there being no compulsion 
for students to learn to read or write, where ‘spoken rather than standard English was 
emphasised as a source of empowerment’ (see Woodin, 2008, p. 223). Student editors 
were unlikely to select ‘birthday card verse’ that had been submitted for publication as 
they embraced pride in the working class as a means of mobilising students to have a 
sense of themselves as oppressed and denied rights rather than as victims ‘in need of a 
dose of literacy’ (ibid). The influence of Paulo Freire can be found here, particularly in 
how writings were read and studied by other students (ibid). There is also a distinctly 
British tradition evident where intrinsic value is placed on working class and rural 
culture, reminiscent of the work of Raymond Williams (1993, 1993b) and Richard 
Hoggart (1957).  
 
However, this educational activity was controversial and an Adult Literacy and Basic 
Skills Unit (ALBSU) newsletter in 1991 described how student publishing kept students 
in an ‘educational ghetto’ (Woodin, 2008). These concerns had already reached wide 
audiences after news media coverage of an anti-Thatcher poem composed by literacy 
students, referring to her blue coat turning red with blood (see Frost and Hoy, 1980).  
Funding possibilities for student writing dwindled in the late 1980s with the 
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introduction of accreditation, certification and a core curriculum in England (Woodin, 
2008). However, student writing has persisted in a different format, with government 
funded schemes such as those encouraging Scottish students who are also prisoners to 
write stories (CLAN, 2008). 
 
In the 1980s approaches for teaching adult literacies were being developed which linked 
literacies education to the possibility of societal change. Frost and Hoy’s (1980) writing 
resource pack ‘Opening Time’ was written by students with Robert Merry’s 
introduction describing a problem with adult basic education where ‘It’s too much of 
one person knowing what the other person would like to know and keeping it that way’ 
(ibid, p. 2).  There is no continuity between the writers of the pack and those of NLS. 
However, the pack argues that reading and writing is best learnt in the course of doing 
something that is important to the student and not as an isolated skill. The pack content 
is sometimes overtly political, for example the section that discusses ‘What is it OK to 
write about?’ written by young people on a Youth Training Scheme (YTS), contains 
anti-Thatcherite poems and stories about police violence. The influence of Paulo Freire, 
Raymond Williams and Herbert Kohl is apparent by how they are recommended for 
further reading at the end of the pack (ibid).  
 
During the same period in the 1980s the Gorgie Dalry Adult Learning Project in 
Edinburgh was developed as the only full-scale and consistent effort to sustain a 
Freirian educational project in the UK (Kirkwood and Kirkwood, 1989; Cooke, 2006, p. 
163). The project, which continues in 2012, resulted in tangible outcomes for the local 
area including new road markings and the zoning of a park, the creation of a money-free 
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bartering system and local people teaching courses to widen the local skills base 
(Kirkwood and Kirkwood, 1989).  
 
When interviewing literacy educators and fieldworkers as part of their research into the 
history of literacies education in England, Hamilton and Hillier (2006, p. 116) heard 
Freire cited as a personal influence with his name mentioned more than any other. 
Freire (1972, 1970) describes education with emancipation as a purpose, but it is 
difficult to ascertain how extensive this influence was or is amongst educators and 
students and what kinds of engagement there have been with Freire’s theory and ideas. 
Hamilton and Hillier (2006, p. 116) go on to suggest that literacies educators in the UK 
are first and foremost ‘eclectic pragmatists’ (ibid) where ‘learners helped to read to their 
grandchildren are not seeking empowerment to challenge inequalities in society, or 
employment skills, whereas other learners are being helped to do precisely these things’ 
(ibid). This implies that an emancipatory or empowering education is pertinent only if 
students demand it. It also suggests that adult literacies education for empowerment or 
against inequality is something that can be delivered to students on request, rather than, 
say, an alternative approach that could be integral to the educational relationship 
between students, teachers and educational materials, regardless of the subject matter 
being taught.  
 
It could be that Freire’s influence is indicative through how literacies educators often 
hold a general concern for the purpose of adult literacies education, hoping to avoid 
educational practices that might be considered oppressive and to encourage those that 
might contribute to ‘emancipatory’ or ‘empowering’ outcomes. Frost and Hoy’s (1980) 
writing pack and the activity of the student publishing movement indicates that 
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educators and students have given attention to these types of concern, though it isn’t 
clear precisely what the aims are or how they might be met through educational activity. 
But the point here is that possibility of an empowering or emancipatory education is 
being raised and the purpose of adult literacies education is being questioned. 
  
I have considered the history of adult literacies in the context of its purposes, by making 
use of Raymond William’s three-dimensional conceptualisations of ‘Old Humanism’, 
‘Industrial Training’ and ‘Public Education’.  Here ‘Old Humanism’ refers to a tradition 
where the purpose of adult education is to uphold existing cultural traditions, whilst 
‘Industrial Training’ is concerned with education aimed towards preparing people for 
employment. The third tradition of ‘Public Education’ is one that acknowledges 
equality between human beings, raising the question of how this might be understood 
and enacted. I have also described examples of what might be ‘public education’ in the 
context of adult literacies education in the UK. Purposes are described variously in 
terms of ‘empowerment’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’ or ‘emancipation’ again raising the 
question of what these notions mean in the context of understanding and practicing 
adult literacies education. Academics and educators have also given attention to 
exploring these kinds of questions and in the next section I briefly describe their ideas 
and the problems that have been raised in association with them. 
 
2.4 Public Education – academics and educational purpose 
 
In this section I describe how academics from the ‘social practice’ tradition of adult 
literacies education have given attention to understanding adult literacies education as 
‘public education’. Though they don’t use Williams’ terminology, they do describe the 
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purpose of literacies education through three dimensions which are broadly congruent to 
William’s, but where the third dimension of ‘public education’ corresponds with 
approaches described as ‘radical’, ‘critical’ or ‘powerful’ rather than ‘public’. These 
approaches are influenced by ideas from sociology and linguistics which link adult 
literacies education to ideas about power, identity and discourse. I include the work of 
James Paul Gee, Colin Lankshear and the international consortium known as the New 
London Group, as well as the work of Luke and Freebody in Australia, Crowther, 
Hamilton and Tett in the UK and Hilary Janks in South Africa. In addition, I briefly 
consider the work of Paulo Freire and how it has been understood and criticised by 
academics and educators. The discussion begins to elaborate upon how an empowering 
or emancipatory education might be understood, introducing the possibility that 
‘empowerment’ understandings might encourage socialising educational practices, 
suggesting the importance of distinguishing between emancipation and empowerment in 
the context of adult literacies education. 
 
I have already discussed (in Section 2.2) how the purpose of what has become known as 
‘functional’ models of literacies education is to give students the literacies skills 
deemed necessary for them to function effectively in society as it stands. This 
assumption rests upon the idea that there are wide-reaching consequences of learning to 
read and write, limiting the definition of literacies to reading and writing skills. I have 
also described the emergence of an alternative ‘social practice’ model of literacies 
education (in Section 2.2.) which assumes that literacy has no effects or meaning 
outside of the particular cultural contexts in which literacies are used. This raises the 
question of what the ‘social practice’ model might mean for the purpose of adult 
literacies education and it is in the consideration of this question that researchers 
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drawing from the ‘social practice’ tradition tend towards three-dimensional 
conceptualisations. 
 
Scribner (1988) described three overlapping metaphors for literacy. Literacy as 
‘adaption’, refers to the functional skills needed to perform effectively in daily life, 
whilst another metaphor is literacies as a ‘state of grace’, relating to education that is 
separate from the workplace or economic factors. Here the written word holds intrinsic 
virtue and literate people safeguard intellectual traditions and associated knowledge. 
Literacy as ‘power’ is a third metaphor, strongly influenced by the ideas of Paulo Freire, 
where literacy is made a resource for social transformation, allowing communities to 
engage in action that changes social relationships, though it is unclear what kind of 
change this might be. Scribner suggests that these three metaphors are not at odds, 
implying multiple educational approaches be they for functional skills, self-
improvement or social power, which I suggest are broadly congruent with Williams’ 
three domains.  
 
Three dimensions of purpose are found broadly elsewhere. For example, in their policy 
history of literacies in England, Hamilton and Hillier (2006, pp. 115-116) who adhere to 
a social practice model, refer to three approaches in the English tradition, describing 
then as ‘vocational’, ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’. Here again, Freire is linked to the ‘radical’ 
approach. Similarly, Freebody and Lo Bianco (ibid, 2006, p. 5), influential in the 
context of Australian literacy policy development, describe three ‘families’ of thought 
about literacy: ‘skills’ necessary to literate practices, literacies for ‘personal growth and 
cultural heritage’, and a third ‘critical’ or ‘cultural’ family, where once again, Freire is 
mentioned as an influence. Lankshear also borrows from the work of Brian Green 
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(Lankshear, 1999) to describe three dimensions (3D) of literacy; the ‘operational’, 
‘cultural’ and the ‘critical’, but with specific meanings which I describe in the next 
section. 
 
Summarising all these three-dimensional conceptualisations, the first dimension of 
educational purpose is aimed towards the operational skills needed for daily use 
including employment, which seems to correspond with Williams’ Industrial Training, 
whilst the second is aimed at the literacies pre-requisite to the continuance of existing 
cultural traditions, or Williams Old Humanism. The third domain or strand is described 
as a ‘radical’, ‘critical’ or ‘powerful’ approach, again raising the question of how these 
approaches might be understood and practised. Broadly, the third dimension of 
literacies education seems to be concerned, not with continuing existing cultural 
traditions, or to fit into existing workplaces, but rather to create alternatives to these that 
are understood to be socially empowering. This seems to contrast with Williams’ 
terminology of promoting equality. Again this raises the question of how all these 
notions might be further understood.   
 
But some attention has already been given to understanding this third, ‘critical’, 
‘powerful’ or ‘radical’ strand of literacies education by academics working in the 
‘social practice’ tradition (e.g. Lankshear and McLaren, 1993, Luke and Freebody, 
1997, New London Group, 1996, Gee, 1996, Crowther, Hamilton and Tett, 2003, 
Giroux, 1988).  Though the work of Paulo Freire is cited as being of key influence to 
this third dimension amongst educators and students (see Scribner, 1988, Hamilton and 
Hillier, 2006, p. 116 ibid, p. 5), it seems that Freire is not of primary influence amongst 
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academics. So, before I describe the ideas of the academics I shall briefly summarise the 
influences that they tend to draw upon.  
 
Literacies education and empowerment 
 
I have already described how New Literacies Studies has drawn upon a range of 
disciplinary influences (see Section 2.2). Also, some researchers working in this 
tradition have drawn broadly upon sociological ideas to inform approaches that allow 
adult literacies education to be understood in contexts of power, where the ideas of 
Pierre Bourdieu, and before him Basil Bernstein, have held great sway (Lankshear, 
1999, p. 65). In this section I consider some of the work of such researchers, describing 
how understandings of power have been informed by theory from the field of 
linguistics, particularly through the work of James Paul Gee (e.g. 1996).  The influence 
of Gee along with Bourdieu has led to the idea of a potentially empowering adult 
literacies education which is predicated upon understandings of how ‘identity’ and 
‘discourse’ create and replicate power in society. Because Bourdieu and Gee are of 
particular importance, I shall briefly describe their work. 
 
Gee describes how ‘folk’ understandings of language assume that signs (e.g. words, 
facial expressions etc.) exactly match concepts that are held in the mind (as explained 
by Gee, 1996, pp. 271-275), the corollary being that if a language does not contain a 
word then the speakers cannot conceptualise what the word identifies. This 
understanding is found in relation to people who speak languages which do not hold 
vocabulary for numbers, such the Piraha people (Everett, 2008; Frank et al, 2008) or 
some sign languages for the deaf (see Bates, 2011) where claims have been made that 
the speakers are incapable of becoming numerate or of numerate ways of thinking. This 
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illustrates how the ‘literacies myth’ of the Great Divide, which assumes that reading and 
writing effects peoples’ ability to thinks, might be backed up by the assumptions people 
make about language. For Gee, this means that adopting a different linguistic theory 
might offer alternative understandings about literacies and literacies education that 
might counter the ‘literacy myth’ and offer the possibility of a third ‘empowering’ or 
‘liberating’ strand of literacies education (see Gee, 1996). This is Gee’s starting point 
for describing an alternative theory of literacies education which presents what he 
describes as a ‘post-structuralist’ understanding of language which incorporates a 
conceptualisation of power and how it is reproduced through discourse. Critical 
discourse analysis is used both as a research tool and an educational practice that 
incorporates understandings about how discourse reproduces relationships of power and 
knowledge in society (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 4). 
 
As with Gee, Bourdieu attempts to counter ‘structuralist’ or deterministic 
understandings of language. As a sociologist, he is informed by and also criticises the 
work of early sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber. Bourdieu draws upon Marxist 
concepts, but attempts to develop Marx’s work so that it might incorporate a role for 
language and discourse within understandings about the relationship between people’s 
agency and the structure of society and how society changes (Bourdieu, 1991, Bourdieu 
in Wacquant (1989, p. 45, Snook, 1998, p. 168; Garnham and Williams, 1980). Both 
Gee and Bourdieu present education as a process of identity formation through 
discourse which is understood to reinforce societal power relationships.  
 
These types of ideas rather than Freire’s have been influential amongst NLS researchers 
who have given attention to the possibility of a literacies education that might be 
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‘radical’, ‘powerful’ or ‘critical’. In the next section I describe this briefly through 
summarising the work of a selection of such researchers from the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa and the USA. 
 
‘Powerful literacy’ - Crowther, Hamilton and Tett 
 
Crowther, Hamilton and Tett’s approach is embedded in findings from empirical 
research into the practice of literacies education around the UK, reflecting the concerns 
of the RaPAL (Research and Practice in Adult Literacy) grouping of which they are 
founding members. In their book, ‘Powerful Literacies’ (2003), emphasis is placed 
upon social practice models of literacy with influence from Gee and Lankshear. They 
state opposition to policy that emphasises the vocational strand of adult education and 
the aims of employability and economic progress. The difficulty with adult literacies 
education aimed at employability, the economy and international league tables as 
constructed by the International Adult Literacy Surveys (IALS), is that it fails to address 
the power relations in people’s lives and what they might be able to do about them (ibid, 
p. 1).  
 
Instead, they state an aim of opening a space for the divergent and critical voices of 
students and educators engaged in the practice of adult literacies education to be heard 
in a policy context. This means grounding literacies education in people’s everyday 
lives where associated research should engage with these situations, be they in the 
workplace, community or home, as this will reveal what makes literacy education 
meaningful to students. Drawing heavily on the work of Gee, the logic here is that 
understandings and practices of adult literacies education that don’t place importance on 
revealing power imbalances in people’s lives are ultimately ‘disempowering’. In other 
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words, if educators and researchers aren’t actively engaged with the endeavour of 
revealing power structures then this amounts to contributing to maintaining those 
structures, because literacies education that ‘obscures the power relations in its 
construction ultimately disempowers’ (ibid, p. 3). There is a tacit assumption here that 
the social practice model of literacy with the employment of ethnography and discourse 
analysis are in some way ‘empowering’ whilst functional models, which underpin most 
nations’ literacy policies have disempowering consequences. This is indicative of a 
tendency for discussions about the purpose of adult literacies education to be short-
circuited into debates across the ‘functional’ versus ‘social practice’ dichotomy (as 
described by Maddox, 2007, or as found in Tett and Maclachlan, 2008; Maclachlan, 
2009 or Fulford, 2010). 
 
‘Critical literacy’ - Luke and Freebody 
 
Luke and Freebody’s work is indicative of how literacy education is understood in the 
Australian policy context, describing an approach to critical literacy that marks out: 
 
‘a coalition of interests committed to engaging with possibilities that the 
technologies of writing and other modes of inscription offer for social change, 
cultural diversity, economic equity, and political enfranchisement’  
(Luke and Freebody, 1997, p. 1). 
 
Influenced by Bourdieu, (see Carrington and Luke, 1997) they acknowledge that 
inequality in the literacies classroom contributes to the reproduction of social inequality 
and various forms of injustice in society. The argument is that this might be addressed 
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by seeking approaches that provide ‘analyses of how schools function as social 
institutions regulating access to resources and knowledge, and of how literacy can be 
made to count in the stratification of wealth and power in late capitalist societies’ (Luke 
and Freebody, 1997, p. 6). Here the issue is how Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’ 
can be reproduced through literacies, enabling entry into current society (ibid, p. 9), an 
idea that has been taken up at policy level in adult literacies education in Australia (see 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2010).  But literacies education should not be limited to 
giving students the technical literacies so that they might join and be socialised into 
existing institutions. Rather, the challenge is to create possibilities for using discourse 
and literacy to reinvent institutions, by critiquing and reforming rules for the conversion 
of ‘cultural and textual capital’ in communities and workplaces. Here they draw upon 
Heath (1986), Gee (1996) and Kress (e.g. 2003), arguing that this might be attained 
through a social practice approach to literacies (Luke and Freebody, 1997b, p. 212). As 
with Crowther, Tett and Hamilton, this re-states a dichotomy between social and 
functional models of literacies education, where the former is empowering and the latter 
disempowers, but explicit use is made of Bourdieu’s concepts to describe these 
possibilities.  
 
‘Multiliteracies’ - New London Group 
 
Luke and Gee were both part of an international consortium of academic researchers, 
including Gunther Kress, Mary Kalantis and Bill Cope, who convened at the New 
London guest house (in New England) to collaborate on a new approach to literacies 
education. Describing themselves as the New London Group, their approach was named 
multiliteracies and set out in the form of a manifesto (NLG, 1996). The Group 
described their endeavour as inherently political and concerned with the literacies 
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required in a ‘fast capitalist’ world. The notion of multiliteracies was developed through 
what they claim to be post-structuralist understandings of both language and the 
economic system. Multiliteracies has been influential in Australia where group 
members have been engaged with literacies research alongside policy formation and its 
enactment at governance level, indeed Allan Luke (2011) has described his 
granddaughter bringing home a school report specifying how her ‘multiliteracies’ was 
in need of improvement.  
 
The notion of ‘multiliteracies’ is influenced by understandings about linguistics, 
semiotics and sociology, further developing a social practice understanding of literacies 
but linking it to possibilities for empowerment in what is understood to be the ‘post-
fordist’ world of ‘fast capitalism’ (see NLG, 1996, p. 5). Importance is placed upon the 
assumptions that literacies educators and researchers make about language. If 
definitions of literacy assume that language is a stable system based upon rules, then 
this will ‘characteristically translate into a more or less authoritarian kind of pedagogy’ 
(see NLG, 1996, p. 3). The multliteracies group express the idea that if this potentially 
authoritarian linguistic theory is linked to orthodox Marxist class-based views of society 
then it encourages deterministic understandings of the economic system as well as 
practices in literacies education that serve to socialise people into rigid and inflexible 
workplaces. Instead they hold to what they would describe as ‘post-structuralist’ 
understandings of language and alongside this offer a conceptualisation of current day 
capitalism broadly described as ‘post-Fordist’. This provides the basis for arguing that 
workplaces nowadays require broad and creative communication skills, including those 
necessary to team working and new technologies, where people must successfully 
operate as negotiators. Here, they argue, ‘design’ (as understood by Fairclough, 2000) 
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has become central to the workplace, where it is claimed that the term is free of negative 
associations that sit with stable understandings of literacies based around grammar.  
 
The upshot is a broad definition of literacies that might include anything from to text 
messaging to tilt of the hat on your head (but with no reference to numeracy). The 
alternative literacies education described is reliant upon a particular sociological 
analysis that sits with what a poststructuralist understanding of language. It seems that 
these understandings can also be used, not only to understand the workings of 
capitalism, but to change capitalism for the better.  The ‘multiliteracies’ approaches to 
literacies education might encourage the redesign of the discourse of the workplace so 
that the desirable attributes of creativity, negotiation and team working are encouraged 
and where access to these might be made equitable. 
   
‘Critical’ literacy - Colin Lankshear 
 
Lankshear attempts to make a contribution towards filling a ‘theory gap’ which he 
claims to have identified, which is that the term empowerment has a tendency to be 
used in a meaningless way in the context of literacies education (Lankshear, 1997, p. 
63, see Section 2.4). To do this he borrows from the work of Brian Green and James 
Paul Gee to describe three dimensions (the 3D) of effective literacy (Lankshear, 1999), 
the ‘operational’, ‘cultural’ and the ‘critical’. The ‘operational’ refers to the ‘means’ of 
literacy through competency with the language system and how it is used and handled; a 
question of individuals being able to read and write adequately in a range of contexts in 
an appropriate and adequate manner. The cultural dimension (ibid, p. 217) involves 
competency with the meaning system, recognising that literacy acts and events are not 
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only context specific but also entail a specific content. This might mean understanding 
the work or study contexts in which writing is done, not just technical skills aspects of 
its use.  Thirdly, the ‘critical’ dimension is concerned with how social practices and 
their meaning systems are socially constructed in the first place, where there could be 
opportunities to create new meanings, rather than being socialised into existing 
‘operational’ and ‘cultural’ contexts. However, it is unclear from Lankshear’s argument 
how to judge whether any ‘new meanings’ are more desirable or better than any old 
ones.  
 
Considering literacies education, unless individuals are also ‘given’ access to the 
grounds for selection and the principles of interpretation, they are merely socialised into 
the meaning system and are unable to take an active part in its transformation, again 
without providing a criterion for gauging whether the transformation is better or worse. 
So, the ‘critical’ dimension is the basis for ensuring that people can transform and 
actively produce new social practices in literacies (ibid, p. 218), which is the purpose 
and domain of critical literacy education. Importance is placed on these ideas because it 
is understood that literate practices and their contexts are instrumental in the 
reproduction of relationships of power and knowledge in society, so the purpose of 
critical literacies education is to influence these reproductive processes. Here Lankshear 
draws heavily on the work of James Paul Gee, describing how students might gain 
meta-level knowledge of discourse, revealing the ways in which power is produced and 
enacted through language and so ‘giving them’ ways of accessing power through 
literacy (see Lankshear 1997, pp. 75-78), where critical literacies education is 
understood as a form of empowerment. 
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‘Literacies and Power’ Hilary Janks 
 
Hilary Janks describes a ‘critical literacy’ that works at the interface between language, 
literacy and power (Janks, 2010, pp. 21-26). She acknowledges that literacies education 
is not a neutral activity in relation to power and so students must develop a critical 
stance in relation to writing and other media such as film or photography. She argues 
that the various conceptualisations of critical literacy, such as those described by Green 
or Freebody and Luke, Gee, or the New London Group bring to the fore one or other of 
‘domination’, ‘access’, ‘diversity’ or ‘design’ whilst neglecting one or all of the others.  
By ‘domination’, Janks refers to the idea that literacies is powerful in maintaining 
existing relations of domination that might be addressed utilising the tool of critical 
discourse analysis.  Connected to ‘domination’ is ‘access’, or the question of how 
students might gain access to dominant forms of literacies. Janks links this to a paradox 
where gaining access serves to perpetuate dominance, whilst denying access to students 
further marginalises them. This raises the question of how to make features of dominant 
discourses visible in order to ‘give’ students access to them (ibid, p. 24). By ‘diversity’, 
Janks refers to the differences in discourses and their connection to the diverse range of 
ways by which people are identified and labelled as part of social institutions. 
Differences between discourses are considered to be ‘productive’ as they allow people 
to enter new discourses and be identified differently, offering alternative ways of being 
in the world, whilst excluding this diversity might exclude students’ diverse languages 
and literacies. Finally, ‘design’ incorporates the idea of productive power, recognising 
that human creativity can produce new meanings that might ‘revolutionise’ students’ 
literary practices and the character of the workplace. Janks argues that all four concepts, 
described above, must be integrated in a single approach to literacies, including 
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curriculum design, and she describes how this might be practically achieved with 
examples from the classroom.  
 
Summary – literacies education for empowerment 
 
The positionings briefly described above hold to common understandings about how a 
‘radical’, ‘critical’ or ‘powerful’ strand of adult literacies education might be 
understood. Literacy does not consist of a set of discrete and identifiable skills, rather a 
range of social practices which are linked to the distribution of societal power. This 
allows a broad definition of literacy, much wider than reading and writing, where 
literacies includes many forms of symbolic identification perhaps including clothing, 
ways of moving the body or facial expressions. These ways to identifying, naming or 
labelling people are understood as processes of ‘discourse’ formation that are assumed 
to constitute people’s ‘identity’, where ‘identity’ is linked directly to the replication of 
power relationships in society. Importantly, processes of discourse reproduction are 
understood to operate in ways that are undetectable to the participants. In this sense 
discourse is understood as ideology, or to be ideological in character (see Eagleton; 
1991, p. 3, ibid, p. 198), so that understanding the operation of power necessitates a 
requirement for some people to sit outside of a discourse in order to analyse its 
workings, and I discuss this in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Literacies education is then associated with understanding the replication of societal 
power, so suggesting the possibility of a third dimension or domain of literacies 
education that might reveal existing power hierarchies and create opportunities to 
change these. Students might then take control of dominant discourses in order to 
change them, where to be literate means being able to participate in such activity. In 
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broad terms, this is literacies education understood as a form of empowerment (e.g. 
Crowther, Tett & Hamilton, 2003, p. 4; Janks, 2010, p. 35; Lankshear, 1997, pp. 70-71), 
where to be liberated is to be powerful (Gee, 1996, p. 144). To gain a more detailed 
understanding of what this empowering literacies education might consist of and how 
this relates to concepts such as ‘identity’, ‘discourse’ and ‘power’ I explore the theory 
of Bourdieu and Gee in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Paulo Freire, literacies education and emancipation 
 
As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, Paulo Freire’s work is of significance 
amongst practitioners in the UK (Hamilton and Hillier, 2006, p. 116) and is 
acknowledged as being historically of greatest influence in the conceptualisation of a 
third ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ strand of literacies (e.g. as described by Hamilton and Hillier, 
2006; Scribner 1988; Janks, 2010; Gee, 1996). But, Freire’s work has had little 
influence in the academic work I have just described above. However, the influence of 
Freire continues in the activity of field workers, educators and students, linked to 
literacies projects around the world (e.g. Sandler & Mein, 2010; Ramdeholl, 2009; 
Betts, 2003; Tagoe, 2008; Archer and Newman, 2003; Archer and Costello, 1990). 
Traces of Freire’s influence can also be found amongst ‘social practice’ researchers 
which I describe below.  
 
My main engagement with Freire’s work takes place in Chapter 5 and so this section 
does not aim to describe his work in detail. Rather, in this section I briefly contextualise 
Freire’s ideas as part of the history of adult literacies education and the discussions 
within it that I have already described. The purpose is to raise questions which will be 
77 
 
engaged with in subsequent chapters concerned with how adult literacies education for 
emancipation might be understood, including attendant problems and issues. Firstly, in 
this section I contextualise a brief description of Freire’s theory of education within 
another, alternative three-dimensional conceptualisation of educational purpose. The 
conceptualisation allows me to raise the idea that literacies education for empowerment, 
associated with understandings about the ideological character of discourse 
reproduction and identity formation, might be distinguished from literacies education 
for emancipation, associated with the notion of subjectification. I then discuss how the 
dominance of the idea of education for empowerment seems to have influenced the 
interpretation of Freire’s work. Here I raise for the first time the possibility that 
literacies education for ‘empowerment’ might be understood as a form of socialisation, 
suggesting the importance of distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation if 
the possibility of an education that does not serve to socialise is be maintained.  Finally, 
I describe the main criticisms of Freire’s ideas since initial publication more than forty 
years ago. I also describe how nonetheless his work is returned to by academics 
working in the ‘social practice’ tradition and that this might be where they themselves 
raise a need to understand and practice adult literacies education as emancipation. 
 
Freire – education for emancipation 
 
Biesta (2010, p. 5, ibid, p. 21) refers to three overlapping domains of educational 
function and purpose, to inform discussions about ‘what education should be for’. The 
first is qualification which describes education as providing students with the 
knowledge, skills and understandings, as well as dispositions and forms of judgement 
that allow them to “do something”, be it laying bricks, passing examinations, living on a 
budget or using a voting booth (ibid, pp. 19-20). Secondly, the socialisation function 
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refers to educational activity that serves to continue existing ways of doing and being, 
be they cultural or religious traditions. This might be an explicit aspect of education, for 
example in the form of religious instruction, or it might be implicit in the ways that 
schools or teachers encourage particular ways of speaking or behaving (ibid, p. 19), 
perhaps by prohibiting swearing or endorsing school uniform. Biesta also refers to 
education as a process of subjectification or being and becoming a human subject (ibid, 
p. 20), which he describes as the ‘opposite of the socialization function’ (ibid) because 
‘it is precisely not about the insertion of “newcomers” into existing orders, but about 
ways of being that hint at independence from such orders’ (ibid). In the context of 
education, subjectification could be understood as being explicitly political or to 
incorporate moral questions (ibid, pp. 24-25), where questioning the purpose of 
education means considering the possible “quality” of subjectification (ibid, p. 21).  
 
I suggest here that the first two domains of purpose Biesta describes are already 
familiar, corresponding broadly with those described by Williams, Scribner or Hamilton 
and Hillier, as education for employment or skills for daily life and education that 
encourages existing cultural traditions. Also, in generalised terms, the third domain is 
suggestive that there might be an education that does not socialise but rather offers 
some kind of alternative to socialisation. Here it seems that the alternative 
conceptualised by Biesta does not coincide with the literacies education for 
empowerment that I have just described in the work of Crowther, Tett and Hamilton, 
Luke and Freebody, Lankshear, the New London Group and Janks, which place 
emphasis on processes of identification and the constitution of power relationships. 
In contrast, Biesta describes this third domain as a process of subjectification 
understood as the quality of how people act and respond to each other’s actions (Biesta, 
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2006, p. 137). Understandings of identity are inadequate or perhaps irrelevant to this 
conceptualisation, because they cannot engage with questions about how people relate 
to each other socially and respond to each other’s acts.  Rather, ‘identity’ seems 
concerned only with potentially individualistic processes by which people label or name 
each other and themselves, where to have an ‘identity’ is to have a name (Bourdieu, 
1991, pp. 120-122), so that people might only need each other in order to identify how 
they are different or the same, ignoring questions about why it matters that people are 
unique and irreplaceable (Biesta; 2010, pp. 85-86). I shan’t explore this understanding 
further at this point. Rather, I state in general terms that a distinction might be made 
between education for empowerment and education for emancipation, which might be 
associated with a distinction between processes of identification and processes of 
subjectification. 
 
Biesta’s three-dimensional conceptualisation is useful when considering the work of 
Paulo Freire. Freire’s ideas could be interpreted as an attempt to describe how education 
for subjectification might be understood and practised. His central concern is how to 
distinguish between education that socialises (i.e. that oppresses) and education that 
maps onto the domain of subjectification (i.e. that emancipates). Freire’s own particular 
understanding of subjectification relates to a specific definition of what it means to be a 
human subject. Freire pins down and defines the ‘human subject’ as a description of a 
natural way of being, understood as ‘species being’ (see Freire, 1972, pp. 70-71). He 
assumes that humanity has a natural predisposition to be in a social state of 
simultaneous reflection and action upon the physical and social world, described by the 
notion of praxis (see ibid, p. 70, p. 96).  If people enact praxis, then they are enacting 
their vocation to be emancipated human subjects. This allows emancipatory education 
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to be understood as a process of becoming a human subject, a process of subjectification 
enacted by teachers and students in praxis with each other and the physical world (see 
ibid, p. 30, ibid p.53). All these ideas are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
point here being that Freire’s ideas pertaining to adult literacies education are 
understood as a process of subjectification rather than a process of identification 
through discourse production.  
 
It seems that the concept of subjectification is associated with the idea that education 
might emancipate, whilst identification, linked to the understanding how power is 
reproduced, is associated with understandings of education that might empower. But it 
is not possible to undertake a meaningful discussion about this possibility until terms 
such as ‘identity’, ‘discourse’, ‘the human subject’ or ‘equality’ have been further 
understood. This is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, when the concepts of literacies 
education for empowerment is explored through considering the ideas of Bourdieu and 
Gee, and the idea of a literacies education for emancipation is explored through the 
detailed analysis of the work of Freire and Rancière.  
 
Freire and empowerment 
 
Such is the influence of ideas which associate education with the constitution of power 
and identity, the idea of emancipation tends to go unarticulated when Freire’s work is 
examined by researchers or educators. This is in keeping with a strand in the critical 
tradition where emancipation is understood to be brought about from the outside and 
here the task of critical social science is to make visible the operation of power which is 
hidden from everyday view (Biesta, 2009, 2010a).   
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It seems to me that the emphasis that has been placed upon understanding power may 
have contributed to a tendency for Freire’s work to be discussed in the context of 
empowerment or the expose of power. Both Scribner (1988) and Hamilton and Hillier 
(2006) make reference to Freire’s work in this way, in their three-dimensional 
descriptions of educational purposes for adult literacies education (see Section 2.4) 
Freire’s work is described in the context of empowerment in the reporting of literacies 
programmes around the world. For example, Oughton (2007), Rocha-Schmidt (2010) 
and Tagoe (2008) all introduce Freire with reference to power or the revelation of 
power relationships and not emancipation. Stromquist (2006), Brookfield (2005), 
Barton (1994, p. 13), Luke (1991), Ellsworth (1989), Archer & Costello (1990), 
Macedo (1998), Hamilton (1996) all mention or discuss Freire’s work in this fashion.  
 
The same approach is also found in the theoretical underpinning of the Freirian inspired 
REFLECT projects, which place emphasis on making links between literacy and power 
rather than literacy and emancipation (Archer & Newman, 2003). David Archer co-
designed the REFLECT (Regenerated Freirean Literacy through Empowering 
Community Techniques) as a director of education for the charity Actionaid 
International.  Since 2000, 350 organizations in over sixty countries have implemented 
REFLECT projects and several evaluation studies that have been conducted globally  
(e.g.  Riddell 2001; Betts 2003; Burchfield et al 2002; Tagoe, 2008). Archer states firm 
opposition to what he describes as the colonial implementation of literacies where 
‘Rifles, railways and writing’ were the ‘3 Rs’ of colonial conquest (see Archer, 2003, p. 
33 or Archer and Newman, 2003), drawing upon Freire and ideas from the ‘social 
practice’ tradition to create a program that claims to link literacies to empowerment.  
82 
 
 
Though there is some reference to Freire’s notion of praxis in Archer’s description 
literacies education as a ‘critical group process’ incorporating ‘reflection-action-
reflection’ (see Archer, 2003, p. 46), but the idea of education as a process of 
subjectification that might orientate towards emancipation is lost. Instead Archer 
contextualises the purpose of literacies education as a description of power 
relationships, claiming strong links between literacy and power, where power is 
categorised as Government power, Economic power, Social Power, Religious power 
etc. and where literacies education might give students greater access to these (Archer, 
2003, Archer and Newman, 2003). This suggests a purpose of empowering people so 
that they might participate in society as it stands, rather than creating possibilities for 
emancipatory alternatives to it. 
 
At this point I wish to make it clear that I make no judgements about how educators and 
students undertake REFLECT projects on the ground. However, the possibility that the 
emancipatory orientation of Freire’s ideas has been lost is implied by a review of 
REFLECT projects (Duffy et al, 2008). The report states REFLECT’s aim to influence 
literacy development, where ‘individual and community empowerment’ is a goal for 
nine out of sixteen projects around the world (ibid, p.  17) and where ‘empowerment’ is 
an ‘additional development outcome for eight of the projects’. ‘Individual and 
community empowerment’ is defined as the strengthening of the capacity of people, 
particularly women, to secure their basic rights (ibid, p. 4), perhaps through gaining 
access to employment or political enfranchisement. This might re-engage with 
functional understandings of literacies education which both Freire as well as those 
working in the ‘social practice’ tradition have set out to avoid. For example, taking this 
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to its logical extreme, empowerment might be measured and this notion is found in a 
World Bank review of literacy projects (Abadzi, 2003). Abadzi suggests that 
empowerment gains should be measured through experimental trials with control 
groups that might even uncover an empowerment ‘placebo effect’, citing research 
conducted by Hashime et al who claim to have measured empowerment with the use of 
‘empowerment indicators’.  
 
According to Lankshear (see Lankshear, 1997, p. 79) the term ‘empowerment’ has 
come into popular usage in literacies education in such a way that it can mean ‘all 
things to all people: which is to say that it means nothing clear’. However, in instances 
where the term is used without explanation, for example in UNESCO discussion or 
review documents pertaining to adult literacies (e.g. UNESCO, 2006; UNESCO, 2010; 
UNESCO UIL, 2008a; UNESCO UIL, 2008b; UNESCO UIL, 2008c; UNESCO, 
2009a), it tends to refer to the idea of ‘giving’ people the literacy skills they need in the 
context of their working, home or community lives so that they might participate within 
the global economy. For example, the Belem Framework for Action (UNESCO, 2009a) 
states a commitment to reducing ‘illiteracy’ by 50% by 2015 where literacy is described 
as: 
 
‘a prerequisite for the development of personal, social, economic and political 
empowerment. Literacy is an essential means of building people's capabilities to 
cope with the evolving challenges and complexities of life, culture, economy and 
society.’ (UNESCO, 2009a; p. 3).  
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This statement seems to describe educational activity that might perhaps map entirely 
onto the domain of socialisation. According to Welton (2005), the terms 
‘empowerment’ has been an ‘award-winning, celebrity word’ that crossed-over from 
business into education in the 1980s, when companies implemented ‘employee 
empowerment programs’ with the aim of incorporating workers into company ways of 
doing and thinking (ibid, also see Inglis, 1997). Perhaps a question should be raised here 
as to whether all understandings of adult literacies education aimed at ‘empowerment’, 
including that conceptualised by Janks, Gee or Lankshear are orientated towards 
functional activity for socialisation and I re-engage with and explore this possibility in 
Chapters 4 and 6. If so, the implication is that empowerment and emancipation must be 
distinguished if the possibility of an adult literacies education that does not serve to 
socialise students is to be raised, supporting the central aim of this thesis which is to 
distinguish between education for emancipation and education for empowerment. In this 
context, my research can also be understood as a rediscovery of Freire’s endeavour to 
understand and practice education as emancipation. 
 
Freire – issues and problems 
 
The voicing of Freire’s ideas in terms of power rather than emancipation might have 
implications for some of the criticism of Freire’s work, of which there has been a wide 
body over the last forty years. For example, Freire has been criticised for holding to a 
simplistic and inadequate understanding of how power operates (e.g. Coben, 1997 or 
see Taylor, 1993, p.59), perhaps without taking into account that the theory is actually 
concerned with educational emancipation rather than explaining how power is 
reproduced. I return to this in Chapter 6, when I contrast criticism of Freire from an 
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empowerment perspective with that raised by researchers who assume the possibility of 
emancipation.  
 
Other strands of criticism include concerns that Freire promoted educational practices 
that restrict the ways that people think (Gee, 1996), in particular that he privileges 
rational thought allowing students to be categorised as irrational by their teachers 
(Ellsworth, 1989; Luke, 1992), perhaps incapable of understanding how they are 
oppressed (Prakash and Esteva, 2008).  There is an associated problem raised about how 
Freire pins down humanity by offering a final and definitive definition of what it means 
to be a human subject, described by his notion of praxis. The problem is that that this 
might exclude other ways of being human whilst unconditionally accepting his own, 
with potentially undesirable consequences. Biesta outlines this problem in broad terms, 
describing theories that make assumptions based upon a fixed understanding of what it 
means to be human as ‘humanist’ theories (see Biesta, 2006, p. 5). Gur-Ze’ev criticises 
Freire specifically on this point, raising a concern that Freire’s ideas might even support 
violence (Gur-Ze’ev, 1998). Gur-Ze’ev and Rancière describe understandings of 
subjectification that might avoid this problem, which I describe and discuss in Chapters 
5 and 6.  
Freire revisited 
 
Regardless of the body of criticism, there are also instances where the ideas of Paulo 
Freire are revisited by researchers associated with the ‘social practice’ tradition. Freire 
describes an educational emancipation that is inherently social (Freire, 1972) which has 
gained attention from researchers concerned that literacies education should avoid 
supporting individualistic responses to what they see as social and political problems in 
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society (see Inglis, 1997
4
). For example, Tett and Maclachlan (2008) suggest that a 
social practice model of literacies education might be linked with Freirian inspired 
educational activity, implying that the employment of ‘values of equality and activity’ 
might contribute to a radical literacies education and ‘cultural action for freedom’ (ibid). 
Also in the UK tradition, Hamilton and Pitt (Hamilton and Pitt, 2009) raise alarm at 
how the discourse of UK literacy policy encourages inequality to be understood as a 
personal problem for individuals to deal with. Though not going as far as endorsing 
Freire, neither do they cite any alternative to him, referencing his influence within a 
‘critical’ tradition that counters this type of individualism. 
  
Similarly, Lankshear & McLaren (1993) refer back to Freire in detailing criticisms of 
what they call ‘postmodernism’ or ‘poststructuralism’ which they understand to 
orientate towards ‘liberal humanism’ rather than challenging existing social relations. 
Though others do not rely upon Freire, they may attach importance to Freirian concepts, 
for example, Freebody and Luke (1997, pp. 10-11) cite Marx’s theory of alienated 
labour (the 1844 manuscripts) and the notion of ‘species being’ for its usefulness in 
understanding the context of literacies education, though how it is useful is unclear. In 
similar vein, Janks (2010, pp. 58-59) argues that Marxist perspectives on power, 
alongside those of Foucault, are important for critical literacy, though again it is unclear 
why this might be the case.  
 
This return to Freirian ideas may be indicative of how those who use the work of Gee or 
Bourdieu to discuss the possibility of a ‘critical’, ‘radical’ or ‘powerful’ literacies 
                                                          
4
 Indeed, for Inglis, this concern informs how he distinguishes between empowerment and emancipation in the 
context of education, where ‘empowerment’ is associated with individualism and emancipation with social responses 
to oppression. Whilst the arguments I present in this thesis agree with Inglis’s broad distinction, I take issue with how 
Inglis describes an emancipatory education and I elaborate upon this in Chapter 4,  
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education, continue to question these same ideas, even their own. Gee himself raises a 
problem with his own argument that an empowering literacies education might be 
geared towards the creation of new identifications and discourse. The problem is that 
there is no way of making judgements as to whether one discourse is better or worse 
than another discourse, or in other words, whether an identity or label is preferable to 
any other (Gee, 1993, pp. 291-292). I have already alluded to this problem when 
describing Lankshear’s work above and I discuss it further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Lankshear, who draws heavily upon Gee, describes a literacy education that might 
create new meanings and social practices, but with no indication of how to judge 
whether these are better or worse than the existing ones. Freire’s (1972) theory 
incorporates ways of making this type of judgement, which rests upon how he defines 
humanity in praxis. Gee attempts an alternative strategy, dealing with the problem by 
introducing a framework of ethical principles upon which judgements can be made. 
Mary Kalantis and Bill Cope, members of the Multiliteracies consortium, raise a similar 
problem (Cope and Kalantis, 2000, pp. 206-208). Rather than introducing an ethical 
framework, they suggest the need to demarcate between the merits of various attempts 
at ‘being human’, again referring to the possibility of a ‘species being’ (ibid). For Gee 
as well as Kalantis and Cope, perhaps this is where the idea of a human subject and a 
process of subjectification is being introduced into their theorising of education, and I 
return to similar questions in Chapter 6. 
 
I have described two issues above, raised by researchers who have given attention to the 
possibility of ‘radical’, ‘critical’ or ‘powerful’ literacies which places emphasis on 
processes of identification linked to the idea of empowerment. There is a concern that 
adult literacies education should support social rather than individualistic responses to 
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what are considered to be social problems in society, as raised by Tett, Hamilton, 
Crowther and Lankshear. Secondly, there is the problem of distinguishing between 
desirable and undesirable discourse or in other words, how to judge if the outcomes of 
and empowering literacies education are desirable, as raised by Gee, Kalantis and Cope. 
Other strategies have also been employed, which, as with Freire, seem to involve re-
engaging with ideas associated with subjectification, rather than identification. But 
Freire’s own understanding of subjectification as ‘species being’ and praxis has faced 
criticism. 
 
At this point I raise a third issue which sits with Biesta’s (2009, 2010a) observation that 
the tradition of ‘critical’ education orientated towards the revelation of how power 
operates has a tendency towards creating a dependency between teachers as ‘liberators’ 
and students as ‘liberated’. This is apparent in some of the language used by academics 
who have engaged with the possibility of a ‘critical’ or ‘powerful’ adult literacies 
education. For example Lankshear (1999, p. 218) states how critical literacies relies 
upon students being ‘given’ access to grounds for selecting and interpreting meaning 
systems, suggesting the student is dependent upon the teacher. Similarly, Gee (1991, p. 
9) describes how students need to be ‘given’ meta-knowledge about discourses by 
teachers, again suggesting a paradox where students are dependent upon teachers for 
knowledge that might liberate. Related to this is the connection made between research 
into adult literacies education and policy formation (e.g. Hamilton and Hillier, 2006; 
Crowther, Hamilton and Tett, 2003; Luke and Freebody, 1997; Fulford, 2010) 
suggesting a similar paradox where approaches to literacies education that might 
empower must be prescribed to and followed by teachers and students. I return to this in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the first aim of this thesis by mapping out the issues and 
problems that have been raised by academics, educators and students who have given 
attention to the purpose of adult literacies education and its implications for how it 
might be understood and practised educationally. In so doing, I have also dealt with the 
first five research questions, through an engagement with three areas of literature. 
Firstly, the ideas which have informed adult literacies education historically; secondly 
how adult literacies education has developed as a distinct and formalised part of the 
education system as understood by the teachers, students and activists who have 
championed it. Here I paid particular attention to how adult literacies education has 
developed in the UK. Finally I described some issues and problems raised by 
academics, educators and students who have given attention to an adult literacies 
education that might raise possibilities for empowerment or emancipation and I 
summarise these below.  
 
I have described how the policy context of adult literacies education has historically 
been dominated by what is known as a ‘functional’ understanding of literacies, 
supporting a ‘Great Divide’ theory or ‘literacy myth’ which assumes that there are wide 
reaching and pre-determined consequences of learning to read and write for both 
individuals and society. Empirical research, particularly the ethnographic work of 
anthropologists as well as evidence from cognitive tests has discredited this notion, 
suggesting that there are no predetermined consequences of learning to read and write, 
where literacies are only meaningful in the societal contexts in which they are used. 
This has led to wider definitions of literacy, as part of what known as a ‘social practice’ 
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model that might include speaking or body language and which incorporates 
understandings of how power operates in society, raising the possibility that literacies 
education might be ‘empowering’ or ‘disempowering’. However, most policy contexts 
for adult literacies education continue to be informed by ‘functional’ understandings, 
encouraging discussion and debate around a ‘functional’ versus ‘social practice’ divide. 
 
I have described how the scholarship associated with the ‘social practice’ model of 
literacies, has become known as ‘New Literacies Studies’ (NLS) and has incorporated 
influences from anthropology and linguistics and is strongly influenced by sociological 
understandings of adult literacies education. Here some attention has been given to 
addressing issues of power, as well as the possibility of an adult literacies education that 
might not always serve to socialise students into society as it stands.  Those with 
concern for these issues have described the purpose of adult literacies education in three 
dimensions, broadly congruent to those described by Raymond Williams. The third 
strand  that might correspond with William’s ‘public education’ is described variously 
as ‘critical’, ‘radical’ or ‘powerful’ literacies’, where Paulo Freire has held greatest 
sway. However, when NLS researchers have given attention to the possibility of this 
third domain, the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John Paul Gee has been of far greater 
influence.  
 
The orientation towards these theorists by NLS researchers has allowed the third 
dimension of adult literacies education to be expressed in terms of empowerment 
through understandings of power, identity and discourse, raising the possibility that new 
forms of discourse and identity might alter existing power hierarchies. I have also 
described a tradition in the practice of adult literacies education influenced by Freire, 
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which assumes the possibility of an education that might emancipate. I have discussed 
this possibility in terms of education as a process of becoming a human subject, or what 
Biesta (2010) describes as subjectification, in so doing raising the question of how 
education for empowerment might be distinguished from education for emancipation.  
 
Taking the ideas of academics in the ‘social practice’ tradition alongside those of Paulo 
Freire, two types of problem have been encountered by those who have given attention 
to the possibility of an emancipatory or empowering literacies education. Firstly, there 
is the problem of what is meant by a range of notions and concepts, such as ‘literacies’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘emancipation’, ‘equality’, ‘oppression’, ‘discourse’, ‘power’, 
‘subjectification’ and ‘identity’.  
 
Secondly, there are issues associated broadly with the idea that education need not 
always serve the purpose of socialising students into society and how this might be 
understood and practised in the context of adult literacies. Such educational alternatives 
have been described in terms of empowerment or emancipation, with empowerment 
associated with how processes of identification re-produce power hierarchies, which I 
describe in Chapter 4, whilst emancipation is understood as a process of 
subjectification, described in Chapters 5 and 6. This raises questions about how 
empowerment might be distinguished from emancipation in the context of adult 
literacies education and exploring this distinction is the main aim of my project. 
 
Particular problems have been associated with literacies education for empowerment. 
Firstly, there is concern about educational practices that encourage individualism; 
secondly there is the problem of how to make judgements as to whether educational 
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outcomes are desirable or not; and thirdly that understandings of empowering literacies 
might encourage a dependency between teachers and students that replicates existing 
societal hierarchies. These three problems relate to ideas strongly influenced by John 
Paul Gee and Pierre Bourdieu and so I examine the work of the two theorists in more 
detail. I describe and justify my approach to this in the next chapter (Chapter 3) and set 
out my analysis and its outcome in Chapter 4. Attendant problems are that 
understandings of both emancipatory or empowering adult literacies education have a 
tendency to rely upon fixed notions of what it means to be human, privileging some 
ways of thinking and being whilst excluding others and with potentially undesirable 
consequences. This issue has been particularly associated with the work of Paulo Freire 
and is explored in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
But next I turn to the question of methodology. 
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3 Design 
 
In this chapter I justify the main aim of this project. I also describe and justify the 
objectives and the methods that I employ to meet them. What I do not describe at this 
stage is a theoretical argument that might underpin the aim, objectives and methods. 
This is a theoretical study that incorporates an examination of various attempts to define 
and theorise education which are described in the chapters that follow. This means that 
discussion about the possible theoretical justifications for my research and how I 
undertake it are better placed in a later chapter so that it might be informed by the ideas 
that precede it. This makes for a more meaningful discussion and so engagement with 
the theoretical justification of my research aims and the associated methods, including 
how I criticise or make judgements about theory, is situated in the final chapter (Chapter 
7).  
 
Instead this design chapter is geared towards describing two other aspects. Firstly I 
justify the pragmatic decisions that I have taken in the undertaking of this project. 
Secondly, in the broadest of terms, my research is concerned with exploring the 
possibility of an emancipatory or empowering adult literacies education. This means 
that I am making the general assumption that an emancipatory or empowering literacies 
education might be possible. There may be some broad repercussions that follow the 
making of this assumption that influence the approaches that I employ and some of the 
decisions and judgements I have made. I attempt to justify these here. I shall structure 
this by restating and then justifying the main aim of my research. I then move on to 
justifying the objectives that follow on from the aim as well as the research design and 
approaches that I employ to meet them. 
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3.1 The main aim – empowerment or emancipation 
 
The main aim of this research project is to explore whether it is possible to distinguish 
meaningfully between adult literacies education that might contribute towards 
empowerment and adult literacies education that might create possibilities for 
emancipation. This aim has emerged from discussions amongst educators, students and 
academics associated with adult literacies education and who have given attention to its 
purpose and which I draw upon in my review of literature. What I am arguing here is 
that the research aim and objectives are rooted in existing discussions and can be 
interpreted as an attempt to continue an existing conversation, though perhaps rerouting 
it along a new course. 
 
There is an existing tradition where academics, educators and students have questioned 
the purposes of adult literacies education, with wide acknowledgement that it typically 
serves to incorporate or socialise students into society as it stands. However in these 
discussions society is also understood to be inherently oppressive, unjust or unequal 
making socialisation unacceptable and giving rise to the broad notion that adult 
literacies education with a purpose other than socialisation might be possible.  It is from 
my engagement with literature pertaining to this discussion and the positions held 
within it that the main aim and objectives of my research emerged and I describe this 
process in the next section.  
 
Design of literature review and emergence of main aim 
 
95 
 
In common with most PhD projects, my first objective was to conduct a review of 
literature, in this case pertaining to adult literacy education. However it was through the 
meeting of this objective that the main aim of my research was clarified. This means 
that the justification for the design of the literature review is integral to the justification 
of the project as a whole and so this section serves two purposes; firstly, to justify the 
design of the literature review and secondly to justify the central aim of my project and 
ultimately to justify the objectives that follow from this. For this reason, I have 
explicitly stated the questions that drove the literature review as an integral part of the 
research questions listed in Section 1 (see pp 13-14).  Once identified, I strategiesed 
how to meet the central aim through a series of essays, each answering a different 
question, which I take to be the research questions that this thesis addresses. However, 
the essays are not presented intact and in chronological order in this thesis, rather they 
have been re-presented as a single coherent text.  
 
The purpose of the literature review that I have set out in Chapter 2 was to map out the 
issues and problems that have been raised by academics, educators and students who 
have given attention to how adult literacies education might be understood and 
practised. I explored three areas of literature. Firstly, the ideas that informed adult 
literacies education historically including ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ 
conceptualisations. Secondly, how adult literacies education developed as a distinct and 
formalised part of the education system particularly in the UK context. Finally I 
explored the issues and problems that have been raised by academics, educators and 
students who have given attention to the possibilities for empowerment or emancipation 
in the context of adult literacies education.  
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I started by describing ‘functional’ and ‘social practice’ models of literacies education 
as this is how literacies education is typically discussed by those who describe its 
history, for example in the summaries set out by Harman (1970), Tagoe (2008) and 
Kelder (1996). Also, the two models, even if expressed through different terminology, 
have been integral to the presentation of theories and understandings about literacies 
education (e.g. Street, 1984, Barton, 1994, Gee, 1996). In addition, academic 
discussions in adult literacies education are often presented in a ‘functional’ versus 
‘social practice’ context, again even if different terminology is used (e.g. see 
Maclachlan, 2009; Fulford 2010; Wicklin and Sanders; 2007, Oughton; 2007; Hamilton 
and Pitt, 2009) and Maddox (2007) has noted this tendency. Higher level analyses of the 
trajectory by which literacies has become a focus for academic research is also couched 
in terms that relate to the ‘functional’ versus ‘social practice’ approaches (e.g. 
Lankshear, 1999 or Gee, 2000), where psychological research has been associated with 
‘functional’ understandings whilst sociological understandings are linked to the 
emergence of New Literacies Studies and the development of the ‘social practice’ 
model.  
 
Contextualising the first part of the literature review within the ‘functional’ versus 
‘social practice’ dichotomy sets out the discussions as they are usually presented and it 
provides a useful structure to present some the history of the development of ideas and 
understandings. However, whilst the notion of ‘functional’ literacies is linked directly to 
predetermined and predictable outcomes and purposes for adult literacies education (see 
Section 2.2.) the ‘social practice’ model discredits this possibility. This raises the 
question as to what the ‘social practice’ model implies for the purpose and function of 
adult literacies education and so I adjust the inquiry of the literature review so that it re-
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orientates away from the ‘social practice’ versus ‘functional’ model discussion and 
towards examining literature from the ‘social practice’ tradition that addresses the 
question of educational purpose. This reorientation continues throughout the remainder 
of the review of the literature and as a result the main aim of the project emerges.   
 
Researchers from the ‘social practice’ tradition who have considered the question of 
educational purpose were found to utilise three-dimensional approaches e.g. Scribner 
(1988), Hamilton and Hillier (2006), Lankshear (1999), Freebody and Lo Bianco (in 
Hamilton and Hillier, 2006, 5). The approaches describe three distinct but overlapping 
strands of purpose for adult literacies education. Firstly, literacies for the workplace 
which encompasses vocational skills and secondly literacies education that upholds 
cultural and intellectual traditions where these two dimensions are understood to 
socialise students into society as it stands. Thirdly, the possibility is raised of a third 
dimension that might not serve to socialise students, understood as a ‘critical’, 
‘empowering’ or ‘emancipatory’ literacies education. In broadly similar but not 
identical terms, Williams (1993) describes a three-dimensional approach in relation to 
the history of adult education in Britain as does Biesta (2010) in relation to education in 
general and I utilise these during the process of reviewing the literature and in the 
design of the review itself. 
 
In the broadest of terms, the three dimensions or domains of purpose all raise the 
possibility that adult literacies education need not always serve to socialise students into 
society as it stands, instead suggesting the possibility of some kind of more desirable 
alternative. If a distinction cannot be made between education that socialises and 
education that creates emancipatory or empowering alternatives then perhaps education 
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may only be understood as a socialising machine. There could be a range of sociological 
models offering insights into its operation, but no possible way of understanding or 
enacting an emancipatory education that might not serve to socialise people into society 
as it stands. However, there has been a refusal to accept this, found in the tradition I 
have referred to above, where educators, academics and students associated with adult 
literacies education have assumed that there might be an alternative purpose that does 
not always serve to socialise students. It is here that I feel that my responsibility lies as 
an academic researcher as I cannot accept that my work should contribute only to the 
socialisation of students. This leaves me with no alternative but to assume that some 
kind of alternative is possible and to design and enact research accordingly. Because the 
three-dimensional conceptualisations assume this possibility, I utilised them to structure 
the literature review from which the aim and objectives of my research arose.   
 
Contextualising the design of the last two sections of the literature review within three-
dimensional approaches oriented me towards exploring literature that assumed the 
possibility of a third non-socialising dimension of adult literacies education. It 
orientated my attention towards the endeavours of academics, educators and students 
who have attempted to understand and describe it. Exploring these understandings as 
part of the literature review raised understandings of how the third ‘alternative’ purpose 
of adult literacies education has been broadly associated with either notions of 
empowerment or notions of emancipation. What’s more, that empowerment and 
emancipation are understood through contrasting concepts, suggesting that they might 
refer to distinctive educational purposes and practices.  This laid the basis for the main 
aim of this thesis, which is to explore the understandings of empowerment and 
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emancipation in the context of adult literacies education and whether they might be 
distinguished from each other.   
 
Selection of literature 
 
It should be apparent from the discussion so far in this chapter that I did not commence 
with any particular understanding or definition of empowerment or emancipation. As 
such I had no specific basis upon which to select or discuss literature pertaining to 
emancipation or empowerment as part of the literature review. However I employed two 
strategies both consistent with idea of the three-dimensional approach to educational 
purpose and the assumption that an empowering or emancipatory literacies education 
might be possible. Firstly, I made a very broad distinction between literature which 
described literacies education aimed at socialisation and literature which was attempting 
to describe education that in some way was not aimed at socialisation. This strategy 
brought to my attention a range of ideas and educational activity which I was then able 
to examine in more detail to gain an impression of what the educational ‘alternatives’ 
consisted of and how their purpose and practices might be understood.  
 
The second strategy influencing my selection of literature concerned with emancipatory 
or empowering adult literacies was a concern for the issue of dependency between 
teachers and students in the context of emancipation (Biesta, 2009, 2010a). Biesta 
describes a paradox which is that if people are reliant upon academics or educators for 
understandings about how they might be oppressed, empowered or emancipated, then 
they will be in some way be dependent upon them for their own emancipation, 
seemingly making emancipation impossible. This idea allowed me to make early 
judgements as to whether ideas or theories were concerned with emancipation as a 
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purpose for education. For example, it seemed to me that Raymond Williams, Paulo 
Freire and Jacques Rancière, at the very least, acknowledged the same issue and had 
attempted to explore it further. On the other hand, ‘empowerment’ understandings of 
educational alternatives for adult literacies, associated with Colin Lankshear, Alan Luke 
or John Paul Gee seemed to re-inforce rather than attempt to confront this problem (see 
Section 2.4). This allowed me to make early judgements or criticisms about ideas 
pertaining to adult literacies education, suggesting that a distinction might be made 
between ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’. 
 
I also interpreted the issue of dependency between teacher and student for emancipation 
to mean that the ideas of educators and students had to be included as well as literature 
pertaining to academia. If I assume broadly that an emancipatory education is possible 
then I cannot assume that only academics can consider or understand this matter and so 
the ideas of non-academics or perhaps students might be brought into the discussion. I 
would argue that this notion sits with Raymond Williams’ (1992) three-dimensional 
approach where the third dimension is understood as an enactment of equality. I don’t 
attempt to elaborate on this at this point (though I return to it in Chapter 7), but his 
approach seems to encourage the valuing of students’ ideas rather than privileging those 
of the teacher or academic. This could include the valuing of much of Williams own 
writing which are the observations and insights of an adult education tutor rather than 
the scholarship of an academic. It might also include ideas in the magazines produced as 
part of the student publishing movement or the journal of the Plebs’ League (see 
Section 2.3). This is a theoretical study rather than a historical project and I have not 
delved into the archives associated with these two historical grass roots movements in 
adult education in Britain.  Instead I orientate towards the work of academics who have 
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given attention to the notion of empowering or emancipatory education and my research 
endeavours to contribute to this tradition. However, the point here is that my approach 
acknowledges that such archives might hold potentially important ideas about adult 
education. One of the outcomes of my work is that it might offer a justification for 
researching these archives from an education perspective and I reengage with this 
possibility in Chapter 7 – again I can only discuss this meaningfully after the bulk of the 
theoretical analysis comprising my research has been set out. 
 
My literature review contextualised the practice of adult literacies education within the 
British experience. This was partly a pragmatic decision. I am situated in Britain where 
I have experience as an adult literacies tutor and development worker, also time and 
resource constraints prevent any detailed exploration of the experience of more than one 
country. However the British tradition is also one with a legacy where teachers and 
students have orientated towards the idea of there being emancipatory possibilities for 
education. In Britain adult literacies education has been largely driven by grass roots 
activism (Hillier, 2009) from which approaches to teaching have emerged, as well as the 
writing of its history. For example there are the ideas of Raymond Williams or Richard 
Hoggart, histories such as those by Webb, McIlroy, Waugh, Cooke or Hamilton and 
Hillier, writings from the student publishing movement which are unique to the British 
context, as well as documented approaches to literacies teaching (e.g. Frost and Hoy, 
1980). There is also the documentation of influences from other traditions, such as 
Kirkwood and Kirkwood’s of Freire in Scotland. This legacy informed the historical 
approach to the literature review, allowing me to situate my research in existing 
traditions where the issues and problems I seek to explore have already been set out by 
others. 
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Exploring empowerment and emancipation 
 
As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, it was from the literature review that the main 
aim of my research emerged which is to explore understandings of empowerment and 
emancipation in the context of adult literacies education and whether they might be 
distinguished from each other.  Aside from raising the possibility of a distinction 
between adult literacies education for empowerment and adult literacies education for 
emancipation, the literature also raised a range of issues and problems associated with 
these two notions which I have summarised at the end of Chapter 2, the objective being 
to explore and discuss these further. 
 
I have also alluded to how I have commenced without any predefined notion or 
understandings of what ‘literacies’, ‘education’, ‘empowerment’, or ‘emancipation’ 
might mean. The literature review raised examples of educators and students with 
strongly held opinions on some of these matters, for example, the opinions of students 
such as Merry (Frost and Hoy, 1980) or Goode (1980) and the Plebs League (1909), or 
educators such as Williams (1993); Freire (1970, 1972); Hoggart (1957) or Frost and 
Hoy (1980). It also raised the scholarship of academics such as Gee, (1996); Crowther, 
Hamilton & Tett (2001); Lankshear (1997); Lankshear and McLaren (1993); NLG 
(1996) and Janks, (2010).   
 
Exploring this work had raised questions, issues and problems relating to the ideas of 
empowerment and emancipation in the context of adult literacies education. None of the 
issues and problems that I seek to explore in my research originated with me. They have 
all been raised first by other educators and researchers who have a relationship with 
adult literacies education and have given attention to the possibility of an emancipatory 
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or empowering purpose. My research could be interpreted as a continuation of the 
endeavours of others as I pick up problems that they first raised and formulate my 
research objectives around further pursuing their exploration.    
 
However raising such issues and problems did not resolve the problem of how to 
embark upon meaningful discussions that might explore them further. The literature 
pointed towards concepts such as ‘identity’, ‘power’, ‘discourse’, ‘the human subject’, 
‘subjectification’, ‘oppression’, and ‘equality’, yet understandings of what 
empowerment, emancipation, literacies or education meant for academics, teachers or 
students remained sketchy and precluded the possibility for meaningful exploration. The 
next objective of the research had to be to develop a more detailed conceptualisation of 
‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ so that they might be understood in the context of 
adult literacies education, furnishing me with some definitions, understandings and 
reference points to allow the continuance of a meaningful exploration. Here the notion 
of subjectification is significant, which Biesta (2010) employs in general terms to 
describe the possibility of an education that might serve an emancipatory function. I 
commence with no definition of subjectification, but addressing how it might be 
understood compels me towards attempting a deep level of engagement with ideas and 
understandings, breaking beneath generalised descriptions of how emancipation might 
be understood in educational contexts. This drilling down, which I attempt to 
accomplish in the latter stages of this thesis, encourages a more nuanced and detailed 
distinction to be made between ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ in the context of 
education, with repercussions for how an emancipatory literacies education might be 
understood. In this sense, exploring emancipation as subjectification has been key not 
only to establishing the aim and objectives of this thesis, but also the meeting of these. 
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I pursue this end by setting out to define empowerment and emancipation separately 
through analysing the work of theorists whose work has been influential in attempting 
to describe these notions in the context of education. This is the main justification for 
the second and third objective of my research, which I outline and justify next along 
with the approaches I employ to meet them. 
 
Selection of theorists 
 
The second objective is to reconstruct and explore the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John 
Paul Gee in relation to how the notion of literacies education for empowerment might 
be understood and practised and what the implications might be for defining literacies. 
The decision to examine the work of these two theorists in more detail arose from 
reading the work of academics who have given attention to the idea that adult literacies 
education might serve a purpose of empowerment. 
 
The notion of an empowering adult literacies education (e.g. Janks, 2010; Crowther, 
Hamilton, Tett, 2001; NLG, 1996 etc.) draws on a variety of understandings from 
sociology and linguistics. In particular, the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and John Paul Gee 
seem to hold great sway. There are other influential academics, particularly from the 
field of semiotics i.e. Kress (2000), which I don’t consider for further analysis. There 
are also academics who, like Gee, have developed understandings based upon discourse 
analysis, e.g. Fairclough (2000). Amongst older literature (e.g. Harman, 1970) there is 
influence of the sociological work of Basil Bernstein, who Lankshear (1999) presents as 
a precursor to Bourdieu (1999). However, as this research is concerned with how 
education might serve a function other than to slot students into existing society, I 
orientate towards theorists who give attention to acknowledging and attempting to 
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understand this possibility. I chose Bourdieu and Gee for further analysis not only 
because their influence seems to be widespread, but also because they offer definitions 
of ‘power’, ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ and link these to understandings of ‘education’, 
suggesting that a detailed analysis of their work might offer a greater understanding of 
what literacies for empowerment might mean and how problems associated with the 
notion might have arisen.  
 
Bourdieu’s ideas can be found in foundational work in New Literacies Studies, such as 
Heath (1983) and Gee himself (1996). There is influence amongst Luke and Freebody 
(1997b) in Australia and Janks (2010) in South Africa. The multiliteracies 
conceptualisation also has influence from Bourdieu, as found in the work of Fairclough 
(2000) and the aforementioned Luke and Gee, who were part of the original 
multiliteracies consortium (NLG, 1996).  
 
In particular, Gee drew upon the field of linguistics to create his own understandings of 
how literacies education that might empower, which has had a wider reaching influence 
amongst academics. As well as being a founder of the multiliteracies consortium, he 
directly influences Lankshear’s (1997, 1999) description of ‘Critical’ literacy, as well as 
Crowther, Hamilton and Tett’s (2003) description of a ‘Powerful literacies’ which has 
been influential in the UK. Hilary Janks (2010) own take, within the South African 
context, also draws on Gee when linking literacies with ‘power’.   
 
The third objective was to reconstruct and explore the work of Paulo Freire and Jacques 
Rancière in relation to how an adult literacies education for emancipation might be 
understood and practised and what this implies for defining literacies. Again, as well as 
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providing reference points, definitions and understandings that might inform later 
discussions about how empowering and emancipatory literacies education might be 
distinguished from each other, the assumption was that such an analysis might offer a 
deeper understanding of the problems associated with emancipatory education, for 
example the existing body of criticism about Freire’s work.    
 
Freire was selected as the theorist most influential in the emancipatory tradition of adult 
literacies education as identified by Scribner (1988), Gee (1996), Hamilton and Hillier 
(2006). Hamilton and Hillier’s historical survey of adult literacies education in England 
found tutors citing Freire as a personal influence more than any other figure (ibid, p. 
116). His work is still influential in the context of literacies projects around the world 
and has informed the charity ActionAid’s approach to literacies education for adults. 
Influence is also visible from the scale and depth of criticism of his work, (e.g. Gee, 
1996; Ellsworth, 1989; Coben, 1997; Luke, 1992; Gur-Ze’ev, 1998; Biesta, 2012) 
demonstrating the large level of attention that it has received. In the literature review I 
argue that Freire’s work is often cited as being concerned with ‘empowerment’ rather 
than ‘emancipation’ and I justify this claim as part of my detailed analysis of his ideas. 
Rancière is not so obvious a choice. Unlike Bourdieu, Gee and Freire, his ideas have 
little influence upon discussions in adult literacies education. Though published more 
than twenty years ago (e.g. Rancière, 1991), there has been little interest amongst 
educationalists until recently (e.g. Bingham, 2009; Lewis, 2009, 2010; Bingham and 
Biesta, 1998, 2010) and there has been no attempt so far to consider his ideas in the 
context of adult literacies education through academic scholarship.  
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The inclusion of Rancière is where I bring some new ways of considering old problems 
into the discussion, continuing a tradition that has discussed the emancipatory or 
empowering possibilities for adult literacies education, but starting to consider new 
understandings. In later discussions I also briefly explore the ideas of Ilan Gur-Ze’ev 
(with help from Holloway, 2002) which serves a similar purpose.  The decision to 
explore Rancière in detail was based upon my own claim and which my analysis (in 
Chapter 5) demonstrates, which is that he gives attention to very similar problems to 
those set out and addressed by Freire. They both offer a detailed theory that sets out 
how education for emancipation might be understood. Within this context they both 
deal with a range of similar issues, for example, both Freire and Rancière attempt to 
conceptualise emancipatory education that might avoid the paradox where students are 
made dependent upon teachers for their own emancipation (see Section 2.4).  
 
Method of analysis 
 
I conduct two sets of analyses. Firstly, to explore the notion of empowerment, I offer a 
detailed reconstruction of the ideas of Bourdieu and Gee. Secondly, to explore the idea 
of an emancipatory education, I reconstruct the ideas of Freire and Rancière. I adopt a 
similar approach for both pairs of theorists.  
 
To consider the theory of Bourdieu and Gee, I reconstruct the ideas in parallel 
commencing by describing the assumptions that each theorist makes. I then examine 
how the assumptions inform each theorist’s understanding of oppression. Finally I 
describe how each theorist’s understanding of oppression informs their 
conceptualisation of a literacies education that might overcome oppression through 
processes of empowerment. I then consider the theory of Freire and Rancière with a 
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similar approach, describing the assumptions that they both make and how these inform 
their definitions of oppression. However, whilst Bourdieu and Gee are considered with 
respect to the possibility of a literacies education for empowerment, I consider how 
Freire and Rancière might describe a literacies education for emancipation.  
 
This approach to understanding theories pertaining to education is justifiable on at least 
four counts. Firstly, it orientates attention towards the assumptions that the theorists 
make about human beings demonstrating that these are, indeed, just assumptions and 
cannot be taken as immovable certainties.  It also shows that the assumptions that the 
theorists make can be linked directly to how they conceptualise empowerment or 
emancipation, and ultimately to understandings about how literacies education might be 
practised by teachers and students. Or to state it the other way around, considering the 
four theories in this way demonstrates how educational practices may be justified by the 
assumptions that theorists, teachers or students make about people.  
 
Whilst this approach demonstrates that there is no blueprint or definitive way of 
understanding education that claims to empower or to emancipate, it informs a detailed 
description of how empowerment or emancipation might be understood. There are four 
useful repercussions that might justify this approach. Firstly the detailed setting out of 
the theories in parallel brings to the fore the problems associated with idea of 
empowerment or emancipation that I have already raised at the end of the literature 
review, for example the issues arising from the critique of Freire’s work, demonstrating 
how these issues may have arisen from the assumptions that the theorists have made.  
 
109 
 
Secondly, and importantly, the detailed description and comparison of the pairs of 
theories helps to set out some terminology and concepts which I can utilise as reference 
points so that further meaningful discussion can continue about the possibility of 
emancipatory or empowering education.  For example, in the literature review I briefly 
describe Williams’ idea that ‘public education’ might acknowledge equality between 
humans, but make no attempt to try and explore it any further at that point (see Section 
2.3). After analysing and setting out the work of Bourdieu, Gee, Freire and Rancière I 
am able to re-engage with and discuss matters such as Williams’ ideas as I have some 
reference points and terminology with which to consider it in a meaningful fashion. It is 
in this way that I am able to sustain and inform a meaningful discussion around a range 
of issues pertaining to adult literacies education, empowerment and emancipation in 
Chapters 6 and 7. This includes setting out how education for empowerment might be 
distinguished from education for emancipation, allowing the main aim of my research to 
be addressed. 
 
Thirdly and relating to this, comparing and contrasting the four theorists allows the 
possibility of setting up a conversation between the theorists, giving opportunities for 
raising further issues and problems. In this sense my strategy could be seen as taking 
two theories (i.e. Bourdieu and Gee) and comparing them and in so doing raising a 
range of problems. When this comparative examination is exhausted, I then introduce 
the two other theories and exhaust these. I can then compare the four theories, see what 
questions arise and exhaust that discussion. After this, I bring in further ideas, notably 
from Gur-Ze’ev and so the discussion continues, but pointing towards other possibilities 
for engagement rather than reaching definitive conclusions. The main aim of this project 
suggests that the objective is not to seek and define a ‘final solution’ to adult literacies 
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education and the aims of empowerment and emancipation, but to initiate a discussion 
and develop an argument about the emancipatory potential of adult literacies education. 
The comparative analyses allow me to set up a debate that might continue, perhaps even 
beyond the bounds of my research.  
 
Finally, as my approach is orientated towards understanding how empowerment and 
emancipation might be defined, it follows that the resulting definitions might also be 
compared. In this way, my approach to exploring the four theorists allows me to begin 
distinguishing between empowering education and education for emancipation, so 
meeting the central aim of my exploration. I take the main characteristics of 
empowerment and contrast them with those that might define an emancipatory 
education, but the distinction between the two is not confined to making straight 
comparisons. I am also able to consider what the different definitions of empowerment 
and emancipation imply for how ideas about education might be criticised and the types 
of problems that the contrasting forms of criticism raise. Here I draw upon the existing 
wide body of criticism of Freire’s work, the bulk of which comes from ‘empowerment’ 
perspectives, and contrast this with criticism of Freire raised by researchers such as 
Biesta and Gur-Ze’ev who assume the possibility of an emancipatory education. As well 
as offering a more penetrating examination of Freire’s theory, this strategy opens the 
way for a deeper engagement with how empowerment and emancipation might be 
understood, including drilling down into the idea of education for subjectification. 
There are implications here for how I make my own judgements or criticisms about the 
literature I review and analyse during this research. However, once again, I cannot 
discuss this meaningfully without first presenting my analyses and so I return to this in 
Chapters 6 and 7 when I re-engage with the methodology that underpins this research.  
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3.2 Design Summary 
 
In this chapter I have justified the main aim and objectives of my project as well as 
describing and justifying the approaches that I employ to meet them. I have described 
how the main aim of the thesis, which is to distinguish between how an empowering or 
an emancipatory literacies education might be understood and enacted, arose from an 
existing tradition of questioning the purpose of adult literacies education that is 
expressed in the work of educators, students and academics. This means that the aim of 
this thesis as well as the problems and issues that it addresses originate with existing 
discussions rather than with me, making the design and organisation of my literature 
review integral to the justification of my aims and objectives and the strategies I employ 
to meet them.  
 
I have described how I drew upon three-dimensional conceptualisations of educational 
purpose, as defined by Williams, Hamilton and Hillier, Scribner, Freebody and Lo 
Bianco and Biesta, to organise and structure the literature review. The resulting 
structure drew my attention to empowerment and emancipation as potential purposes for 
adult literacies education and the possibility of demarcating between these. It also raised 
a need for terms such as ‘identity’, ‘power’, ‘equality’ or ‘the human subject’ to be 
defined or understood so that discussions could be meaningfully continued, so laying 
the basis for the objectives of my project. 
 
I have discussed and justified how I selected the work of four theorists for detailed 
analysis, John Paul Gee and Pierre Bourdieu in relation to understanding empowerment 
and Freire and Jacques Rancière who are associated with education for emancipation. I 
also set out my strategy for analysing the theories by reconstructing them in parallel and 
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in comparison to each other describing how this would place emphasis on the 
assumptions that theorists make about people in the context of education, allow 
terminology and reference points to be defined, raise the possibility of setting up a 
conversation about the purpose of education that might continue beyond this project, as 
well as providing a strategy for distinguishing between empowerment and 
emancipation. I have also described how my strategy creates opportunities for exploring 
what it might mean to criticise or judge ideas about education in the context of 
empowerment or emancipation, including my own engagement with the literature 
pertaining to this thesis.   
 
However I also make clear that a deeper engagement with the justification for this thesis 
and the methods I employ cannot be conducted meaningfully at this point. I have only 
been able justify the pragmatic decisions that I have taken in the undertaking of this 
project and some of the repercussions that might follow from attempting to explore the 
possibility of an emancipatory or empowering adult literacies education. But until the 
ideas of Gee, Bourdieu, Freire and Rancière have been set out and discussed in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 it is not possible to engage in a deeper discussion about any theoretical 
justification of my approaches to examining theory. I will re-engage with these types of 
questions again in Chapter 7. But for now I shall commence with the main analysis of 
theories pertaining to adult literacies education, empowerment and emancipation, 
starting with the ideas of James Paul Gee and Pierre Bourdieu.  
 
113 
 
4 Empowerment in the context of adult literacies education 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 I described how researchers advocating for ‘social practice’ understandings 
of adult literacies education have given attention to the idea that education might 
empower students (see Section 2.4.). I also raised issues and problems identified by 
researchers associated with such understandings of empowering literacies (see Section 
2.4.). To summarise, there are three main problems; firstly that conceptualisations of 
empowering literacies education might suggest educational practices where teachers and 
students are made individually responsible for solving problems in society that are 
understood to be structural in character. Secondly, there is the problem of how to make 
judgements about whether a new ‘identity’ or ‘discourse’ resulting from educational 
activity is more desirable that that which it replaces. Finally, understandings of 
empowering literacies education seems to suggest educational practices that might 
replicate existing power hierarchies by making students dependent upon teachers and 
researchers for understandings about how ‘discourse’ and ‘power’ operate. 
 
The ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and James Paul Gee have held great sway amongst 
researchers in the ‘social practice’ tradition (see Section 2.4). The objective of this 
chapter is therefore to reconstruct and explore the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John 
Paul Gee in relation to how the notion of literacies education for empowerment might 
be understood and practised and what the implications might be for defining literacies. 
This will allow me to address research questions vi., vii., and viii. Firstly, I outline how 
Bourdieu and Gee conceptualise an empowering literacies education. From this analysis 
I go on to describe how the notions of ‘power’, ‘identity’ and ‘discourse’ are understood 
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in the context of literacies education. Finally I discuss how the problems and issues 
associated with the practice of an empowering literacies education arise from the 
assumptions that the theorists make.  
 
My analysis allows me to create some reference points as well as raising more questions 
that might contribute towards addressing the main aim of my research, which is to 
explore the distinction between empowering and emancipatory literacies education. 
 
To address the questions outlined above, I examine the work of James Paul Gee and 
Pierre Bourdieu together and in parallel. I describe the assumptions they each make, 
how they each conceptualise oppression and what the repercussions are for 
understanding an empowering or emancipatory literacies education, including the 
anticipated practices of teachers and students.  
 
4.2 Bourdieu and Gee - assumptions  
 
In order to describe how Bourdieu and Gee conceptualise oppression, literacies 
education and the possibility of empowerment, I am going to start by describing the 
assumptions that they each make. Both seek to address a problem that they have 
identified with how language has been typically understood by academics and others, 
suggesting that this has influenced understandings of how power operates, perhaps even 
contributing to the replication of existing power relationships in society. To address this 
problem, they both attempt to describe how language operates to privilege social groups 
whilst excluding others, through definitions of ‘discourse’, ‘identity’ and ‘power’. This 
also lays the groundwork for setting out how an ‘empowering’ literacies education 
might be understood. 
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Bourdieu’s assumptions 
 
Bourdieu claims to follow the programme suggested by Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach 
(see Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, p. 43), where the final thesis reads ‘Philosophers 
have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point however is to change it.’ (see 
Bernstein, 1972, pp. 1-3).  However, Bourdieu seeks to rectify a problem he has 
identified with Marx’s theory which is that it fails to account for language and processes 
of ‘symbolic production’ such as speech, writing or facial expressions. Instead, Marx 
places emphasis on the structure of economic production, perhaps encouraging 
deterministic understandings about society and the processes that might change it, 
leaving little room for human agency (Garnham and Williams, 1980).  
 
However, Bourdieu still makes assumptions and utilises theoretical methods that are in 
keeping with an interpretation of Marxian concepts. This includes reliance upon a 
Marxian notion of dialectics to describe the dynamics that drive societal change, 
conceptualising a dialectical relationship between agency, structure and symbolic 
production (ibid). He also relies on a Marxian notion of praxis to describe his 
understanding of language and theory and what it means to be human (see Harker et al; 
1990; Garnham and Williams, 1980, p. 212; Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 2-3). I return to these 
ideas in Chapters 5 when I describe and discuss the work of Freire and Rancière, 
distinguishing it from that of Bourdieu. But more important here are the assumptions 
that Bourdieu makes about language as these are integral to his understanding of how 
power, systems of education and literacy might be defined and it is this aspect of his 
work that I describe in this chapter.   
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Bourdieu claims that early sociologists such as Comte (or Marx) and later linguists such 
as Saussure and Chomsky support the idea that all people have the same linguistic 
competence. This is the notion that all people have universal and predetermined 
language skills where language is a common ‘treasure trove’ that everyone has equal 
access to. Bourdieu claims that this idea ignores the processes by which power is 
reproduced in society, as power operates through the extent of people’s mastery of 
linguistic competencies (Bourdieu
5
, 1991, pp. 43-44). 
 
Central to Bourdieu’s understanding of how both literacies education and power operate 
is the idea that people are unable to detect how some understandings about people come 
to be taken as valid and legitimate whilst others are not. According to Bourdieu this is 
because meanings are imposed upon people through an undetectable process which 
simultaneously replicates and reinforces hierarchies of power in society. Bourdieu 
describes this process as symbolic violence, where meanings and ‘truths’ are enforced 
through ‘symbolic productions’ such as speech, writing, or other symbolic forms like 
facial expressions, mannerisms or ways of wearing clothes. He summarises: 
 
‘Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to 
impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power 
relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force 
to those power relations’ 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977
6
, p. 4) 
 
                                                          
5
 Bourdieu’s book  Language and Symbolic Power referred to as LSP for the remainder of this text  
6
 Bourdieu and Passeron‘s book Reproduction In Education, Culture and Society is referred to as RE for the 
remainder of this text 
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Bourdieu claims that the idea of there being an undetectable process of symbolic power 
is an ‘axiom’ or self-evident truth, which he describes as the ‘principle of the theory of 
sociological knowledge’ (RE, p. 4). He also claims that anyone who fails to 
acknowledge the existence of symbolic power is in effect colluding with existing power 
hierarchies by neglecting the possibility of being able to understand about how power 
operates. Logically, this would suggest that if the operation of power is exposed, the 
degree of its operation might be weakened.  However, paradoxically, accepting 
Bourdieu’s axiom also means accepting ‘the truth’ that power is reproduced in 
undetectable ways making such exposure impossible. The upshot seems to be that 
regardless of whether we accept Bourdieu’s ‘axiom’ or not, power relationships are 
continually reproduced and serve to reinforce existing social hierarchies by imposing 
meanings onto people through ‘symbolic productions’ such as speaking, writing or 
gesticulating. 
 
For Bourdieu, language is ‘a ‘system of norms regulating linguistic practices’ (LSP, p. 
45) typically dominated by the official language in a nation state. The enforcement of an 
official language creates the illusion that language is a common treasure trove mediated 
by the dictionary. Linguistic or symbolic production (i.e. speaking, writing, or facial 
expressions etc.) is effected by each individual’s anticipation of how the linguist 
markets (i.e. people situated in social hierarchies) will receive their speech. This means 
that speakers amend their speech to suit its anticipated reception or they will suffer 
sanctions which influence their position in the hierarchy of power. For example, an 
individual might amend their regional accent, choice of words, grammar and body 
mannerisms during a job interview with neither themselves nor the interview panel 
being aware of this taking place. This amounts to a form of self-censorship that is 
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legitimised by both speaker and listener and is influenced by existing hierarchies of 
power in society. Bourdieu understands this as activity that raises or lowers the value of 
an individual’s ‘linguistic currency’, which might rise or fall on ‘linguistic markets’ 
which are already dominated by particular groups. This raises the idea of individuals 
having ‘linguistic capital’ that can be exchanged for ‘social capital’ within a social 
grouping, which ultimately counts as currency that can be cashed in for money and 
other goods, perhaps through obtaining lucrative employment.  
 
Bourdieu conceptualises ‘discourse’ as a way of describing the consequences of 
individuals’ transactions on the ‘linguistic market’. Discourse is the speaking, writing, 
bodily movement etc. that results from people wanting to speak well and achieve 
optimum value on a particular linguistic market, be it academia or the school 
playground.  It results from the contradiction between what a person might intend to 
achieve through the way they express themselves and the amendments forced upon 
them because of how they anticipate their speech might actually be received. Discourses 
are defined as: 
 
‘compromise formations’ resulting from transactions between the ‘expressive 
interest’ (the content of what is communicated) and the censorship inherent in 
linguistic production’ 
 (LSP, p. 78).  
 
To explain how an individual’s own linguistic expression is linked to wider power 
relationships, Bourdieu introduces the idea of the ‘habitus’. This is an important concept 
for Bourdieu because it allows him to explain how each individual’s speech might 
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influence power structures in society, whilst simultaneously explaining how existing 
power structures might influence an individual’s speech as he conceptualises a 
dialectical relationship between the two (see Section 5.2. for a description of dialectical 
relationships). 
 
An individual’s habitus is ‘their subconscious system of thought, perception and action; 
a set of dispositions which tend towards replicating the dominant culture' (RE, p. 40).  
Or to put it another way, it is their set of linguistic practices which, without them being 
able to detect it, contribute towards the replication of existing hierarchies of power. 
Bourdieu likens the reproduction of habitus to a form of genetic transmission (RE, p. 
32) that people have no control over. The habitus includes a person’s own knowledge 
and understanding of the world, which in turn influences their action in the world and so 
their contribution to changing it (an idea which sits with a Marxian notion of praxis 
which I discuss in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 in comparison with Freire’s understanding of the 
term). People are structurally predisposed to see the world in accordance with the 
habitus of dominant groups, or for a child perhaps in accordance with its parents. 
Habitus changes with each generation, unfixing the practices that it helps to structure, 
(see Mahar et al, 1990, pp. 10-12) but in a capitalist economic system, the dominant 
culture is that of the dominant economic class (LSP, p. 83). 
 
For Bourdieu, the form and content of discourse depends upon the relationship between 
the habitus and the ‘linguistic market’, whilst the habitus is a set of linguistic 
dispositions that are a product of sanctions on this market (LSP, p. 79). Bourdieu also 
conceptualises a dynamic relationship between discourse and an individual’s ‘identity’ 
as discourse institutes ‘identity’ through acts of naming which influence how people 
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conduct themselves. Being given an ‘identity’ is having a name which signifies an 
individual with an assigned essence that tells them what they are and how they should 
conduct themselves through their own linguistic productions (LSP, pp. 120-122). 
Identifications are also recognised by others and so the giving of ‘identity’ is linked 
with habitus formation. For example, the wearing of a police officer’s uniform may 
influence the practices of an officer, but this is reliant upon other people, e.g. the public 
or the courts, legitimising (i.e. going along with) the officer’s discourse and behaviour 
(ibid, p. 125).  
 
Gee’s assumptions 
 
Like Bourdieu, Gee assumes language can only be considered in its social context 
where both theorists define language in relation to power, ‘identity’ and discourse. Gee 
claims to hold to a ‘post-structuralist’ understanding of language, which he defines in 
contrast to what he describes as popular or ‘folk’ views of language that most people 
hold to in everyday situations. The ‘folk’ view assumes that signs (e.g. words, facial 
expressions etc.) exactly match concepts that are held in the mind (Gee, 1993, pp. 271-
275). This understanding would imply that if a language does not contain a word then 
the speakers cannot conceptualise what the word identifies. For example, if a language 
has no vocabulary for numbers then the assumption would be that the speakers are 
incapable of understanding numerical concepts (see Section 2.4).   
 
Gee contrasts this ‘folk’ understanding with a ‘structuralist’ conceptualisation of 
language which equates with Bourdieu’s description of the linguistic theory of Saussure 
or Chomsky, where language is understood to be a ‘common treasury’. Gee explains 
how ‘structuralist’ understandings of language assume that the relationship between 
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words and meanings is pre-determined through human biology or predictable 
frameworks that follow from the structure of society. For example, though there are 
different words for colours in different languages and cultures, the assumption is that all 
people would ultimately categorise colours in an identical way. This could be due to the 
biology of the eye, or predictable structural commonalities found universally across all 
societies so that, for example, the colour red might always associated with danger. Here 
the system of signs and the structure of the mind and body is privileged over the human 
being. As Gee puts it, ‘if the system changes, the meaning of red changes regardless of 
what goes on in an individual’s head which is irrelevant to meaning’ (ibid, p. 276).  
According to Gee, both ‘folk’ and ‘structuralist’ understandings of language back up the 
‘literacy myth’ that there are predetermined consequences of learning to read and write. 
The ‘folk’ understanding suggests that if people have a limited vocabulary then this will 
limit their capability for thinking (see Section 2.4). Meanwhile the ‘structuralist’ 
understanding suggests that as everyone is ‘wired up’ for language in the same way then 
the consequences of speaking or writing must be predetermined and independent of the 
social context in which they are used, in line with ‘functional’ understandings of 
literacies (see Section 2.2).  
 
For Gee, the example of these two understandings of language suggests that the 
assumptions that people make about language will influence whether or not they hold to 
the ‘literacy myth’ and the ‘great divide’ theory (see Section 2.2). The corollary is that 
holding to an alternative linguistic theory might encourage alternatives to the literacy 
myth, with repercussions for the practice of literacies education. This argument 
underpins Gee’s endorsement of what he claims to be a ‘post-structuralist’ 
understanding of language. Gee describes how instead of understanding the meaning of 
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a sign (e.g. a word) to be perpetually ‘tied down’, languages can be understood as sign 
systems which are historically derived social practices of particular groups, where 
practices evolve to privilege some groups over others. Like Bourdieu, this links 
understandings of language, which includes bodily mannerisms and facial expressions, 
to understandings of power and how it operates in society. However, unlike Bourdieu, 
Gee does not connect social practices to ‘linguistic capital’ and the structural operation 
of the class system under capitalism. Rather, Gee associates social practices with an 
alternative ‘post-structuralist’ understanding of capitalism, described as ‘post-Fordism’ 
or ‘fast capitalism’ (Gee and Lankshear, 1997; New London Group, 1996). This seems 
to suggest that capitalism itself can be understood as a social practice and a 
manifestation of discourse, though I do not attempt to consider this idea further as part 
of this exploration. 
 
Gee uses the concept of Discourse to describe social practices, distinguishing Discourse 
(with a capital ‘D’) from discourse (with a lower case ‘d’) which he uses when referring 
only to the ‘language bit’ or textual aspects of social practices. Gee defines Discourse 
as: 
 
‘ways of behaving, interacting, valuing, thinking, believing, speaking, and often 
reading and writing that are accepted as instantiations of particular roles (or ‘types 
of people’) by specific groups of people, whether families of a certain sort, lawyers 
of a certain sort, bikers of a certain sort, business people of a certain sort, church 
members of a certain sort, African-Americans of a certain sort, women or men of a 
certain sort,  and so on through a very long list. Discourses are ways of being 
‘people like us’.’  
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(Gee, 1996
7
, p. viii) 
 
For Gee, Discourses create meaning, for ‘apart from Discourses, language and literacy 
are meaningless’ (SL, p. 190). Discourse is a ‘sort of identity kit which comes complete 
with the appropriate costume and instructions on how to act, talk, often write and so 
take on a particular social role that others will recognise’ (SL, p. 127).  Drawing upon 
Wittgenstein’s theory of language, Discourses are ‘forms of life’, ‘always and 
everywhere social and products of social histories’ (SL, p. viii) though it is unclear what 
constitutes the ‘social’ for Gee.  
 
Gee cites Bourdieu and Foucault simultaneously to support the assumption that 
Discourses create social positions (perspectives) from which people are invited 
(‘summoned’) to speak, listen, act, believe and value in certain characteristic, 
historically recognisable ways, combined with their own individual styles and 
creativity’ (SL, p. 128). This means that Discourses are embedded in social institutions 
where human artefacts such as books or technologies are ‘props’ that support particular 
Discourses, underwriting ‘identity’ and ways of being of different ‘kinds’ of people. 
 
As with Bourdieu, Discourses are ultimately connected to the distribution of social 
power and hierarchical structure in society as control over them can lead to the 
acquisition of ‘goods’. There are dominant Discourses used by dominant groups who 
are empowered by their use, where ultimately the qualities associated with these 
Discourses can be ‘cashed in’ (Lankshear, 1993, p. 70).  
 
                                                          
7
 Gee’s book Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology and Discourse referred to as SL in the remainder of this text 
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Gee also describes how any discourse has a tendency to incorporate generalisations 
about people, which inevitably leads to some groups of people being either privileged or 
excluded. For Gee, this tendency is indicative of the ‘ideological’ character of 
Discourse, predicated on the idea that Discourse cannot be criticised internally because 
ways of criticising are in themselves defined by Discourses which exclude.  To put it 
another way, Gee assumes that Discourse encapsulates cultural models which generalise 
and exclude, but in a way that is so natural that people are usually oblivious of it (SL, p. 
79) and it is this characteristic of Discourse which makes it ‘ideology’ or ‘ideological’. 
It means that for Gee, most of what a Discourse does and most of what people do with a 
Discourse is unconscious, unreflective and uncritical (SL, p. 190).  
 
Bourdieu tends not to use the term ‘ideology’ in his work (Eagleton, 1991, p. 156), 
however, Gee’s understanding of Discourse as ideology echoes Bourdieu’s notion that 
processes of Discourse production are inherently ‘misrecognised’, undetectable and 
unnoticed by participants, so that Discourses cannot be critiqued from the inside. For 
Gee, Discourse is transmitted through social groups like a virus (SL, p. 167), whilst 
Bourdieu likens the reproduction of habitus to form of genetic transmission (RE, p. 32). 
Gee affirms an idea that seems to sit with Bourdieu’s understanding of the functioning 
of the ‘habitus’, namely that: 
 
‘It is sometimes helpful to say that it is not individuals who speak and act, but 
rather that historically and socially defined Discourses speak to each other and 
through individuals.’  
(Luke in Gee, SL, p. 190) 
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Gee defines ‘theory’ as generalised or generalising Discourse, implying that all theories 
are ‘ideological’ (SL, 86). Echoing Bourdieu’s idea that there might be self-evident 
truths and the associated concept of symbolic power (RE, 4), Gee claims that some 
generalisations are hit upon that people accept without further argument or grounding, 
where all people can say is ‘that’s the way we (people in my group, in regard to this sort 
of matter) do things’ (SL, 19). Such theories can be understood to be ‘master myths’, an 
example being the literacy myth, where it is popularly understood that there are wide 
reaching and predictable consequences of learning to read and write (see Section 2.2). 
 
Summary of Bourdieu and Gee’s assumptions 
 
Though Bourdieu and Gee make different assumptions about language, they both assert 
against what they refer to as ‘structuralist’ understandings of language. Bourdieu’s 
understandings of language are based upon Marxist dialectics and a conceptualised 
relationship between ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ where language is praxis. Meanwhile Gee 
understands language where the meaning of a sign cannot be ‘tied down’ by either an 
individual person or structural determinants such as human biology or predictable laws 
that govern society. For both, language, which includes ways of talking, facial 
expressions, moving or wearing clothes, is a consequence of social practices where 
language in turn might influence those practices.  
 
To conceptualise this, both introduce and define discourse as a manifestation of social 
practices that identify people, but where there is a tendency for processes of discourse 
and ‘identity’ formation or ‘naming’ to privilege dominant groups, linking discourse 
and identification to the reproduction of power. This makes education a process that 
reproduces discourse and ‘identity’, reinforcing existing power hierarchies. For 
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Bourdieu these existing hierarchies are partly determined by the structure of the 
capitalist economic system, again relying on a Marxian notion of the dialectic to explain 
the character of this dynamic, whilst Gee claims to hold to a ‘post-structuralist’ 
understanding of the capitalist system where capitalism is itself a social practice or 
Discourse. 
 
Gee and Bourdieu both conclude that the way in which discourse imposes meanings 
which exclude or disadvantage groups of people is inherently undetectable. Indeed it is 
the un-detectability of this process which allows the impositions and exclusions to 
occur. Gee describes this as an ‘ideological’ process, where the propensity for 
Discourse to generalise and exclude serves as a definition of ‘ideology’. Whilst 
Bourdieu does not use this term, his theory describes a similar process, driven by 
individuals whose linguistic behaviours are, in effect, entwined into and 
indistinguishable from the structural operation of a social and economic system (i.e. 
capitalism). Theorising within a Marxian tradition, Bourdieu’s description of symbolic 
imposition as an ideological process seems to coincide with a tradition of theorising 
about oppression which relies upon understandings of ideology as a form of ‘illusion, 
distortion and mystification’ and which might be traced to the work of Marx and Hegel 
(Eagleton, 1991, p. 3).  
 
4.3 Bourdieu and Gee – power, discourse and identity  
 
In this section I describe how both Bourdieu and Gee understand oppression in the 
context of literacies education and how this links with the assumptions that they both 
make about ‘discourse’, ‘identity’ and ‘power’. I show how Gee and Bourdieu both 
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describe processes of discourse and ‘identity’ formation which replicate power 
structures in society. They both define oppression as a process that is integral to systems 
of education such as schools, where linguistic productions impose meanings which 
influence how students are positioned in social groups and their likelihood of 
succeeding within them.  
 
Bourdieu – oppression as symbolic violence 
 
As mentioned above, Bourdieu describes a process where meanings are imposed on 
people through symbols, be it writing, speech, facial expressions or ways of wearing 
clothes. The process of this imposition is inherently undetectable, for if it were detected 
then meaning would no longer be imposed and so the process of imposition would have 
been dismantled.  Bourdieu refers to this process as ‘symbolic violence’, describing 
how it is integral to any social formation, so that all individuals, groups or classes are 
not only manifestations of power relations but are also engaged in replicating them 
through their own discourse production. 
 
In a capitalist society this means that symbolic violence reinforces class relationships of 
power integral to the economic structure of the system. However, when Bourdieu refers 
to symbolic power he is not referring to class power, as in the relationship between the 
‘bourgeoisie’ and the ‘proletariat’. Rather, symbolic power is defined as the degree to 
which meanings can be imposed on individuals or groups through symbolic productions 
such as text or speech, though there is a relationship between symbolic power and class 
power where each makes the other possible. 
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Symbolic power is understood to be enacted through an ‘educational’ process so that all 
systems of ‘education’ are inherently oppressive. All relationships between teachers and 
students enact symbolic violence which reinforces the dominance of individuals and 
groups in society (RE, pp. 6-7). This defines education as a process of inculcation where 
teachers impose meanings through a process which neither teachers nor students are 
able to recognise or detect. The replication of symbolic violence isn’t confined to the 
activity of teachers; it extends to educationalists and theorists of education too. For 
Bourdieu, any theory or understanding of education that fails to acknowledge symbolic 
violence only serves to increase its un-detectability, so furthering its replication (RE, p. 
13). This implies that educationalists such as Freire (e.g. 1972) are ‘blind’ to the 
‘objective truth’ about how dominant culture remains dominant (RE, p. 24). It also 
implies that exposing how power operates, perhaps through educational research, might 
serve to change power hierarchies rather than reinforce them. 
 
Bourdieu describes how pedagogic activity functions in two ways. Firstly it gives value 
to the style and content of symbolic representations arising from dominant groups, 
whilst devaluing the rest. For example teachers might praise children who speak 
‘Queen’s English’ more than they praise children with regional accents, but where 
teachers and students are inherently unaware of this and might even wish to prevent it 
happening in their classes. Teachers also select and exclude content, (RE, 8), perhaps by 
selecting classical music for play rather than rap music. Importantly, the dominated 
groups legitimise this, colluding in the enactment of their own domination. They might 
expect classical music to be on the curriculum and complain if it is removed, just as 
they might expect airline pilots to speak ‘Queen’s English’ and feel unsafe if they do 
not. 
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Secondly, because symbolic violence can only be enacted when it is undetected, it must 
also be inherently arbitrary in the way it operates. If attempts were made to control or 
plan it, say by a government’s education department, then this would make it more 
easily detectable and so weaken its enactment. By its illusory character symbolic 
violence cannot be controlled and occurs when the social conditions chance to be suited 
for inculcation to take place (RE, p. 8). It is the ‘misrecognition’ of this arbitrary 
process that allows symbolic violence to be legitimised. This also means that symbolic 
violence cannot be directly linked to ideas about ‘human nature’ or the ‘nature of 
things’ (RE, p. 8) because this would predetermine the meanings to be inculcated, again 
raising the chances of its detection and so weakening its enactment. If a schoolgirl is 
punished for having untidy handwriting whilst untidy schoolboy writing is praised, to 
some extent this is a consequence of assumptions being made about the innate character 
of girls and boys. However, it is the attitudes of teachers and students that allow this to 
occur, without any conscious decision making by teachers and students (RE, p. 10). A 
repercussion of this notion is that the content of ideas isn’t crucial to the enactment of 
symbolic violence, rather, the way in which the content is transmitted (RE, p. 25).  
 
Bourdieu describes how the ‘the market’ plays a role in determining the economic and 
social value of products resulting from the school system (i.e. educated people). So, if 
the product is ‘people with qualifications’ and the middle classes view these as high 
currency in the market then they will legitimise the education system which produces 
them, perhaps by being docile and sensitive to sanctions and rewards at school which 
will enable them to achieve the qualifications more readily (RE, p. 28). This process 
encourages a tendency for educational markets to be unified, so that a school teaching 
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the International Baccalaureate would exert greater authority than say, a local evening 
class in permaculture (RE, pp. 21-22).  
 
However, the value of qualifications might fall on the educational markets, with the 
consequence of weakening symbolic violence, a process which Bourdieu claims to have 
been influential in provoking the student protests in Paris in 1968 (see Bourdieu, 1988
8
). 
But in general, ‘bourgeois society’ has unified the linguistic and educational markets, 
affirming and confirming its domination of power hierarchies (RE, p. 28). For 
Bourdieu, the working class are less able to compete and have greater sanctions 
imposed upon them if they do not speak well at school. Meanwhile the position of 
dominant groups such as the middle class is reaffirmed through an illusion which 
encourages the belief that their success in examinations etc. is the result of them being 
gifted or clever.  
 
Bourdieu introduces the notion of a ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ habitus to explain how 
dominated social groups are disadvantaged both at school and in the ‘cultural’, 
‘educational’ and ‘linguistic’ markets that he conceptualises. The ‘primary habitus’ is 
formed through ‘primary pedagogical work’ that takes place within a family group, 
whilst the ‘secondary habitus’ is formed through ‘secondary pedagogic work’ taking 
place in schools, workplaces and other institutions. The success of this secondary 
inculcation depends upon how different the primary and secondary habitus are from 
each other.  This makes a child’s success in school education fundamentally dependent 
upon their primary habitus. 
 
                                                          
8
 Bourdieu’s book Homo Academicus referred to as HA in the remainder of this text 
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Bourdieu’s understanding is that bourgeois families encourage a mastery of symbolic 
operations (e.g. talking, facial expressions or writing) that is in keeping with that 
required to succeed in the dominant culture. Bourdieu describes this dominant symbolic 
mastery as being directed towards ‘the manipulation of words in relations to both other 
words as well as concrete things’ (RE, p. 50). His claim is that to operate in the 
dominant discourse means acquiring mastery over the manipulation of words and other 
symbols without having to relate them to concrete situations. However, for working 
class children there is a marked difference between the education received at home and 
that at school, which means they have to go through a process of deculturation as well 
as reculturation when they enter the formal education system (RE, pp. 45-46). Bourdieu 
makes the claim, backed by ethnographic data, that the home culture of the working 
class encourages a practical mastery that is restricted to ‘the manipulation of things and 
relating these to words’, in other words, they are restricted to relating concrete 
situations to symbols. As a result they are prepared less effectively for school and 
require more formal teaching when they get there (RE, p. 49).  
  
Bourdieu claims that it is impossible for students from dominated groups to catch up 
and succeed within the education system because they will not be able to fully acquire 
the symbolic mastery needed to be inculcated into the dominant habitus. The ability to 
operate symbolically at school and in society beyond relies upon a practical mastery of 
what’s needed to do this, such as skills in reading and writing, pronunciations or 
physical gestures. However, according to Bourdieu, the linguistic practices associated 
with the dominant habitus cannot be reduced completely to practical elements that can 
be taught by teachers in literacies classes, making it impossible for a dominant habitus 
to be completely inculcated through a process of reculturation at school. Dominant 
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groups are advantaged and this cannot be redressed and so they continue to increase 
their linguistic and educational capital, which ultimately can be exchanged on the 
markets for goods and money (RE, p. 46). 
  
Gee – oppression as discourse that excludes 
 
For Gee, discourse is inherently problematic as it reproduces and replicates hierarchies 
of power through processes of ‘identity’ formation. There is a paradox here which Gee 
surmises might have been discussed since the historical emergence of alphabetic text, 
perhaps first articulated by Plato. Plato was concerned that writing could be 
misinterpreted by readers because the author is absent and so cannot confirm the 
meaning of the text. On the one hand this is potentially liberating for a reader as they 
may interpret their own meaning, however it could also allow texts to be used for 
dangerous purposes against the intention of the writer. This places texts in a 
contradictory situation where there are two sides to literacy (and discourse production) 
as both liberator and weapon (SL, p. 30).  
 
For Plato the resolution of the problem of how to enforce the ‘correct’ interpretation of 
texts was to restrict writing to an inner circle of students and to build different layers of 
meaning into texts so that only people with particular skills could find it. Though 
aiming to privilege the writer’s voice, in effect this meant creating rules about who is 
allowed to read where readers deemed to be acceptable include those who make these 
rules in the first place, creating a hierarchy with philosopher-kings (i.e. people like 
Plato) at the top. For Gee this paradox illustrates his belief that literacy (and Discourse) 
is inherently political in the sense of involving relations of power among people (SL, p. 
22). Discourse always excludes and so it is inescapably linked to the creation and 
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reproduction of hierarchies of power in society. He attempts to show that the history of 
literacy encapsulates humanity’s struggles with this contradictory problem, including 
the fuelling of master myths about the consequences of reading and writing. 
 
Gee describes how the meaning of signs encapsulates cultural models which people 
accept as they allow social institutions such as language to do a lot of thinking for them. 
This is a situation we can’t escape from because we can’t possibly make decisions about 
what everything means, just as we couldn’t dance if we had to think about every step. 
Words have no meaning in and of themselves. The meanings of words relate to choices 
made by speakers and writers and the guesses and assumptions made by listeners and 
speakers. But the choices and guesses of speakers and listeners are also constrained by 
the formal system of language and cultural models enacted through the practices of all 
people (SL, pp. 75-77). According to Gee, the ‘ideological’ character of cultural models 
inevitably excludes people. For example the word ‘bachelor’ comes with tacit 
assumptions about typical gender behaviour, which could marginalise Catholic priests, 
gay men, or other people who just don’t want to get married. These exclusions take the 
form of social theory that generalises beliefs or claims about the ways in which ‘goods’ 
are distributed in society, where ‘goods’ are ‘anything that people in the society believe 
are beneficial to have or harmful not to have’  (SL, p. 21).  
 
Like Bourdieu, Gee distinguishes Discourse acquired within the social group from 
Discourse learnt elsewhere in workplaces, schools or other social organisations or 
groupings. He demarcates between ‘Primary Discourse’ which constitutes people’s first 
social ‘identity’ and informs people’s taken for granted understandings of who they are 
and who people ‘like us’ are from the Secondary Discourses they are apprenticed to in 
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later life. Secondary Discourse is learned as part of people’s socialisation into groups 
outside of the home, though Gee is careful not to define a dichotomy between the two 
borrowing the term heteroglossia from Bakhtin to describe the manifestation of impure 
mixtures of social languages (SL, p. 69). But in general, Primary Discourses are 
‘acquired’, usually unconsciously, by exposure in social groups and without formal 
teaching, whilst, Secondary Discourses are ‘learned’ through a process of conscious 
knowledge gained through teaching and explanation, perhaps in the formal education 
system.  
 
Gee claims that people are better at performing ‘acquired’ Discourse than ‘learnt’ 
Discourses. However, though they often know more or have greater meta-knowledge 
about the operation of Discourse that they have ‘learnt’ as Secondary Discourse (SL, p. 
139). This brings Gee to echo Bourdieu’s conclusion that mastery of a Discourse cannot 
be overtly taught through educational activity. People who have acquired a Primary 
Discourse which is not dominant will struggle to master prevailing Discourses from 
teaching within in a school setting. Drawing upon the work of Heath (1983), he claims 
that ‘middle class’ Primary Discourse has many confluences with the Discourses found 
in schools, so that children from those backgrounds are advantaged in the school 
environment. Ultimately this allows them to achieve positions in society where they 
might exclude others and where their Discourse can be cashed in for ‘goods’ (SL, p. 
146). 
 
Summary 
 
Gee and Bourdieu broadly coincide in that they both describe processes by which 
discourse and ‘identity’ creation contribute to the reproduction of hierarchies of power 
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in society which is integral to the organisation of education systems. However, the 
differences in their philosophical positioning influences how they understand these 
oppressive processes. Bourdieu relies upon a Marxian approach which allows the 
concept of symbolic power to link an individual’s linguistic disposition to the 
reproduction of the organisational structure of capitalist society. Meanwhile, Gee 
describes inescapable power relationships that are underpinned by a claimed ‘post-
structuralist’ understanding of language, where discourse inherently encompasses 
theories and exclusions. Gee’s understanding is also associated with an alternative 
understanding of the capitalist system,  where the economic system is understood as 
Discourse and where proficiency in dominant Discourses can ultimately be cashed in 
for ‘goods’. 
 
Gee claims to take a ‘post-structural’ approach to language as a starting point rather 
than understandings of the economic system, where ideology is ‘a set of complex 
effects internal to discourse’ rather than a property of society’s economic base (see 
Eagleton, 1991, p. 198), as implied by Bourdieu. However, they both understand that 
power is reproduced through discourse production where meanings are imposed through 
undetectable processes which cannot be determined from inside discourses. 
 
In this next section I examine what Bourdieu and Gee’s theory might imply for an 
‘empowering’ literacies education. For both, oppression as they define it is activity that 
replicates relationships of ‘power’ so the possibility of ‘empowerment’ is predicated 
upon how ‘power’ is understood by each theorist. For both, power is associated with the 
reproduction of discourse and ‘identity’ and these processes are an inherent part of 
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educational activity in schools and colleges. However, their definitions of power vary so 
I give attention to describing these differences in the next section. 
 
4.4 Bourdieu and Gee – possibilities for an empowering literacies education? 
 
So far I have discussed the assumptions that Bourdieu and Gee make and how this 
relates to their understanding of oppression in the context of schooling. In this section 
address research question vi. by describing how Bourdieu and Gee conceptualise an 
empowering literacies education. 
 
 Bourdieu’s assumptions imply there is no possibility for educators and students to 
avoid the replication of existing relationships of power. In contrast Gee attempts to 
describe the possibility of a literacies education that might empower by creating 
alternatives to existing power structures in society. But I also describe how Gee 
identifies problems with his ideas which he does not adequately resolve, so that the 
educational practices he advocates can be understood to replicate existing power 
hierarches rather than countering or change them. Overall, the discussion allows me to 
outline how the problems associated with the idea of an empowering adult literacies 
education described at the start of this chapter arise from the assumptions that Gee and 
Bourdieu make about language and power.  
 
Bourdieu – orchestrating market devaluations 
 
 
Bourdieu asserts that processes of symbolic violence are not inescapable (RE, pp. 36-
37) and that there is always room for human agency. However, academics from the 
disciplines of sociology, politics and education have found it difficult to detect from 
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Bourdieu’s ideas how such an escape might occur (e.g. Rancière, 2005; Jenkins, 1992; 
Field, 2005; Schuller et al, 2000; Tett and Maclachlan, 2007; Eagleton, 1991, Schostak 
and Schostak, 2010; Inglis, 1997, 12).   
 
Bourdieu has dismissed such claims (see Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, p. 36), but I 
concur with Bourdieu’s critics that there seems to be no escape from symbolic power 
and in particular no role for education in the context of empowerment (see Rancière, 
2005, p. 179).  This is initially implied by some of the language and insights which 
Bourdieu invokes (Field, 2005). For example, Bourdieu’s usage of the term ‘sub-
proletariat’ (e.g. see HA, p. 179) suggests that there are groups of people, identifiable by 
experts, who are both outside of and beneath their fellow humans and incapable of 
contributing to social endeavours. In similar vein, Bourdieu appears to place blame onto 
dominated groups for the predicaments they find themselves, which relates to his idea 
that people are predisposed to legitimise and enforce symbolic impositions, ultimately 
colluding in their own exclusion from educational markets, linguistic markets and 
ultimately markets for goods and money (RE, pp. 41-42). For example, this 
legitimisation is inherent to symbolic violence ‘which persuades people (no doubt all 
the more so, the less privileged they are) to work at being satisfied with what they have 
and with what they are, to love their fate, however mediocre it may be’ (HA, p. 167). 
Here, according to Bourdieu, it seems that ‘mediocrity’ is defined by those who 
dominate the existing social order, where to escape from ‘mediocrity’ is to become 
successful by ‘successfully’ participating in the oppression of others.  
 
Bourdieu’s presupposition is that people should want to be included by and participate 
in linguistic practices that replicate domination. There is no conceptualisation that 
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people might be excluded as a result of their de-legitimisation of the practices of 
dominators, perhaps by refusing to be included. But according to Bourdieu those who 
attempt to place themselves outside of societal structures are held responsible for 
legitimising the system too. Bourdieu describes how even the outlaw who lives outside 
of society’s jurisdiction recognises the law by the very activity of hiding from it, so the 
force of the law is still granted and the outlaw’s behaviour is conducted accordingly 
(RE, p. 14). It seems to me that theorists of education might be placed in this group if 
their ideas don’t take account of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, and so 
Bourdieu’s detractors might be deemed responsible for further replicating societal 
hierarchies. 
 
However, Bourdieu claims that his account of the ‘crisis of May ’68’ contains the 
embryo of a theory of symbolic revolution (see Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, p. 36) and 
so I briefly consider it here. The student protests in Paris in 1968 are described as 
breaking the cycle of symbolic reproduction within universities (HA, p. 161).  Bourdieu 
treats Paris in 1968 as a case study suggesting that his inferences cannot be generalised, 
but he does seem to make generalisations about how symbolic violence might become 
disrupted.  
 
Bourdieu identified a social effect amongst the student population, which he termed 
‘structural downclassing’, claiming that it generated a collective disposition (or habitus) 
to revolt. The effect was manifested when the numbers of university students increased 
whilst at the same time the value of university degrees decreased in the context of the 
French job market. According to Bourdieu, this devaluation or ‘downclassing’ led to a 
decrease in students’ ‘educational capital’ (HA, p. 168) in the educational market, 
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creating a mismatch between their expectations and the actual opportunities available to 
them (HA, p. 163). The phenomenon was so deep and widespread that the pre-existing 
‘social capital’ of the students bore little influence, so that even bourgeois students were 
affected (ibid). 
 
‘Downclassing’ triggered students into refusing to recognise the rules of the ‘game’ of 
education. They stopped ‘playing’, creating a moment when the game might have been 
redefined along with ‘the moves which permit one to win it’ (HA, p. 172). Bourdieu 
claims that such a situation could undermine the authority of an education system, 
allowing forms of symbolic violence to be recognised by both students and academics. 
Convergences between disparate groups could be created in these circumstances that 
might result in a general crisis, or what Bourdieu terms a ‘historical event’ (HA, p. 173).  
 
However, Bourdieu also describes how such convergences are partly dependent upon a 
relationship of objective orchestration between the people involved, suggesting that 
human agency has an important role to ‘seize the opportunity created by the critical 
break in the ordinary order’, to advance or defend their own interests (HA, p. 175). It is 
unclear what the character of this orchestration is and how it is undertaken, though 
there does seem to be a role for the sociologist in determining the character of 
circumstances and the candidates likely to be orchestrated. He describes how leaders 
often emerge as ‘extraordinary actors’ (HA, p. 181), implying that most people take the 
role of the orchestrated (HA, p. 175). This idea also suggests that ‘identity’ is integral 
to societal change, where people come together with from diverse fields and with 
different practices and discourses, creating a common ‘identity’, perhaps through the 
creation of new discourses (HA, p. 180).   
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Whilst Bourdieu considered the unrest in Paris in 1968 to have been dominated by 
‘bourgeois’ interests, he describes how such a ‘crisis’ could have led to diverting the 
reproduction of society as it stands into the creation of an alternatives, where the: 
 
‘crisis undoes the sense of placing, of knowing one’s place, knowing how to place 
sound investments, which is inseparable from the sense of realities and 
possibilities which we call sensible. It is the Critical Moment when, breaking with 
the ordinary experience of time as simple re-enactment of a past or a future 
inscribed in the past, all things become possible (at least apparently), when future 
prospects appear really contingent, future events really indeterminate, the moment 
truly instantaneous, suspended, its consequences unpredicted and unpredictable.’  
(HA, p. 182).  
 
However, I agree with Rancière (2005, p. 179) that whilst there is a role for education in 
reproducing oppressive social orders, there seems to be no role for it in the creation of 
the possible alternative that Bourdieu describes. The ‘Critical Moment’ seems to be 
reliant upon ‘orchestrators’, perhaps with the attributes of sociologists, sitting outside of 
situations so that they might explain and orchestrate them from above, seemingly 
replicating existing power structures in the process. Bourdieu’s axiom describing the 
undetectable character of symbolic power seems to support an unbreakable circle, 
where discourse might be understood to be inherently ‘ideological’ and where even 
attempts to theorise alternatives to symbolic power can be accused of merely replicating 
it. It seems that education can only be understood as a process of symbolic violence. 
Though claiming to follow Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, 
p. 43, see Bernstein, p. 1), Bourdieu seems to have amended the 11
th
 thesis to: 
141 
 
‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point however 
is to explain why it can’t be changed.’ 
 
Gee – taking control over discourse 
 
 
Whilst Bourdieu appears to define literacies education as a process of inculcation which 
replicates an oppressive social order, Gee attempts to describe an alternative to this, 
suggesting the possibility of an empowering literacies education. Gee defines literacy as 
the ‘mastery of a secondary Discourse’ (SL, p. 143), however, as people operate in 
multiple discourses, literacy is only meaningful in the plural, literacies. Reading and 
writing could be considered as the mastery of a secondary discourse involving print, but 
as print constitutes only part of many discourses, Gee sees no gain from including it in 
any definition, where literacies defines a much wider categorisations than just reading 
and writing that could include ways of gesticulating, moving or behaving. 
 
To recap, Discourse is inherently ‘ideological’ as it inevitably makes generalisations 
about people which encourage the replication of existing power hierarchies that 
privilege some and exclude others. What’s more, printed texts, when considered as 
snapshots of discourse, are inherently political as on the one hand the reader has the 
freedom to interpret meanings, but on the other this could lead to misinterpretations of 
writers’ intentions with texts being used for unintended harmful purposes. All of this 
suggests that literacies are never neutral in terms of power hierarchies and it is not 
possible to escape from its consequences. However, Gee refuses to accept that there is 
no alternative, attempting to describe a literacies education that is potentially 
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‘liberating’ and ‘empowering’. He does not demarcate between these two terms, so 
‘liberation’ seems to be synonymous with ‘power’ (SL, p. 144). 
Gee describes how gaining mastery of more than one Discourse, i.e. alongside meta-
knowledge about how Discourse operates, allows individuals to take control over 
dominant Discourse, create new identities and so change relationships of power. A 
literacy is ‘liberating (‘powerful’) if it can be used to allow students to critique other 
discourses and understand how discourse operates (SL, p. 144).  In order to do this, 
people need to have mastered a secondary Discourse, where the practices associated 
with a ‘liberatory’ or ‘empowering’ literacies are those needed to teach students how 
gain such a mastery.  
 
As with Bourdieu, Gee describes how it is very difficult to gain mastery of a dominant 
Discourse when it is being learnt as a secondary Discourse. Those with greatest mastery 
will have acquired the dominant discourse as a primary Discourse, so gaining an 
advantage during schooling. Whilst Bourdieu suggests no way out other than waiting 
for a devaluation or ‘downclassing’ in the linguistic or educational market, Gee suggests 
an alternative. He describes how people from less dominant groups might still 
participate in dominant Discourse through a process he describes as ‘mushfake’. 
‘Mushfake’ refers to the partial acquisition of a secondary dominant Discourse, 
alongside the learning of meta-knowledge about that dominant Discourse, which if used 
together by students might allow them to give an impression of proficiency. The meta-
knowledge allows students whose primary Discourse is less dominant to gain an ability 
to manipulate dominant Discourse to their advantage. As Gee defines theory as 
discourse that makes generalisations, understandings about how Discourse operates can 
be understood as a form of ‘theory of society’ which could be used to resist oppression 
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(SL, p. 147). Gee speculates that this liberating literacy might ‘open some doors’ for 
non-dominant groups. Possibilities could be created where instead of Discourses 
operating ideologically by ‘capturing’ people and using them to ‘speak’ throughout 
history’, people ‘capture’ Discourses and use them to strategise and survive’ (SL, p, 
149).  
 
There are consequences for how an empowering literacies education might be practised. 
Gee claims that it might be achieved by students partially mastering a Secondary 
Discourse through acquisition, supplemented with meta-knowledge about how 
Discourse operates. In practical terms, this gives the empowering literacies teacher two 
roles. Firstly, the teacher should create possibilities for students to be exposed to 
secondary discourse in natural, meaningful and functional settings rather than through 
the formal teaching of technical aspects such as grammar and spelling (SL, p. 144). This 
would require teachers to gain knowledge about the secondary discourse being taught 
and use this knowledge to inform the creation of naturalistic environments where the 
Discourse might be acquired. This might mean giving students opportunities to 
participate in corporate events, academic conferences or to join a theatre company. It 
might also mean using newspapers, advertisements or work-related spread sheets during 
a class rather than replica ‘text book’ materials. Secondly, students must gain meta-
knowledge about how Discourses operate so that they might critique them for 
themselves. Here Gee stipulates that formal teaching is mandatory and so the second 
role of the teacher is to receive meta-knowledge about Discourses from researchers and 
then deliver it to students. The delivery should include explanations and analysis, 
breaking down the material into analytical bits so that the operation of Discourse might 
be understood (SL, p. 145).  
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Taking these ideas together, Gee’s literacies for liberation involves elements of 
‘learning’ and elements of ‘acquisition’, but where the ‘learning’ aspect that relies upon 
formal teaching is essential. The repercussion is that experts in linguistics and 
ethnography are necessary for garnering and evaluating meta-knowledge about 
Discourse which can then be taught formally to students alongside methods of analysis. 
Students might then help prevent a group’s discourse from being misrecognised, 
marginalised or excluded by taking a degree of control over discourse (SL, pp. 166-
167).  
 
Empowering literacies education – discussion 
 
In this section I address research question viii by describing problems and issues 
associated with the practice of an empowering literacies education and how they arise 
from the assumptions that the Bourdieu and Gee make. So far in this chapter I have 
described  how the theories of Bourdieu and Gee, which hold great sway amongst 
researchers from the ‘social practice’ tradition, might inform ways of understanding an 
empowering adult literacies education. However, my analysis suggests that Bourdieu’s 
ideas offer no possibility of an empowering education and I will briefly return to this 
again when I draw my conclusions.  On the other hand, Gee’s work does assume that an 
empowering literacies education might be possible and attempts to describe how this 
might be understood. For this reason, my attention turns to Gee’s ideas and the 
problems that they raise for most of the remainder of this chapter.  
 
There are at least three implications of the educational activity that Gee describes which 
broadly coincide with problems already identified by researchers about how the idea of 
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an empowering education has been understood (see Section 2.4), which I restated at the 
start of this chapter. Firstly, Gee’s empowering literacies education makes students 
dependent upon researchers for knowledge about Discourse and also upon teachers for 
delivering this knowledge to them. The problem with this relationship is that it seems to 
replicate existing power hierarchies rather than change them. Secondly, there is the 
problem of how to make judgements about whether a new ‘identity’ or ‘discourse’ 
resulting from educational activity is more desirable that that which it replaces. Gee 
himself identifies this as a problem and suggests a way of getting around it (Gee, 1993, 
pp. 291-292).  
 
The third implication is connected to how Gee (and Bourdieu) both associate the 
creation of identities with empowerment. In Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4) I described 
some researchers’ concerns about teachers’ placing emphasis on individual students 
authoring their own ‘identity’, as it might encourage individualistic educational 
practices that fail to address the social character of society and its problems. However, 
in the analysis of Bourdieu and Gee’s ideas that I present above, it seems that the 
development of a common or shared ‘identity’ amongst groups of people is deemed to 
be important to understanding empowerment in the context of education. I attempt to 
discuss this further and in more detail below when I consider these three problematic 
implications in turn. But I start by considering the issues of dependency and the criteria 
for making judgements about discourse, as these are also connected to understandings 
about ‘identity’. 
Dependency between teachers and students 
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Gee’s practical understanding of an empowering literacies education places students in 
a relationship with their teachers where they are reliant upon them for knowledge about 
how discourse operates. There is a similar relationship between teachers and 
researchers, as teachers are dependent upon them for knowledge so that they might then 
fulfil their role of delivering it to students. The required knowledge is described by Gee 
as ‘meta-knowledge’ about Discourse which students must receive and then learn to use 
so that they might control dominant discourse. The problem with this scenario in 
education is that it seems to replicate existing hierarchies, making students dependent 
upon an emancipator for their own freedom. Biesta describes this paradox through 
asking the rhetorical question: 
 
‘Should slaves remain grateful to their masters for setting them free?’ 
(Biesta, 2010a, p. 45) 
 
The problem of dependency seems to be associated with Gee’s (and Bourdieu’s) 
assumption that the functioning of particular discourse cannot be fully understood by 
those who participate within it. According to Gee, Discourse creates generalisations (i.e. 
theories) which exclude people, but in a way that is so natural that people are unaware 
of this process (SL, p. 79). What people do with their literacy (i.e. their mastery of 
‘secondary’ discourses) is unconsciously critical and unreflective (SL, p. 190). It is this 
particular understanding of discourse as ‘ideology’ that seems to underpin how Gee’s 
understanding of empowering literacies relies upon the paradoxical dependency 
between teacher and student that I have described. 
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Gee’s literacy education could be summarised as an attempt to get around the problem 
of the ideological character of discourse, so that students might take some control over 
it rather than the other way around. Whilst Bourdieu’s understandings suggest no such 
possibility, Gee refuses to accept that there is no escape from ideology. But it seems he 
is unable to break the dependency between researchers, teachers and students for 
knowledge about power. Discourse operates in such a way that students must be able to 
adopt a third person stance in order to understand and take control of its operation. But 
to gain this ‘mastery’ they must become dependent upon teachers twice over. Firstly, 
they depend on the teacher to recreate a naturalistic environment where they might gain 
some mastery of a secondary Discourse through ‘acquisition’ rather than ‘learning’. 
Secondly, the teacher is dependent upon the receipt of ‘meta-knowledge’ from 
researchers about discourse, so that they might deliver it to the student. So as with 
Bourdieu, there is a privileged position for the sociologist or socio-linguist.  
 
There are repercussions here for how Gee understands educational relationships. Gee 
seems to limit the possibilities of teachers and students’ relationships to one of 
knowledge transmission. In turn, this suggests that discussions in literacies education 
should orientate around what the content of that knowledge should be (for Gee it is 
meta-knowledge about discourse) and possible ways of transmitting knowledge (for 
Gee this would be through a mixture of teachers’ explanation and teachers’ creation of 
‘naturalistic’ environments in which students learn how the knowledge is used). It 
seems to me that these two orientations broadly coincide with the domains of 
‘qualification’ and ‘socialisation’ described by Biesta (2010)9.  
                                                          
9
 A similar conclusion can be drawn from Inglis’s (1997) attempt to distinguish between empowerment 
and emancipation in the context of adult education. Here Inglis claims that ‘emancipation concerns 
critically analyzing, resisting and challenging structures of power’ (ibid, 4). Inglis advocates a claimed 
educational ‘emancipation’ where ‘By laying bare its features and by announcing the various strategies 
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To recap, Biesta (2010) refers to three overlapping domains of educational purpose and 
function: qualification which describes education that allows people do something e.g. 
fix leaky pipes or pass exams; secondly, socialisation, referring to education for 
assimilating people into existing traditions of society; finally subjectification, which is 
education that might create possibilities for emancipation from the existing social order, 
creating possibilities for alternatives to society as its stands (see Section 2.4). Relating 
this conceptualisation to Gee’s understanding of literacies education, the delivery of 
meta-knowledge about discourse could be considered as education with a purpose of 
qualification, where students are ‘given’ knowledge that allows them to do something 
i.e. analyse how discourse operates. Meanwhile, the teachers’ role of creating 
environments in which students learn how to operate within existing Discourse could be 
understood as a form of socialisation into society as it stands. 
 
To reiterate, Gee’s understanding of an empowering literacies seems to discount the 
possibility for emancipation as subjectification. As yet, I have only described briefly 
how the idea of ‘subjectification’ might be understood and what is important about this 
in the context of adult literacies education (see Section 1.5). My research aims to 
describe how emancipation as subjectification might be understood and I attempt a 
detailed description in Chapter 7. But the point here is that that Gee (and Bourdieu) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and tactics through which it is exercised, adult educators can help people, particularly the less powerful, 
to know and understand power and to see how it operates in their lives.’ (ibid, 10). This ‘requires a 
theoretical or conceptual framework which enables the oppressed to see different types of power so that 
they can learn to see how they are being dominated.’ (ibid 15). What’s more ‘if adult education is to make 
a contribution to emancipation, it needs to provide not merely a theory of power, but one which comes in 
a language that can be understood by the oppressed. It is this goal of producing an analysis of power 
which is at once attractive and accessible...’ (ibid). Though Inglis draws upon Foucault’s theoretical 
work, he discusses this in terms of how it might inform subject matter being taught to students, rather 
than considering the implications for educational relationships (eg as attempted by Biesta (2012b). 
Though Inglis raises pertinent questions about the character of power, the educational practices he 
recommends broadly mirrors Gee’s and so I would categorise this as education for ‘empowerment’ rather 
than ‘emancipation’ (as claimed by Inglis) 
149 
 
offers little in the way of insights about this matter and it is in this second sense that 
Gee’s work can be judged to offer no overlap with subjectification. Perhaps Gee comes 
closest to addressing the possibility of subjectification as a purpose or function for 
education in his attempt to overcome the problem of how to judge whether one 
Discourse is preferable to another, though there seems to be no place for subjectification 
as an educational function, but I discuss this further in the next section. 
 
Judging discourse 
 
Gee himself raises a concern about how to distinguish between discourse which 
reproduces existing social hierarchies and discourse that might create more desirable 
alternatives to it and what this might mean for understandings of literacies education. If 
the purpose of an empowering adult literacies education is to master a Secondary 
Discourse, then presumably this new Discourse should be preferable to that which it 
replaces. But on what basis can any Discourse be judged better or worse than any other? 
As Gee puts it: 
 
‘if all sign systems are rooted simply in historically derived social practices, then 
how can we ‘morally condemn’ one discourse over another? Any such judgement 
made would itself be rooted in a sign system which like all other sign systems 
cannot be validated from outside itself or ‘outside history’. 
(Gee, 1993, pp. 291-292) 
 
It seems that it is here, in the context of his own theorising of literacies education, that 
Gee’s attention turns to a question which Biesta (2010) might consider to be an 
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educational one. Gee is posing the problem of how to judge the outcome of literacies 
education, in other words, whether the resulting Discourse can be judged to slot people 
into existing (oppressive) social hierarches, or whether it might have raised the 
possibility of more desirable alternatives. There could be some overlap here between 
this question and Biesta’s (2010) posing of the possibility of distinguishing between 
education with a purpose of socialisation and education with a purpose of 
subjectification (as emancipation). I start to explore how such a distinction might be 
made when I reconstruct the theories of Freire and Rancière in Chapter 5. But Gee 
seems to immediately shut the question down again, by introducing two ethical 
principles which must be used to make judgements about Discourse. What’s more, Gee 
states that if anyone disagrees with the ethical principles then he ‘would withhold the 
term ‘human’, in its honorific, not biological, sense, from such people’ (SL, 20, Gee, 
1993, 293). The first principle states: 
 
‘That something would harm someone else (deprive them of what they or the 
society they are in view as ‘goods’) is always a good reason (though perhaps not a 
sufficient reason) not to do it.’  
(SL, p. 19; Gee, 1993, p. 293) 
 
Here, ‘goods’ are described as ‘anything that people in the society believe are beneficial 
to have or harmful not to have, be it life, space, time, ‘good’ schools, ‘good’ jobs, 
wealth, status, power, control, or whatever’.  So Gee defines society as any grouping 
who share beliefs about what counts as ‘goods’ (SL, p. 21; Gee, 1993, p. 293).   
 
The second principles states: 
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‘One always has the (ethical) obligation to (try to) explicate (render overt and 
primary) any theory that is (largely) tacit and either removed or deferred when 
there is reason to believe that the theory advantages oneself or one’s group over 
other people or other groups’  
(SL, p. 21; Gee, 1993, p. 293).   
 
Considering the two ethical principles in turn, the first is concerned with the acquisition 
of goods but with no criteria for judging whether the ‘goods’ are ‘any good’. Given the 
dependency of students on teachers that I described above and how this might replicate 
existing societal processes, this seems problematic. Gee claims that society is defined 
by peoples’ common understanding of what counts as goods, but given that there is a 
privileged role for researchers in Gee’s description of literacies education, perhaps 
researchers will be privileged in determining what counts as goods.  
 
Gee’s second ethical principle seems to be a circular argument. Gee has already argued 
that the ideological character of Discourse is such that it always advantages or excludes. 
To make this understanding overt suggests that understanding how Discourse operates 
might allow people to judge the Discourse. But an explanation of how a Discourse 
operates does not in and of itself provide criteria for judging it. It might demonstrate 
that a particular Discourse excludes, but it doesn’t help in the making judgements about 
what to exclude or include. It might explain how literacies education operates as a 
socialising machine, but it doesn’t suggest how teachers and students might put a 
spanner in its works. 
 
152 
 
What’s even more alarming here is Gee’s idea that those who don’t accept the two 
ethical principles might be in some way considered to be inhuman. Instead of 
encouraging further exploration of the problem of how to judge discourse, it shuts it 
down. In this way it seems to function in the same way as Bourdieu’s ‘axiom’ about the 
inherently misrecognisable character of symbolic violence, where anyone who disagrees 
with it is assumed to be encouraging the replication of existing power hierarchies.  
 
Gee’s ethical principles seem to define humanity through its relationship with discourse. 
Though he claims a ‘post-structuralist’ understanding of language, the ethical principles 
return Gee to a structure where humanity is predefined to the extent that those who do 
not accept the definition may be considered unworthy of the honorary title of human. 
This could open Gee’s ideas up to the same criticism that Freire has received for 
defining humanity through a description of the concept of praxis (see Section 2.4. and 
Section 6.3). After placing great emphasis on describing empowering literacies 
education as one that might create new ‘identities’ through discourse production, Gee 
has returned the possibility of empowerment to a problem about how to define humanity 
and I return to this again in the next chapter when I consider Freire’s work in some 
detail. 
 
Another problem with Gee’s ethical principles is that they imply that education might 
be an individualistic practice. If the role of the teacher is to make judgements about 
Discourse, then it is their task to judge an individual student’s Discourse and the ways 
that they identify themselves, making teaching an individualistic pursuit. However, Gee 
also attaches some importance to students creating shared identities.  This brings me to 
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the question of individual and group ‘identity’ and how it relates to the idea of 
empowerment, which I discuss next. 
 
Identity and identification 
 
The discussion so far seems to suggest three problems with understandings of literacies 
education that aims to encourage the creation of new identities through discourse, which 
I outline briefly in this section. Firstly, as with Discourse, there is an absence of criteria 
for judging whether any ‘identity’ is preferable to any another. Secondly, that 
understanding education as a process of identification neglects the possibility of an 
active and social human subject, limiting human relationships to those between people 
and symbols. Thirdly, that this has implications for how educational relationships might 
be understood, perhaps suggesting educational practices should be limited to the passing 
down of knowledge.  
 
Gee emphasises the importance of creating social identities, as the naming or the 
labelling of groups or people, as part of an empowering literacies education. He defines 
a social grouping by the commonly held understanding of what a group considers to 
counts as goods, where goods are anything that the group considers it to be harmful not 
to have, such as jobs, wealth, status or power (SL, p. 21).  This implies that the main 
purpose of developing a social ‘identity’ is to create new discourse about what counts as 
‘goods’, where, in the context of literacies education, mastering this discourse might  
allow the goods to be acquired. This logic doesn’t add to or detract from the problems I 
have already discussed in the previous sections. Gee’s understanding of identity can’t be 
disassociated from circular arguments which seem to revolve around Gee’s initial 
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assumption that all Discourse is inherently ideological, operating to exclude people 
through processes that speakers, writers and gesticulators cannot detect.   
 
Gee associates Discourse directly with the ways in which people identify or label 
themselves and each other. Discourse operates as a kind of identity kit that influences 
how people wear their clothes, speak and behave (SL, p. 127). But here the problem of 
how to distinguish between preferable or less preferable discourses that I described 
above applies equally to the constitution of identity. As Holloway puts it: ‘it would be 
nonsense to say there are good identities and bad identities’ (Holloway, 2002, p. 68). In 
the context of Gee’s empowering literacies education, it seems that if such judgements 
are made, there is a privileged role for researchers as only they can sit outside of a 
discourse and analyse its operation. In Bourdieu’s terminology, perhaps the importance 
of creating social identities is that this might identify groupings of people ripe for 
‘orchestration’ by sociologists as revolutionaries.  
 
For Biesta, the problem with understandings of education orientated towards 
identification and identity is that they offer a limited understanding of the ways in 
which people relate to each other and respond to each other’s actions. The purpose of 
human relationships might be reduced to us identifying whether we are the same or 
different from each other. 
 
‘This has to do with the fact that if we would only relate to others in order to make 
clear how we are different from them, there would, in a sense, be nothing “at 
stake” in our relationships with others. Or, to put it differently, we would only 
“need” others in order to find out and make clear how we are different from them - 
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how my identity is unique - but once this has become clear we wouldn’t need 
others any more. Our relationship with others would therefore remain 
instrumental.’ 
(Biesta, 2010, p. 86) 
 
Biesta draws upon the work of Levinas and Arendt in educational contexts, asking the 
question of why it matters that we are unique, (Biesta, 2010, p. 86), considering 
uniqueness as irreplaceability and exploring the quality of human relationships where 
people are both the subjects of action and responsive to the actions of others (Biesta, 
2006, p. 137). Biesta discusses these as aspects of being and becoming a human subject, 
in other words, education as subjectification. This re-orientates the discussion away 
from questions around what makes us unique, where our characteristics and possessions 
become matters of overriding precedence. From my exploration of the ideas of both Gee 
and Bourdieu, it seems that their understanding of human relationships in the context of 
education is indeed limited to that between people and the symbols that identify them, 
where human qualities such as responsibility, trust, love or friendship are not 
mentioned.  
 
Gee’s ethical principles seem to define and judge human beings by whether or not they 
accept an understanding of how Discourse operates, in other words by whether or not 
they accept an understanding of how people are identified or labelled. It seems that 
humans are primarily the carriers of characteristics (Biesta, 2010, p. 86) and so 
importance is attributed to how these characteristics are assigned. The consequence is a 
limited description of how education might be understood. I have also discussed above 
(in Section 4.4) how Gee understands education as a process of knowledge 
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transmission,  characterising literacies education by processes of identifying the 
knowledge that should be transmitted and the ways in which the transmission might be 
organised. Here again, the character or quality of the relationships between people, for 
example the relationships between teachers and students, is not considered beyond 
processes of delivering or receiving knowledge. 
 
The implications of Bourdieu’s understanding of discourse and power have even 
bleaker implications for the quality of human relationships. For Bourdieu, symbolic 
power is woven into the operation of the capitalist system, suggesting that if that system 
were replaced then symbolic power might be dismantled. But as I mentioned above, 
Bourdieu’s theory seems to describe the impossibility of such an occurrence. It seems 
that symbolic power cannot be escaped as all discourse is inherently oppressive. To take 
Bourdieu’s understandings to their logical conclusion, escaping from symbolic power 
would mean escaping discourse and processes of identification or naming. Human 
equality would be reliant upon the ceasing of all speech, bodily mannerisms or facial 
expressions, as well as the halting of all symbolic expressions such as dance, painting or 
music. Presumably science itself would cease if it is understood as social activity reliant 
upon human discourse.  
 
But the point here is that to understand inequality in terms of the imposition of 
identification through discourse reproduction suggests a limited if not absurd notion of 
equality and what it is to be human. Perhaps ‘identity is the antithesis of love and 
friendship’ (Holloway, 2002, p. 68). Whilst I have described the work of Biesta to help 
illustrate this point, I pursue the notion of subjectification through exploring the work of 
Freire and Rancière. I introduce the work of these two theorists of education in Chapter 
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5 and explore what this means for understanding emancipatory education for 
subjectification in Chapter 6. 
 
This chapter set out to explore how empowerment might be understood in the context of 
adult literacies education, through considering the ideas of Bourdieu and Gee. It seems 
that understandings of ‘empowerment’ must be in some way be intrinsically linked to 
understandings of ‘power’, so before I summarise my exploration, I briefly give 
attention to how Bourdieu and Gee conceptualise ‘power’, so addressing research 
question vii. 
 
Power and empowerment 
 
Gee doesn’t explicitly define power in his work, presenting ’liberating’ literacies as 
being synonymous with ‘empowerment’, without distinguishing between the two terms 
(SL, p. 144). However, his usage of the term ‘power’ seems to refer to a measure of a 
degree of ability to control discourse, or to put it another way, a degree of ability to 
recognise or exclude some identities over others. Gee also links the mastery of 
Discourse to the possibility of acquiring goods. Lankshear (1997, p. 70) summarises 
Gee’s understanding of power, echoing Bourdieu’s description of linguistic and social 
capital: 
 
‘To have access to power is to possess qualities that have been related positively to 
goods or means of accessing them. To actually exercise power is to draw on these 
qualities, to ‘cash them in’, as it were. To be empowered is to have the qualities 
one possesses (or has available) made discursively – that is, through Discourse – 
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into ‘currency’ for acquiring goods and benefits, or for having them bestowed.’  
(Lankshear, 1997, p. 70). 
 
It seems that those whose Discourse excludes are dominators and will have power (and 
goods), whilst those who are excluded by dominant Discourse have less power (and 
therefore less goods). But being empowered is to take control over discourse and 
somehow ‘cash it in’ for goods, where literacies education might encourage this. Given 
how mastery of Discourse is dependent upon meta-knowledge about how Discourse 
operates, it is no surprise that Gee also declares that ‘Knowledge is power, because it 
can protect all of us from harming others and from being harmed, and because it is the 
very foundation of resistance and growth’ (SL, p. 191).  
 
Presumably it is meta-knowledge about Discourse that is powerful, relating directly to 
the notion of ‘powerful literacies’ as the mastery of discourse and that might ‘give’ 
students the skills to author new identities. It seems to me that it is this understanding 
that seems to have garnered influence amongst academics from the ‘social practice’ 
tradition of adult literacies education (e.g. Crowther, Tett & Hamilton, 2003; Janks, 
2010). Perhaps this is best summarised by Crowther, Tett & Hamilton’s statement that 
‘literacy [education] that obscures the power relationships inscribed in its construction 
ultimately disempowers’ (2003, p. 3).  
 
This notion can be seen to inform research that is orientated towards revealing the 
operation of power in situations where literate practices are required, such as form 
filling (Fawns and Ivanič, 2003), interpreting advertisements (Janks, 2010) or 
understanding teacher-parent relationships on family literacy programs (Rocha-Schmid, 
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2010). Here the assumption is that exposing power hierarchies must be integral to the 
task of changing them. Otherwise parents might be ‘deluded’ (Roch-Schmid, 2010, p. 
357), or form fillers remain without power in their hands (Fawns and Ivanič, 2003, p. 
92).  
 
Bourdieu defines power or ‘symbolic power’ as a degree to which meanings are 
imposed through symbolic productions. This power is exerted through its legitimisation, 
as people ‘misrecognise’ the arbitrary way in symbolic imposition operates. By 
definition, it isn’t possible for those who are suffering this imposition to detect its 
operation and so simultaneously dismantle it.  It seems that symbolic power is 
inescapable and tends to support existing structural hierarchies associated with the 
economic classes in the economic system. The notion of the habitus describes a 
mechanism where symbolic power is woven into the structure of capitalism, where 
groups who accumulate linguistic capital will tend to be bourgeois and those who do 
not, to be proletarian. But ultimately, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are defined by 
their relationship with the production of economic capital, rather than Bourdieu’s 
galaxy of other forms of capital, be it ‘linguistic’ ‘symbolic’ ‘cultural’, ‘social’ etc.  
 
This brief summary of Bourdieu’s understanding of power seems to re-iterate how there 
seems to be no possibility for an empowering education. This sits with how Bourdieu’s 
ideas are engaged with by literacy researchers, where they are utilised to inform how 
literacies education might be researched rather than explore possibilities for its practice 
(e.g. Luke and Freebody, 1997, Heath, 1983).  Perhaps their purpose is to further 
understand literacies education as a socialising machine rather than to explore how 
teachers might practice a literacies education which places spanners in the machine’s 
160 
 
works. But, again, I shall re-engage with how the ideas of Bourdieu and Gee have been 
picked up in Chapter 7.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to reconstruct and explore the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John 
Paul Gee in relation to how the notion of literacies education for empowerment might 
be understood and practised and what the implications might be for defining literacies. 
This exploration has allowed me to describe notions such as ‘power’, ‘identity’ and 
‘discourse’ in the context of literacies education, so that they might serve as reference 
points to enable a meaningful exploration of issues and problems raised in relation to 
the idea of an empowering education. In this chapter I pursued these ends by 
considering the work of Gee and Bourdieu together and in parallel. I described the 
assumptions they each make, how they each conceptualise oppression and what the 
repercussions are for understanding an empowering or emancipatory literacies 
education, including the anticipated practices of teachers and students.  
 
This allowed me to address the question of how a literacies education for empowerment 
might be understood. It also allowed me to address the question of how problems and 
issues associated with the practice of an empowering literacies education arise from the 
assumptions that the theorists make. I concluded that both theorists take understandings 
of language as a starting point and link this to the idea that discourse is inherently 
ideological, where Bourdieu’s understandings of power and discourse suggest no 
possibility for an empowering literacies education, whilst Gee’s imply educational 
practices which are problematic. 
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In the discussion above I raised the possibility of an emancipatory literacies education 
that might overlap with Biesta’s domain of subjectification (Biesta, 2010). In the next 
chapter I attempt to describe how this might be understood, through exploring the 
theories of Paulo Freire and Jacques Rancière which attempt to describe education as 
emancipation. In Chapter 6 I continue this exploration to explore how education for 
emancipation as subjectification might be understood and distinguished from education 
for empowerment, preparing the ground for exploring the possibilities for emancipation 
in the context of adult literacies education in the latter part of this thesis. 
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5 Exploring emancipation 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to reconstruct and explore the work of Paulo Freire and Jacques 
Rancière in relation to the question of how an education for emancipation might be 
understood and practised. As with Bourdieu and Gee, I take the theories of Freire and 
Rancière together and in parallel, considering the assumptions they each make, how 
they understand oppression and how these ideas inform the possibility of an 
emancipatory education, so addressing research questions ix, x and xi. The exploration 
allows me to describe how concepts associated with the idea of an emancipatory 
literacies education, such as ‘emancipation’, ‘equality’, or ‘oppression’, might be 
understood. These descriptions create reference points to inform a meaningful 
exploration about how education for empowerment might be distinguished from an 
emancipatory education, including descriptions of education for subjectification, which 
commences in Chapter 6.  
 
Rancière theorises how an emancipatory education might be understood but perhaps 
with more detailed descriptions than those provided by Freire, so part of my 
reconstruction of Rancière’s work continues into Chapter 6. For example, Rancière 
details the significance of identity and identification in relation to understanding 
emancipation. This aspect of Rancière’s work has implications for understanding how 
empowerment might be distinguished from emancipation in the context of education 
and so I also consider it in Chapter 6. 
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The reconstruction of Freire and Rancière’s work set out in this chapter also informs my 
discussion about the emancipatory potential of literacies education. Freire’s work has 
already been considered in this context (e.g. Freire, 1986, 1970; Giroux, 1988). 
However, to date, the work of Rancière has not been explored in the context of literacies 
education and attempting such an exploration is one of the objectives of this project. I 
consider specifically what the ideas of Freire and Rancière imply for the understanding 
and practice of adult literacies education in Chapter 7.  
 
In this chapter, in my reconstruction of Freire and Rancière’s ideas I will begin to touch 
upon the problems I have already raised about literacies education for empowerment 
and hint at how understandings of education for emancipation might avoid such issues.  
I discuss and summarise these aspects in some detail as part of my main exploration of 
empowerment in relation to emancipation in Chapter 6.  
 
Though the central purpose of this current chapter is to reconstruct the theories of Freire 
and Rancière so that they might inform later discussions, I will also begin to touch upon 
some of the problems that have been raised by researchers and educators about the 
understanding and practice of emancipatory literacies education. The issues are 
generally associated with the ideas of Freire, whose work has had greatest influence in 
attempted practice of an emancipatory adult literacies education (see Section 2.4) and I 
discuss these in detail in Chapter 6. To restate, the central purpose of this chapter is to 
reconstruct the theories of Freire and Rancière in parallel and so I commence by 
considering the assumptions that each theorist makes. 
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5.2 Freire and Rancière – assumptions 
 
Bourdieu and Gee take understandings of language as their starting points and relate 
these to describing how power is replicated in societal institutions, including formal 
systems of education. This contrasts with Freire and Rancière who start out with 
questions about how education might be understood. Central to this is the question of 
how to distinguish between education that socialises people into an intrinsically 
oppressive society and education that might create possible emancipatory alternatives. 
Like Bourdieu and Gee, both Freire and Rancière describe how education typically 
serves to replicate societal processes that are understood to be oppressive in character. 
But whilst the starting point of Bourdieu and Gee is to define how inequality is 
reproduced and then consider what this might mean for understanding educational 
institutions and practices, Rancière and Bourdieu commence from understanding 
education as an enactment of equality, with follow on implications for understanding 
societal inequality.  
 
Crucially, unlike Gee, both Freire and Rancière describe how education for 
emancipation is not reliant upon teachers delivering more correct knowledge to students 
about the nature of their oppression, claiming instead that such educational practices 
actually replicate societal oppression. Rather, importance is placed upon the character 
of the relationships between students and teachers and the relationships between these 
people and the educational materials that they use (though in the case of Freire, the 
content of such materials is also significant). For both, emancipatory education cannot 
be systemised or implemented by government policy (Freire, 1972,
10
 p. 31; Rancière, 
                                                          
10
 Freire’s book Pedagogy of the Oppressed, referred to as PO for the remainder of this text. 
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1991
11
, p. 46; Bingham and Biesta, 2011, p. 37), demanding instead that people trust 
one other (Rancière, 2007, p. 51-52; PO, p. 135; IS, p. 46). Though they offer different 
conceptualisations of emancipation, both Freire and Rancière describe its pursuit as a 
risky undertaking which people try to avoid, encouraging a tendency for people to 
replicate oppression themselves (IS, 16, 22, 40, PO, 23-24, pp. 99-100). In Chapter 4 I 
demonstrated how Bourdieu and Gee’ understandings about the operation of literacies 
education could be traced to the assumptions they make about the ideological character 
of discourse. In this chapter I also consider the assumptions that Freire and Rancière 
make about ‘ideology’ as this might encourage an understanding of the distinction 
between education for empowerment and education for emancipation.  
 
Freire and Rancière both describe oppression and emancipation as activity that might be 
enacted by teachers and students. They each present assumptions about humanity and 
use these to produce a definition of equality. This definition is then utilised to describe 
oppression in terms of activity that serves to undermine equality, the corollary being 
that emancipation can be understood as educational activity that might re-instigate it. In 
contrast. Bourdieu and Gee might use their starting point of inequality to explain how 
equality might be understood educationally. As I mention in Section 4.4, for Bourdieu, 
equality could only be achieved if people stopped all forms of discourse production as 
discourse production is assumed to be inherently oppressive. This would mean people 
with no speech, bodily mannerisms or facial expressions, no poetry, music, dance, song 
or science; a strange if not absurd notion of emancipation. 
 
Freire defines equality by the assertion that all people are conscious beings who are 
                                                          
11
 Rancière’s book The Ignorant Schoolmaster, referred to as IS for the remainder of this text 
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equally predisposed to reflect and act upon the world around them.  Such social activity 
is assumed to be integral to the innate character of humanity and if it is suppressed or 
prevented then social inequality results. Rancière’s definition of equality is described in 
terms of the opinion or assumption that all people are equally capable of directing their 
intellect towards forming their own opinions. This means that if the intellectual activity 
that is necessary to forming opinions is suppressed or undermined, then inequality is 
replicated. Each theorist elaborates a complicated theory of emancipatory education 
from these brief definitions of equality and I start by describing these definitions in 
more detail.  
 
Freire - assumptions 
 
Freire assumes that people are conscious beings that have evolved from and are part of 
an ever changing natural world. Humans are aware of themselves and each other as well 
as external reality (PO, pp. 54-55) within the context of ceaseless change.  As historical 
beings, people are aware of a past, present and future which allows them to separate 
themselves from the consequences of their actions, encouraging them to believe that 
reality can be transformed through conscious activity. There is no need for people to 
resign themselves to the physical and social world as it is because they can make 
conscious plans to take action that might change it (PO, pp. 70-1).  This drive for 
transformation and inquiry informs Freire’s conceptualisation of education as the 
enactment of humanity’s conscious and eternal striving towards completeness in the 
context of an ever changing social and physical world (PO, pp. 56-57). For Freire, ‘The 
unfinished character of men [sic]
12
 and the transformational character of reality 
                                                          
12
 Both Freire and Rancière use the terms ‘man’ and ‘men’ to refer to all people. This has been 
controversial in the context of Freire’s work as have his writing in relation to women more generally (e.g. 
see hooks, 1993), but as far as I am aware there has been no comment about this by researchers who have 
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necessitate that education be an on-going activity’ (PO, pp. 57).  
 
As with Bourdieu, Freire draws upon a notion of praxis which is presented as integral to 
humanity’s innate way of being (PO, p. 70, p. 96). Though it is natural for people to be 
engaged in social activity that enacts praxis, Freire doesn’t assume that this is 
permanent. Rather, it is a relationship that might be enacted and Freire conceptualises 
emancipatory education as educational activity that encourages and sustains praxis. It is 
on this point that Freire diverges from Bourdieu, who understands praxis as a 
permanent human condition (see Bernstein, 1972, pp. 45-49, or Dale and Hyslop-
Margison, 2010, p. 115, p. 131). There are implications here for how each theorist 
understands ideology and the possibilities for emancipation, which I shall return to 
when I describe how Freire understands emancipation. 
 
Freire understands praxis as a social relationship between people and the social and 
physical world, where they simultaneously and consciously reflect and act upon that 
world. Praxis must involve both action and reflection, indeed an act of true reflection 
cannot occur without action and vice versa. The two social activities are connected in a 
relationship of opposites, where action requires simultaneous critical reflection and 
where this reflection if ‘true’, results in action (PO, pp. 27-8, pp. 40-41, p. 96) and it is 
the character of this dynamic that defines it as a dialectical relationship. 
 
Freire assumes that the social reflection that is integral to praxis is reliant upon dialogue 
between human subjects whilst they consider the concrete situations that limit them. 
Importantly, this means that the starting point for this process of simultaneous reflection 
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and action (i.e. praxis) is always the social perception of challenges being encountered 
in the ‘here and now’, where intervention is required (PO, p. 57). By starting from this 
situation, people in praxis perceive that the problematic conditions in which they find 
themselves are alterable rather than fated, static and permanent. In contrast, if people’s 
social relationships do not constitute praxis they perceive their problems to be 
permanent and inescapable, a situation which Freire understands as a manifestation of 
oppression.  
 
Freire understands emancipatory education as social activity which encourages praxis, 
which in turn encourages the social action that results in some kind of resolution to the 
problems that have been perceived. This activity results in some kind of resolution that 
changes the problematic circumstances that were first encountered and Freire describes 
this as a process that drives forward human history (PO, pp. 71-74).  However, new 
limiting situations will inevitably arise, so that there is always a need for emancipatory 
education that encourages praxis. For Freire there will never be a time when education 
is redundant and no longer necessary. 
 
Freire assumes that when people are socially engaged in simultaneous reflection and 
action upon the social and physical world, (i.e. when they are in a relationship of praxis 
with the world), then they also fully conscious of the world, an idea that informs his 
usage of the term conscientization (e.g. see PO, p. 42, Freire, 1970, p. 42). Freire also 
understands that everyone is equally predisposed to enact praxis with others, making 
praxis a definition of equality. Praxis is also understood to be humanity’s natural state 
of being when people are understood to be free. This means that when people are 
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socially engaged in a relationship of praxis with each other and the world they are not 
only fully conscious of the world, but experiencing freedom as well. For Freire, 
freedom is synonymous with humanity acting out history in praxis, in tune with their 
‘species being’. The notion might be traced to Hegel, though the terms ‘Geist’ or 
‘reason’ might have been used rather than ‘consciousness’ (see Bernstein, 1972, pp. 42-
45). It seems that what it means to be ‘conscious’ is a debate in itself (ibid, 14-59) and I 
do not attempt to engage with it here or to interpret Hegel’s work for myself, not least 
because it might constitute a separate thesis. However, I do return to the notion of 
‘reason’ when I discuss Rancière’s work in Chapter 7.  
 
Freire assumes that dialogue is integral to the possibility of social reflection, making it 
crucial to the possibility of social equality and freedom (Freire and Shor, 1987b). It is 
here that he draws upon the ideas of Martin Buber to describe how ‘I-It’ relationships 
between people are manifested when dialogue is obstructed, where ‘I’ turns the 
‘conquered ‘thou’ into a mere ‘It’, making a relationship between two subjects into a 
subject object relationship where ‘Thou’ is made inhuman and inanimate (Guilherme 
and Morgan, 2009). Buber assumes that humans oscillate between ‘I-Thou’ and ‘I-It’ 
relationships where ‘I-Thou’ relations are those of dialogue between subjects, where 
people are creatively and spiritually fulfilled (ibid, p. 567).  For Freire, true dialogue 
creates the possibility of relationships of co-subjects, where ‘two ‘thous’ become ‘two 
I’s’’ (PO, p. 135). Importantly, the relationship that Freire describes is reliant upon love 
and trust, making these human qualities integral to the possibility of praxis and full 
consciousness of the social and physical world (PO, pp. 62-64).  
 
The emphasis Freire places on dialogue in the context of praxis describes an education 
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that is inherently social rather than individual, that might orientate towards wider goals 
of social justice. For Freire, the social character of emancipatory education makes 
individual emancipation as impossible as being the midwife at one’s own birth (PO, p. 
25 or see Shor, 1997).   
 
The concept of praxis that Freire describes suggests human subjects in constant flux, 
immersed in ever changing relationships with each other and an ever changing social 
and physical environment. However, for Freire, praxis also describes the innate 
character of humanity, where the state of praxis is associated with freedom, 
relationships of equality and the possibility of an emancipatory education, all of which I 
elaborate upon below. The point here is that reliance upon the notion of praxis confines 
Freire to a fixed and absolute definition of what it means to be human. Freire has been 
criticised specifically for this on the grounds that it is both impossible and undesirable 
to define humanity in the context of education (see Section 2.4). This becomes relevant 
when I consider Freire’s understanding of an emancipatory education below. However, 
Rancière avoids the problem by describing the assumptions that he makes about 
humanity in the context of education as ‘opinions’ rather than the ‘truth’ about humans, 
which I describe in the next section. 
 
Rancière – assumptions 
 
Rancière draws attention to the assumptions that theories make about humanity by 
describing the possibility of an emancipatory education that does not claim to be based 
upon any ‘truth’ of people’s natural predispositions. Though Rancière assumes that 
unlike animals, people can enact equality through expressing opinions (see IS, pp. 77-
78), this assumption is itself presented as just an opinion. This contrasts with Freire’s 
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presentation of the truth about humanity’s ‘species being’ (see PO, 98) as well as 
Bourdieu’s ultimate definition of humanity in praxis, which is linked to the structural 
operation of the capitalist system. Bourdieu persistently refers to his description of the 
operation of power as ‘facts’ or the ‘truth’ (for example see RE, p. 12, p. 15, p. 22, p. 
31), where his initial definition of symbolic power is referred to as an ‘axiom’ (see RE, 
p. 3) or self-evident truth. Gee attempts to avoid defining humanity through his claim 
that all Discourse excludes and can only be understood as a partial description of social 
contexts. However, this doesn’t seem to include his own written discourse which in my 
judgement is treated as the truth. Indeed he argues that this truth must be passed down 
to teachers and students if they are to be empowered (see Section 4.4). I will further 
explore this aspect of the theorists work in Chapter 7, when I discuss the implications 
for both literacies education and also for its associated research methodology. In this 
and the following sections I demonstrate that Rancière draws attention to how defining 
‘the truth’ about people might be problematic if the possibility of an emancipatory 
education is to be enacted, whilst setting up assumptions in his own work that might get 
around the issue.   
 
Rancière claims that his work is informed by ‘opinions’ rather than ‘facts’ or ‘the truth’ 
about people and as a consequence his description of oppression and the movement to 
educational emancipation is taken in a different direction to that described by Freire. In 
Rancière’s writing, opinions are not presented as an account of the innate character of 
human beings or even as being consequent of organised empirical research. Opinions 
are just opinions. But the opinions that Rancière raises inform understandings about 
how opinions arise in the first place as well as his conceptualisations of both equality 
and oppression. So the use of opinions is in keeping with the arguments that the theory 
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makes to describe possibilities for an emancipatory education.  Rancière’s writing (e.g. 
1991, 2007, 2007, 2011) could in itself be interpreted as an example of what can be 
achieved if the logic of his opinion about opinions is followed through.   
 
Rancière elaborates his arguments through the story of a nineteenth century educator, a 
teacher named Joseph Jacotot, who gained some notoriety in France and Holland 
(Rancière, 2010, 1). Rancière describes how Jacotot discovers emancipatory education 
by accident from observations made when he was teaching a language he didn’t know. 
He gave the students a bilingual text and left them to figure it all out for themselves, 
which they did, implying the possibility of an ignorant schoolmaster. This story 
describes how Jacotot’s opinions about education arise from chance encounters in 
everyday situations, demonstrating that it is in such contexts that opinions might arise. 
Jacotot observed that the students had learned in the same way that they had learned 
their first language, ‘by repeating and verifying, by relating what they were trying to 
know to what they already knew, by doing and reflecting about what they had done’(IS, 
p. 10). The students hadn’t been instructed or followed orders, rather they had taken the 
measure of each other’s intellectual capacity and used it (IS, p. 17).  
 
It is these and other everyday observations of Jacotot’s that inform Rancière’s first 
opinion, that ‘all men [sic] have equal intelligence’ (IS, p. 18). To summarise, Freire’s 
starting point for an emancipatory education is to assume the possibility of enacting a 
social relationship of ‘praxis’ in the context of the issues and problems that limit 
people’s ability to act, whilst Rancière describes a starting point of everyday encounters 
which are acted upon in the belief that everyone is an intellectual equal. 
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Rancière’s opinion is stated in the context of an exploration of the possibility of an 
emancipatory education. As with Freire, the starting point and purpose of Rancière’s 
work can be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish between educational activity that 
socialises and educational activity that might emancipate. To illustrate the implication 
of this I shall I re-introduce Biesta’s (2010) conceptualisation of qualification, 
socialisation and subjectification as possible purposes and functions for education (see 
Section 2.4). Considering these three overlapping domains of purpose, Rancière is 
attempting to understand subjectification. It is in the context of the possibility of 
emancipation, that Rancière’s opinion is enacted. For Rancière, the problem wasn’t ‘the 
instruction of the people’, rather, ‘that of emancipation; that every common person 
might conceive his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and 
decide how to use it.’ (IS, p. 17). 
 
By stating that everyone has equal intelligence, Rancière is not claiming that all people, 
regardless of their situation, are equally predisposed to be instructed to become air 
traffic controllers, lace makers, welders or confectioners. Rather, he is taking the 
opinion that when it comes to subjectification as emancipation we have to assume that 
all people are intellectual equals, or the enactment of equality (or emancipation) cannot 
be possible.  
 
Rancière describes intelligence as being synonymous with equality (IS, p. 73) and there 
is a sense in which his reference to intelligence is a reference to equality itself. He is 
taking the opinion that all people are predisposed towards enacting equality. But whilst 
Freire defines equality by people’s equal predisposition to live in praxis (PO, p. 70), 
Rancière is defining equality by expressing the opinion about people’s equal 
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predisposition to enact the opinion that intellectual equality is possible (IS, p. 18). I 
elaborate upon this in subsequent sections, but first I shall describe two other opinions 
which comprise Rancière’s assumptions.   
 
Rancière notes that even though he assumes that all people have equal intelligence, 
people can be observed to achieve different outcomes when applying their intellects to 
achieve similar goals. This might include differences in some of the qualities relating to 
what Bourdieu would call their ‘symbolic productions’, such as their speech or writing, 
suggesting that all people are not intellectual equals. If people are equal in their 
intelligence, how does this account for evidence that suggests the contrary? As a 
consequence of anecdotal observations Rancière introduces a second opinion that ‘man 
[sic] is a will served by an intelligence’ (IS, pp. 51 – 52).  The performance of 
intelligence, or equality, relies on an act of the will. Those who don’t attend to their will 
whilst acknowledging intellectual equality are enacting a form of intellectual 
weakening, creating diversity in achievement in specific situations. Equality between 
people is reliant upon individuals attending to their will whilst acting under the 
assumption that everyone has equal intelligence. If people rely on the intellect of others, 
accepting others’ opinions and neglecting to form their own then they fail to attend to 
their own will and equality is no longer enacted.  The consequence of this argument is 
that reliance on a group will undermines equality, making all societal institutions 
enactors of inequality. From here, Jacotot’s initial opinions produce a third opinion that: 
‘it is precisely because each man [sic] is free that a union of men is not’ (IS, p. 78). 
 
So far I have described the assumptions that Freire and Rancière make in their 
respective theorising of oppressive and emancipatory education.  For Freire, the 
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assumptions encompass a description of the innate character of humanity where people 
are taken to be conscious and historical beings living in praxis. In contrast, Rancière 
avoids the making of truth assumptions about humans, instead referring to his 
assumptions as just opinions. Bourdieu and Gee commence by stating their assumptions 
about language and using these to define how inequality is replicated in society as a 
consequence of the ideological character of discourse. In contrast, Freire and Rancière’s 
assumptions are orientated towards the definition of education as the enactment of 
equality which might give rise to understandings of inequality and the possibility of an 
emancipatory education. Whilst Freire refers to power in the wider context of class 
power (e.g. see PO, pp. 106-107; Freire, 1970, p. 16) and Rancière refers to intellectual 
power (e.g. see IS, p. 15) neither Freire nor Rancière offer a conceptualisation of power 
in the context of discourse production. 
 
Rancière and Freire seem to share a joint endeavour in that they both attempt to 
distinguish between education that might socialise and education that might raise 
possibilities for emancipation, taking a definition of equality as their starting point. 
Though Rancière and Freire do not produce a definition of ideology, their work has 
implications for how ideology might be understood. This comes into play when they 
consider how inequality is enacted as oppression, which I consider in the next section. 
 
5.3 Processes of oppression: banking education or stultification 
 
 
In this section I will describe how both Freire and Rancière describe oppression as a 
process of knowledge transmission that is enacted and replicated throughout society and 
its institutions, not just in schools or colleges. Both Freire and Rancière understand 
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oppression as the dichotomising of the human qualities that might enact equality. In 
Freire’s case, oppression is the dichotomising of people from the world; the separation 
of reflection from action. This breaking down of humanity’s innate ways of being 
results from human activity that blocks dialogue between people and is enacted through 
an educational process described as ‘banking education’. In contrast, Rancière describes 
oppression as a dichotomy of intelligence dividing people into a world of ignorant 
minds and knowing ones. This is understood to be enacted by processes of explication 
(i.e. explanation) where educators encourage students to believe that some are more 
intelligent than others, weakening the attention that students give to their own intellects 
and the intellects of others. Both Freire and Rancière describe these oppressive 
processes as forms of knowledge transmission which are understood to be replicated 
throughout society, not just in the formal education system.  
 
Freire – banking education 
 
 
Freire describes a class driven oppression where dehumanisation is a fundamental 
attribute of society (PO, pp. 21-22). Oppressor and oppressed classes are locked into a 
co-dependent struggle for recognition which will only be resolved when the 
dehumanisers are defeated. But it isn’t people’s destiny to be oppressed; rather it is their 
vocation to become human and this struggle can only be led by the oppressed who will 
free their oppressors as well as themselves. Oppressors make oppressed people 
dependent upon them for knowledge about the world, but they themselves are 
dependent upon the oppressed for the possibility of a future social emancipation. Here 
Freire makes clear that this project need not be left to chance for there can be a role for 
humanising education.  
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Freire’s description of a class driven oppression cites Hegel as justification. Though he 
is influenced by the early writings of Marx (i.e. the 1844 Manuscripts, see PO, pp. 70-
71; Dale and Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 112) and describes oppression in the context of 
class, unlike Bourdieu, Freire does not refer directly to the organisation and structure of 
the economic system of capitalism (e.g. in Freire 1970 or Freire 1972). This could be in 
part due to how Freire positions himself as ‘man’ from the ‘third world’ (Freire, 1970, 
p. 17), where education takes place in the context of agrarian economies inhabited by 
‘peasants’ rather than the ‘proletariat’. However, as I mentioned above, Freire’s 
understanding of equality also suggests that oppressive circumstances might always 
challenge people before or after the capitalist system is replaced, so that the need for an 
emancipatory education is always there and never made redundant (Dale and Hyslop-
Margison, 2010, p. 113). 
 
Freire understands the separation of humanity from the physical and social world to be 
enacted by an oppressor class that acts as if other people are mere objects rather than 
fellow humans. They render everyone inanimate in an all-encompassing act of 
dehumanisation which, drawing on Fromm, Freire equates directly to sadism, violence 
and a love of death (PO, p. 40, pp. 50-51).  For the oppressors, ‘to be is to have and to 
be of the ‘having’ class’ (PO, p. 35) and so they live in a world without people. The 
oppressed, objects in the world of the oppressors, are people without the world. They 
are encouraged into passivity, disconnected from active engagement with the world 
because ‘as things they have no purpose except those that the oppressors prescribe for 
them’ (PO, p. 36).  
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For Freire, dialogue is integral to praxis so that oppression is physically ena’cted 
through ‘anti-dialogical acts’ that isolate people by interrupting the social reflection that 
must accompany all action. Anti-dialogical acts take the form of mythmaking, 
sloganeering, and cultural invasion which distrusts people and serves to keep them 
apart. This is enacted throughout society, including organisation aimed at reducing 
inequality such as the welfare system, development projects and political parties. This 
activity is understood to disrupt praxis, as oppressed people are ‘objectified’, weakening 
their social enactment of reflection and action upon the world. Freire describes this 
process of oppression as banking education.  
 
The banking education model describes a social world where oppressors, as teachers, 
assume the role of subject and act to make people (as students) objects by regulating 
and controlling the knowledge of the world that enters their consciousness. Students 
may not open their consciousness to the world as they intend, but passively receive it in 
the form of deposits which they may file and store. The teacher teaches, knows, thinks, 
talks, chooses, acts and decides. But students, as the objects of education, do the 
opposite of all of these things, making them dependent on the teacher for these actions. 
They are receptacles for knowledge about the world that they may collect, catalogue 
and store but not act upon, transform or recreate. The teacher justifies this relationship 
by presenting themselves as knowledgeable, encouraging students to accept themselves 
as ignorant (PO, pp. 46-49). 
 
Banking education controls people’s conscious engagement with the world, making 
them receptive to knowledge transmission from the ‘teacher’ and less able to 
communicate or reflect amongst themselves. This socialises the banking educated 
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person into a world of objects; the oppressive society created by the oppressor class. 
They accept the status quo and believe that they cannot engage with the world other 
than through the teacher’s guidance. This false perception prevents them from 
objectifying the oppressor; indeed, they may admire oppressive people and harbour 
ambitions to be like them, as the peasant dreams of becoming a landowner. As banking 
education denies the ever changing nature of people and the world they inhabit, 
oppression seems to be permanent with no prospect or possibility for change.  
 
Though they know that they are oppressed, people’s perception of their situation is 
impaired so that they may be unable to describe the reality of their own oppression. This 
notion implies that, as with Bourdieu and Gee, oppressive education is ideological in 
character. Bourdieu and Gee describe the illusive character of discourse, where 
discourse imposes meanings through processes that people cannot detect. For Bourdieu 
there seems to be no prospect for education to intervene in this process, whilst for Gee, 
and empowering literacy education is predicated upon knowledge transmission about 
‘the truth’ of how discourse operates. In contrast, Freire is describing the ideological 
character of knowledge transmission, which cannot ever be countered by more 
knowledge transmission. This is the case regardless of ‘the truth’ that is being 
transmitted. The problem is that knowledge transmission prevents ‘the truth’ from being 
discovered in the first place, so it can be assumed that any transmission about the 
character of a person’s oppression will contain mistruths. 
 
However, nonetheless, Freire’s theory still conceptualises that students are unable to 
detect ‘the truth’ of the world around them, because they are in receipt of knowledge 
directed to them from others, instead of intending towards the physical and social world 
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in praxis. What’s more, the possibility of emancipation is predicated on the revelation of 
‘the truth’ (Biesta 2012). This leaves Freire the difficult job of describing an 
emancipatory education that can overcome the false or naive consciousness of ‘the 
oppressed’ without resorting to educational liberators revealing the world to ‘them’ 
through processes of knowledge transmission in an endeavour to emancipate from the 
outside. He attempts this by utilising his understanding of the transient character of 
praxis which I discuss below. But first I describe how Rancière’s assumptions, like 
Freire’s, describe oppression as an educational process of knowledge transmission. 
However Rancière’s does not suggest that oppression manifests as an ideological 
process that distorts people’s perception of ‘the truth’.  
 
Rancière – explication 
 
 
In common with Freire, Rancière sets up an educational model that describes the 
enactment of oppression throughout society that is replicated in all social institutions, 
not just schools or colleges. However, Rancière takes schooling as a detailed example. 
He describes how school children are encouraged to believe that they can’t understand 
without explanation (i.e. explication) which makes them intellectually reliant on a 
teacher, in contradiction to life before school when children learn to speak, relate and do 
with no explanation. This makes school a place where children grieve over the loss of 
their ability. The continual process of explication may be the result of a teacher’s good 
intentions but also serves the purpose of allowing teachers to reinforce their status as the 
knowledgeable one. The more the teacher explains, the more the child becomes 
dependent on explanation; it is a regression ad infinitum. The teacher may be well 
meaning and conscientious, perhaps even arguing that ‘teaching was not about 
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cramming students with knowledge and having them repeat it like parrots’ (IS, p. 3). 
But unlike Freire who views such techniques as manifestations of knowledge 
transmission as banking education, preventing students from intending their 
consciousness towards the social and physical world, cramming isn’t the problem. 
Instead, Rancière understands knowledge transmission as the entwining of two relations 
between student and teacher, that of will to will and that of intelligence to intelligence 
(Rancière, 2010). The processes of explanation enacted by teachers serve to weaken the 
will to will relationship whilst strengthening that of intelligence to intelligence, 
encouraging students to believe that they need help to understand. Students are 
encouraged to enact the belief that some are more intelligent than others and rely upon 
the opinions of others instead of directing their will towards their own intellect whilst 
acknowledging the intellect of others.  
 
For Rancière, the word understanding ‘throws a veil over everything’ (IS, p. 6).The 
teacher obscures knowledge and then gradually unveils it making teaching the art of 
continually gauging the distance between the taught material and the understanding of 
the student. Using Freire’s description of banking education this process could be 
interpreted as the regulation and control of the knowledge that enters into a student’s 
consciousness; an oppressive act of objectification. In contrast, Rancière constructs 
inequality as a process that enforces the belief that some people have an inferior 
intelligence.  The result isn’t Freire’s ‘naive consciousness’, but rather a kind of 
intellectual laziness underwritten by the belief that all people vary in intellect (IS, p. 
40). This weakens the attention people give to their own intellectual powers, replicating 
inequality by encouraging reliance upon the opinions of others.  
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Unlike Freire (as well as Bourdieu and Gee), there is no process of illusion or 
‘misrecognition’ here and as I mentioned above, emancipation is not predicated on the 
revelation of the truth. In this sense, Rancière’s understanding of oppression is not 
ideological in character. For Gee and Bourdieu, the ideological character of discourse as 
a process of illusion or misrecognition serves to socialise students into existing power 
hierarchies. Similarly for Freire, ‘banking education’ is ideological in the sense that it 
encourages a false consciousness that serves to maintain existing oppressive societal 
relationships. But whilst Freire’s emancipatory education must overcome a delusionary 
process, Rancière’s emancipatory education is reliant only upon enacting the belief that 
all people have equal intelligence. 
   
For Bourdieu and Gee, it is the ideological character of discourse that serves to socialise 
students as it underpins the processes that replicate oppressive power hierarchies. This 
is also the case for Freire, except that it is the ideological character of knowledge 
transmission that encourages socialisation. In contrast, Bourdieu’s ‘misrecognition’ is 
understood to pervade ‘even when the information transmitted tends towards zero’ (RE, 
p. 21) implying that knowledge transmission from teacher to student might rectify the 
problem (see Rancière, 2010, p. 10). Like Freire, Rancière understands that processes of 
knowledge transmission serve to socialise students (IS, p. 78), but this is not an 
ideological process for there is no illusion or misrecognition. Instead, for Rancière, 
understandings of education or politics underpinned by a concept of ideology are taken 
to be problematic. If people act under the assumption that ideological processes are 
operating in society then this entails practising a socialising education because they 
encourage the idea that knowledge transmission should be an integral part of 
educational relationships (see Rancière, 2010, pp. 10-11). Gee and Bourdieu both argue 
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that failing to acknowledge how power is reproduced through ideological processes has 
the effect of replicating it. But for Rancière, to enact Bourdieu or Gee’s presumption of 
ideology means enacting inequality, socialising students and replicating the social order.  
 
Using Rancière’s terminology, this enactment of inequality serves a ‘policing’ function 
that serves to replicate the ‘police order’. In contrast, the enactment of equality is 
‘political’ and defines Rancière’s own definition of ‘politics’. This means that most 
activity commonly understood to be political, such as parliamentary work, lobbying or 
industrial solidarity would be described by Rancière as ‘policing’ rather than ‘politics’, 
as it encourages the belief in intellectual inequality (Bingham and Biesta, 2010, pp. 32-
38; Biesta, 2010b, pp. 546-547). For Rancière, the problem isn’t that that ‘the truth’ is 
distorted, but the very concept of ideology as ‘the truth of the false’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 
85) where ideology ‘is, in short, the concept in which all politics is cancelled out’ (ibid, 
86). The presumption of ideology drives the enactment of intellectual inequality by 
dichotomising intelligence into ‘a world divided into knowing minds and ignorant ones, 
ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the 
stupid’ (IS, p. 6). This means that for Rancière, emancipation cannot be about 
understanding power relationships (Rancière, 1999, p. 42). 
 
Freire characterises the enactment of oppression as the dichotomising of subject from 
object, people from the world, where the oppressed are made objects in a world without 
people.  But for Rancière, people are not disconnected from the world.  Rather, people 
are encouraged to act in the belief that some are intellectually superior to others and so 
neglect to form opinions of their own. This belief is replicated through acts of 
explication throughout society’s institutions, in what Rancière describes as a series of 
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interlocking circles of inequality. In relation to child development, professionals might 
perform tests on children’s brains supposedly producing evidence of the difference in 
their intellectual capability (IS, p. 47), under the premise that it is natural for 
intelligences not to be equal. This supposed measurement of intelligence is actually an 
enactment of inequality because people can’t (and in point of fact haven’t) measured 
differences in intelligence. All they are doing is explaining differences by giving them 
the meaningless label of intelligence and using this to reinforce a ‘circle of inequality’ 
(IS, p. 87) where the oppressive opinion that all people are unequal is re-stated 
endlessly.  
 
This process of reinforcing inequality through explication prevails throughout society 
including parliament, government, academia and courts of law. A stultifying 
educational process is also enforced by those who aim to help the common people, 
including those (like Freire) with a goal to undermine the social order. Revolutionaries, 
progressives, supporters of meritocracy and philanthropic rulers are bundled together by 
Rancière as well-meaning people but with something else in common too (IS, p. 17). 
They all transmit their ideas via an explicatory monitor system; an inverted tree of 
instruction from which their orders radiate outwards. Their intention is to explain 
knowledge to people, be it political philosophy, psychology, sociology or journalism, 
believing that they are encouraging the possibility of liberty when actually they are 
extending the reach of inequality (ibid). Of course more inequality means even more 
explanatory work for the revolutionaries and progressives to attend to, further 
reinforcing the ‘circle of inequality’ (IS, p. 87). 
 
Rancière presents a very strong statement against the possibility for social science to 
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contribute to the preservation of humanity (IS, p. 77-78). If humans are studied and 
explained like other animals under the auspices of natural science, then their 
continuance as a species need not be considered because the natural laws cannot raise 
such questions (ibid). The needs of existence can only be attended to by individuals who 
enact a belief in intellectual equality, who attend to their will and so create their own 
opinions. Rancière describes how social science utilises the intellect of ordinary people 
whilst simultaneously functioning to suppress it. Systemised social science instruction 
enacts oppression by taking opinions that might originate with the everyday habits of 
ordinary people and then explicating these back to them as though they cannot 
understand them, telling people that:  
 
‘An opinion is a feeling we form about facts that are superficially observed. They 
are from weak and common minds and are the opposite of science which knows 
the true reasons for phenomena’  
(IS, p. 45) 
 
Here, Rancière could be describing the work of Bourdieu or Gee and the assumptions 
that they make about the ideological character of discourse. This ideological function 
can only be observed and understood by observers from outside of a discourse, such as 
sociologists or socio-linguists, who might explain its operation to teachers and students. 
For Rancière, such explanations and explanatory theories not only encourage the 
oppressive opinion that people have unequal intelligence, they also undermine the 
attention people might give to their intellectual powers, weakening the intellectual 
activity from which opinions originate in the first place, for ‘where need ceases, 
intelligence slumbers’ (IS, p. 51). So, according to Rancière, enacting the assumptions 
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that Bourdieu makes about ideology serves to replicate inequality and leaves no 
possibility for emancipation as education (see Rancière, 2005, p. 179) and presumably 
this would also apply to Gee’s assumptions also.  
 
I have described how both Freire and Rancière understand oppression as a process of 
knowledge transmission that is enacted throughout all social institutions, including 
schools and college and serves to socialise students. However, whilst Freire understands 
knowledge transmission to distort students’ perceptions of the truth, for Rancière 
knowledge transmission weakens the will of students to attend to their intellects. I have 
also described how they both present oppression as the dichotomising of the human 
attributes that are necessary to equality. For Freire, this is dichotomising of people from 
the social and physical world, a breaking down of humanity’s innate ways of being in 
praxis that results from a ‘banking education’ that blocks dialogue between people.  
Rancière describes oppression as a dichotomy of intelligence dividing people into a 
world of knowing and ignorant minds, enacted through processes that weaken people’s 
wills so that they neglect their intellect and the intellect of others, replicating the belief 
that some are more intelligent than others. In the next section I shall describe Freire’s 
understanding of an emancipatory education.  
 
5.4 Freire’s emancipatory  education 
 
In keeping with the notion of praxis, Freire presents emancipatory education as a 
practice as well as a theory, describing how an educational project might be conducted 
‘on the ground’.  Emancipation must not involve the practice of educators explaining 
more correct knowledge of people’s objective situations back to them as liberators 
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coming from the outside because this replicates banking education. Instead of 
knowledge transmission, it is the relationship between educator, students and the 
‘world’ that is of importance.  
 
For Freire, praxis is not a permanent state for there are processes of knowledge 
transmission which disrupt it that are understood to be oppressive. For Bourdieu, praxis 
also defines the species being of humanity, but following Marx, praxis is a permanent 
state of affairs (see Bernstein, 1972, pp, 45-49). Bourdieu assumes that it is the 
historical circumstances dictated by the economic system of capitalism which ultimately 
distorts people’s conscious understanding of how discourse operates, where the 
‘habitus’ operates like a genetic transmitter, passing down the linguistic dispositions 
that replicate the structure of capitalism (see RE, p. 32). Though Bourdieu understands 
there to be a dialectical relationship between people’s collective habitus’ and the 
operation of the economic system, it seems that capitalism is the driver, where 
ideological character of discourse is permanent at least until capitalism is replaced.  
 
For Bourdieu, if there is a quantitative change in the economic system, for example, one 
that results in the devaluing of university qualifications (see HA, p. 168), this might 
result in a change to how people perceive ‘the truth’ of how society operates, 
precipitating a social response that might be orchestrated by sociologists (see Section 
4.4). Importantly, sociologists can only view oppressive discourse as observers rather 
than understand it as participants, suggesting that praxis might also be understood as a 
scientific technique where the unification of theory and practice might allow 
sociologists to determine an objective truth.  
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According to Bourdieu the purpose of research is to achieve ‘objectivity’ about how 
power operates. In contrast, for Freire, ‘objectivity’ and the associated process of 
‘banking education’ is the problem where ‘objectification’ is synonymous with 
oppression
13. The purpose of  Freire’s emancipatory education is to undermine 
processes of objectification by unifying subject and object, where people’s dialogic 
relationships with each other and the world encompass a quality of intersubjectivity, 
understood as praxis, ‘an event in which subjectivity and objectivity are united’ (Freire, 
1970, p. 21, p. 31).  According to Freire, when people reflect and act upon the world 
together in praxis they are fully conscious of ‘the truth’ of the world, where there is 
‘indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing.’ (Freire, 
1970, p. 31). 
 
However, as Freire understands being in praxis as an act of knowing, he simultaneously 
assumes that emancipatory education functions to allow people to ‘objectify’ their 
oppressors revealing the true character of their own oppression (ibid, p. 25; PO, p. 22). 
It seems that though Freire assumes that knowledge transmission is oppressive, there is 
an extent to which a process of objectification, perhaps as knowledge transmission, 
remains integral to the emancipatory education that he describes. This might arise from 
Freire’s assumption that it is only when people can fully understand ‘the truth’ of the 
problems that challenge them will they be able to intervene and counter them through 
collective action (PO, p. 57, see Section 5.2) and I return to this in Chapter 6..  
 
Nonetheless, a demarcation can still be made between Bourdieu’s and Freire’s 
                                                          
13
 According to Bernstein (1971, p45) it is on this point that Marx distinguishes himself from Hegel, so 
perhaps here Freire can be seen to follow Hegel rather than Marx. It follows logically that this is also 
where Freire can be demarcated from Bourdieu 
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understandings of education. Whilst Bourdieu describes a need for sociologists to reveal 
‘the truth’ of how power operates from a third person perspective, Freire describes 
liberatory educators who do not serve to reveal ‘the truth’ to students, but rather 
encourage an intersubjective enactment of praxis, where students can reveal ‘the truth’ 
by reading the world for themselves. This implies that to be literate means to engage in 
praxis, as a social enactment of dialogue and so develop a critical consciousness of the 
world and the situations within it that serve to limit peoples’ freedom.  
 
Freire elaborates on how this education might be understood in practical terms. He 
describes how the role of the teacher is to re-instigate dialogical and reflective practices 
which simultaneously re-initiate praxis and link people back to the world (PO, p. 30). It 
is dialogue within the educational relationship that drives the emancipatory process, 
whilst ‘the world’ holds a mediating role (PO, p. 53). This raises questions about the 
status of dialogue and ‘the world’ in the educational emancipatory process. For Freire, 
dialogue is essential to the dialectic between reflection and action that constitutes 
praxis. This makes dialogue the driver of emancipation, but Freire introduces another 
dimension. A profound love for the world and for humanity is described as prerequisite 
to dialogue. Martin Buber informs Freire’s notion that those in dialogue may depart 
from relationships of domination opening up not just the possibility, but the necessity 
for a non-oppressive relationship between teachers and students. In banking education 
the relationship between teacher and student is one of oppressor to oppressed. In 
emancipatory education this opposition is expected to dissolve, transforming the 
student-teacher relationship into one of love and trust, where they work with each other, 
replacing the oppressive subject object relationship with one of co-subjects in praxis. 
For Freire, love is distorted in this relationship. Drawing from Fromm, he describes an 
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oppressive love which takes the form of necrophilia as a love of things not people, or a 
love of death rather than life (PO, pp. 50-51). 
 
The existence of this relationship is dependent on love and trust which are essential to 
dialogue and the initiation of a complex of dialectical relationships between critical 
thinking and dialogue, dialogue and reflection, reflection and action and ‘I and thou’ 
without which emancipation cannot be enacted. Freire describes the relationship 
between dialogue and critical thinking as being like that between reflection and action, 
in that they define each other. Critical thinking takes place if it generates dialogue and 
likewise true dialogue generates critical thinking.  Dialogue cannot exist without critical 
thinking: 
 
‘which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men, admitting 
of no dichotomy between them – thinking which perceives reality as process 
and transformation, rather than as a static entity – thinking which does not 
separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without 
fear of the risks involved’  
(PO, pp. 64-65).  
 
I make no attempt to describe what is meant here except that this is where Freire relates 
the significance of ‘the world’ in emancipatory education, for dialogue and critical 
thinking are activities that must take place whilst co-intending upon concrete situations 
arising from the physical and social world. Here, Freire not only trusts people’s 
relationships with each other, but also their relationships with the ‘world’ which they 
may reveal to each other without the unveilings of an educator. 
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But for the oppressed, praxis has broken down and there is a distorted perception of 
reality as it is. Freire argues that ‘the world’ must therefore be re-presented in symbolic 
form as educational materials geared precisely towards the lives and experiences of the 
oppressed students. If the content is too obvious, then education can degenerate into 
propaganda, sloganeering or knowledge deposits, but if it is too enigmatic it can turn 
into a puzzle or guessing game where the educator takes the role of revealing the answer 
(PO, pp. 86-87). Either way, these scenarios continue banking education as they block 
dialogue. To get around this problem the ‘world’ must be ‘codified’ encompassing the 
experiences and concerns of the students (Freire, 1970, pp. 32-34).  
 
Here, Freire returns to the concept of people as historical beings, incorporating the 
historical philosophy of Hans Freyer which assumes that humanity creates not only 
material goods but also ideas, concepts and social institutions whilst they 
simultaneously create history and become ‘historical-social beings’. It follows that the 
study of history or society can reveal ideas, values, concepts and hopes as well as 
oppressive situations.  These are the themes of the current epoch and they both contain 
and are contained within limit-situations from which the limit-acts necessary to 
transform society may be detected (PO, pp. 71-74).  Following from this, Freire’s 
educational practice describes a complicated process of producing a ‘codified’ world in 
the form of educational materials that encapsulate the reality of student’s lives (PO, p. 
75). Educator and students will co-intend upon the ‘codified’ world as if for the first 
time, investigating the themes through dialogue and enabling ‘limit situations’ to be 
found. Educators can then pose these situations back to students as problems for them to 
solve. In so doing it is assumed that students can name the corresponding ‘limit-acts’ 
and start to plan transformative actions; a ‘conscientization’ through dialogue that 
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initiates praxis and drives forward history. 
 
In summary, Freire is describing emancipatory education as a process of 
‘conscientization’ that overcomes knowledge transmission by attempting to break the 
dependency between teachers and students for knowledge about the world. Freire’s 
emancipatory education can be understood as an enactment of equality where the 
purpose is for students to become fully conscious of ‘the truth’ of the circumstances that 
they find themselves in, through an emancipatory educational relationship that is 
ultimately driven by love and trust. Here, the role of the teacher is to instigate dialogue 
whilst co-intending upon symbolic representations of ‘the world’ alongside students, so 
that praxis might be reinstated.  
 
5.5 Rancière’s emancipatory education 
 
Freire’s emancipation is understood as an enactment of equality as a humanising 
process that reinstates people’s innate character of being in praxis whilst overcoming 
knowledge transmission. Rancière’s emancipation follows this model in the sense that it 
is also understood as an enactment of equality that reinstates the opinions about 
humanity that the theory assumes, whilst dismantling processes of knowledge 
transmission.  
 
But whilst Freire’s emancipatory education is assumed to reveal ‘the truth’ about the 
situations that students and teachers find themselves in, Rancière’s emancipatory 
education is understood as an enactment of intellectual equality so that students give 
attention to their intellect and create their own opinions rather than relying on the 
opinions of others. Not only does this remove any dependency between students and 
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teachers for understandings about the social world, it also describes emancipation with a 
purpose other than revealing ‘the truth’. Rancière’s understanding of emancipatory 
education also maintains a distinct relationship between teachers and students, 
describing a relationship of will against will that drives the emancipatory process, rather 
than Freire’s relationships of co-subjects. This links with Rancière’s understanding of 
emancipation being predicated upon assumptions that are just opinions rather than an 
ultimate definition of the human subject, for example as described by Freire. The 
repercussion is that though, like Freire, Rancière’s emancipatory education is also 
reliant upon relationships between teachers, students and symbolic productions, there is 
no need for particular understandings about the world to be incorporated in the form of 
‘codifications’.   
 
Three opinions are enacted in the emancipatory process; that all intelligences are equal; 
that man [sic] is a will served by an intelligence and that equality cannot be maintained 
in unions of men. This gives the emancipatory educator two roles (IS, pp. 13-14) which 
are supported through the use of texts, visuals or other symbolic productions, described 
by Rancière as ‘the book’. Firstly, to reinstate the equality of intelligence the 
emancipatory schoolmaster must be ignorant which is not to say that the teacher must 
feign ignorance in order to help students to acquire knowledge, perhaps by a teacher 
asking questions of students whilst already knowing the answers. Neither is it a case of 
someone judging another person to be ignorant and then putting that person into the role 
of teacher.  
 
Rancière describes knowledge transmission as the entwining of two relations between 
student and teacher, that of will to will and that of intelligence to intelligence (Rancière, 
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2010, p. 2). An ignorant schoolmaster is someone who teaches without transmitting 
knowledge, by dismantling the intelligence to intelligence relationship that creates the 
deficit between their own intellect and that of the student. This requires the ignorant 
schoolmaster to be ignorant of inequality by enacting the opinion or assumption that all 
people have equal intelligence. To do this, the teacher ignores the explanations that 
pervade from the social order that serve to undermine the equality of intelligence and 
does not participate in any explicatory acts. But this does not mean that an emancipatory 
teacher merely has to avoid the act of explanation, where students might be 
emancipated if teachers stop explaining. The emancipatory teacher must also enact the 
opinion that all people have equal intelligence by demanding that students pay attention 
to the power of their own intellect whilst acknowledging the intellect of others. The 
relationship of will against will is strengthened in order to weaken the relationship of 
intelligence to intelligence, where the will of the teacher drives the will of the student 
towards emancipatory intellectual acts. This makes teaching for emancipation about 
verifying that students have paid attention; a new educational relationship described as a 
circle of power of the wills. 
 
The consequence is that each student is propelled to follow their own circle of opinion 
forming, where opinions are formed whilst enacting the opinion that all people are 
intellectual equals. Students must rely on their own will, in line with the third opinion 
that equality cannot be maintained in unions of people. Whilst Freire’s emancipation is 
reliant on the maintenance of a relationship of co-subjects between teacher and student 
so that the resulting dialogue might drive praxis, for Rancière it is the will of the 
educator that drives the emancipatory process making Rancière’s educational 
relationship into one of domination – will against will. But this relationship can only be 
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emancipatory if it is conducted under the auspices of the equality of intelligence. In this 
way, Rancière’s emancipatory process removes the split between inferior and superior 
intelligences just as Freire’s conscientization undoes the dichotomy between people and 
the world.  
 
Whilst Freire’s theory raised questions about the status of dialogue and symbolic 
representations of ‘the world’ in the emancipatory process, for Rancière, there are 
questions about the status of the will and the status of the symbolic representations in 
‘the book’.  Here the teacher’s role is to ensure that the student is paying attention to 
their own intellect, whilst enacting the equality of intelligence by not participating in 
explanatory acts, but where the symbolic artefact could take any form because its 
purpose is not to reveal ‘the truth’ about students’ circumstances. Rather, the symbolic 
productions are necessary when demanding that students give attention to their intellect 
and the intellect of others. It is in this context that Rancière explains in some detail 
about what it means for students to pay attention to their will. 
 
According to Rancière, the will is driven by the belief that all intelligences are equal, for 
this is what drives the need to understand and to be understood. Here the notion of the 
will is directly equated to reason, just as intelligence is synonymous with equality (IS, p. 
73).  To believe in the equality of intelligence means assuming that all people are 
capable of understanding each other’s thoughts, emotions or opinions. To enact this 
belief requires ‘tireless work’ (IS, pp. 9-10, pp. 63-64). For example, poets will expend 
enormous effort revising and correcting a poem because they work under the 
assumption that the readers will understand the results of this endeavour (IS, p. 68). The 
argument is that if people are to enact their own intellectual power in the conduct of 
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daily life, then this will require endlessly repetitive acts where everyday encounters are 
imitated, ordered, translated, reconsidered and compared so that opinions might be 
created and expressed to others, under the assumption that they too have the intelligence 
to understand them (IS, p. 55). Of course this repetitive activity is relentlessly boring, 
making the demanding of equality an act of the will, with the emancipatory teacher 
taking on the role of demander (IS, pp. 55-6). For Freire, the repetitive acts of ordering, 
repeating and translating might be associated with banking education, for Rancière the 
acts of imitating, translating, taking apart and putting back together might be associated 
with the enactment of equality if students, at the same time, give attention to their own 
intellect whilst assuming that all others are equal in intelligence. 
 
What Rancière describes is a circular motion of emancipation where the will is driven 
by the belief that all people have equal intelligence, but where the enactment of this 
belief is driven by the will. The role of the teacher is to maintain and strengthen this 
motion.  Rancière defines the guidance of intelligence by the will as attention (IS, p. 
25), so more precisely, the role of the emancipatory teacher is to verify that the student 
has indeed attended to their will whilst they simultaneously acknowledge that all 
intelligences are equal. This is where symbolic representations of the ‘world’ become 
integral to the emancipatory process. Freire relies on ‘codifications’ that incorporate the 
concrete social and physical circumstances of students’ lives so that they might become 
more fully conscious of them through the dialogue that re-instigates praxis and 
reconnects them to the ‘world’. As discussed above, for Rancière, people don’t need 
reconnecting to the world because they are connected already. ‘The book’ is required to 
verify that students have paid attention and directed their intelligence and is described 
as:   
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‘The thing in common, placed between two minds, is the gauge of that equality, 
and this in two ways. A material thing is first of all “the only bridge of 
communication between two minds”. The bridge is a passage, but it is also 
distance maintained. The materiality of the book keeps two minds at an equal 
distance, whereas explication is the annihilation of one mind by another.’  
(IS, p. 32) 
 
The student must engage with the text or picture (IS, p. 66), answering a three part 
question: what do you see, what do you think about it and what do you make of it? This 
allows the teacher to enforce the will of the student, encouraging the repetitive acts of 
translation, imitation and so on required for opinions to be formed. The symbols aren’t 
veiled and then revealed incrementally through explanations so the student is no longer 
encouraged to believe that they understand less than the teacher or that say that they 
don’t understand it (IS, p. 10). The purpose of emancipatory education is not to reveal 
knowledge about the world, but to strengthen the students’ will so that they might give 
attention to their own intellect whilst enacting the opinion that all people have equal 
intelligence.  
 
Rancière also relates how learned people find it very hard to stop explicating, making 
their emancipatory teaching very reliant on ‘the book’ to maintain intellectual equality 
between themselves and students. On the other hand, the ignorant and uneducated find it 
much easier to be ignorant teachers and have less need for ‘the book’ for the purpose of 
preventing explication. However, as well as being ignorant, a master must also 
emancipate (IS, pp. 14-15) by verifying that students have attended to their wills and the 
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power of their own intellects. Ignorant or learned, all teachers rely on ‘the book’ for this 
purpose. The teacher’s role is to reveal students’ intellectual power (IS, p. 17) and so it 
follows that any symbolic production, be it a text or other representation, can be used 
(IS, pp. 27-28, IS, p. 32).   As Rancière states: 
 
‘The problem is to reveal intelligence to itself. Anything can be used. Télémaque. 
Or a prayer or a song that the child or the ignorant knows by heart’  
(IS, p. 28).  
 
In the context of Jacotot’s emancipatory education, described in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, only individuals can be emancipated (Rancière, 2010). However, like 
Freire, Rancière attempts to understand a social emancipation that might counter 
societal oppression
14
. He explores this possibility in later works (see ibid), describing 
how ‘individual emancipation carried to its logical extremes reconnects with shared 
concerns’ (Rancière, 2007, p. 51). Rancière describes how the enactment of intellectual 
equality is a public enactment and must be so for emancipation to be effected, where 
teachers demand that a student will ‘speak’ (IS, 26, Biesta, 2010b, Rancière, 2007,  p. 
51) for ‘It is essentially as a speaking being he [sic] discovers his equality with all other 
human beings’ (ibid).  For Rancière, ‘speaking’ is inherently social and can be 
understood as a political act. It can also be understood as an educational process of 
subjectification which I address in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
                                                          
14
 The avoidance of education that encourages individualistic responses to societal oppression is of key 
concern here (see Inglis, 1997). It is a concern articulated by academics and educators who have given 
attention to the possibility of non-socialising purposes to education (see Section 24, pp84-86 or Biesta, 
2012a). Rancière’s body of work attempts to describe social emancipation, However, taking, The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster in isolation, it may seem that for Rancière, only an individual emancipation is 
possible and his work has been interpreted as making this assumption (eg see Radford, 2012). 
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If the notion of ‘literacy’ were to come into play in Rancière’s work, it might be defined 
in relation to the act of ‘speaking’ that Rancière refers to. In Chapter 7 I discuss what 
the emancipatory activity described by Freire and Rancière implies for the possibility of 
an emancipatory literacy education. Here I return again to the question of what it means 
to ‘speak’ in the context of Rancière’s understanding of emancipation and re-engage 
with the tension between individual and social emancipation in the context of his work. 
 
As I described above (in Section 5.3), for Rancière, people’s symbolic expressions, 
regardless of their formal education or role in society, are assumed to replicate existing 
social organisation, or in Rancière’s terminology, the existing police order. Here there is 
no misrecognisable or illusory process in operation and the replication of the police 
order is neither complete nor unavoidable. Rather, there are fluctuating states of 
emancipation amongst different individuals at different times, where anyone in society 
might be oppressed, oppressor, emancipated or emancipator. 
 
For both Freire and Rancière, education as emancipation is a risky undertaking. 
Rancière describes how people tend to avoid having to deal with intellectual 
emancipation (IS, p. 16) and the change that it signifies. People will pretend that they 
can’t understand and take on a public persona of humility, arguing that they are less 
intelligent than others (IS, p. 40) when actually they are frightened of the consequences 
of their intellectual freedom (IS, p. 57). Rancière also describes emancipation as being 
‘uncomfortable’, where it is easier to participate in what he terms as ‘metapoltics’, or 
interpreting emancipation through acts of explication
15
 (Rancière, 1999, p. 85). The 
‘fear of freedom’ is also discussed by Freire (PO, pp. 23-24, pp. 99-100), drawing on 
                                                          
15
 Perhaps that is the function of this thesis 
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Fromm, as one where it is easier to conform to the oppressive social order, loving death 
and not life, than to enter risky relationships with potential comrades in emancipatory 
projects. Both theorists outline a tendency for the oppressed to become oppressors with 
Rancière describing the successful student who learns his lesson so that he might ‘peer 
down on high from those he [sic] has surpassed’ (IS, p. 22) in his role as lawyer, 
journalist or academic. Meanwhile Freire describes a culture where peasants strive to 
become landowners and where to be a ‘real man’ is to be oppressive (PO, p. 22). He 
also describes a tendency towards ‘false generosity’ (PO p. 21, p. 36) where oppressors 
give charitably only to satisfy their guilt whilst situating the poor as passive receivers. 
  
Freire suggests degrees of oppression and emancipation and complicated relationships 
within a class society which he discusses further in his later writings (Roberts, 2003; 
Giroux, 1988). However in Freire’s main theoretical expositions (i.e. Freire 1970, 1972) 
the distinction between the oppressed and the emancipated also seems clear cut, as the 
teacher is unequivocally presented as emancipated whilst ‘the oppressed’ are presented 
as a distinct group where it seems that I who read the theory cannot be oppressed 
myself. This is not the case for Rancière, for whom intellectual emancipation is always 
possible but cannot be understood as a fixed state to be achieved in the future. 
Otherwise groups might come to hold to the same opinions and then intellectual 
emancipation would be destroyed. For Rancière, the very possibility of an emancipatory 
relationship is reliant upon movement; changes in the attention people give to their 
intellect where individual wills are in constant flux (IS, p. 78).  
 
There is always the possibility that people’s speech might enact the opinion that 
everyone has equal intelligence, though for Rancière such forms of expression have a 
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tendency to be rare. Such expressions might effect a reconfiguration of the police order, 
incorporating an inscription of equality, and I consider this possibility in more detail in 
Chapter 6. Such expressions arise throughout society in the fashion of a flickering flame 
that moves and fluctuates but has yet to be extinguished (IS, p. 78) and might be 
encouraged by an emancipatory education that can be enacted by anyone, regardless of 
their formal education (IS, p. 26). But Rancière doesn’t downplay its significance, for 
‘at the moment when society is threatened to be shattered by its own madness, reason 
performs a saving social action by exerting the totality of its own power, that of the 
recognised equality of intellectual beings’ (IS, p. 97). 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have addressed research questions ix, x and xi by describing how 
education for emancipation might be understood through an analysis of the work of 
Freire and Rancière. This has allowed me to describe how terms associated with the 
idea of an emancipatory education, such as ‘equality’, or ‘oppression’, might be 
conceptualised, creating reference points to inform my exploration of the emancipatory 
potential of adult literacies education which commences in Chapter 7. But first I address 
the central aim of this thesis, which is an attempt to distinguish between empowerment 
and emancipation in the context of education. To make this distinction, I start the next 
chapter by reviewing the main assumptions and understandings I have described in my 
reconstruction of the work of Bourdieu, Gee, Freire and Rancière in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In so doing I consider how the idea of ‘subjectification’ is an important one if the 
possibility of emancipation in the context of literacies education is to be upheld, 
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culminating in my attempt to describe how education as ‘subjectification’ might be 
understood. 
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6 Empowerment and emancipation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter I begin to address the central aim of this research by exploring how 
education for empowerment might be distinguished from an education that assumes the 
possibility of emancipation. This, along with the reconstruction of the ideas of Freire 
and Rancière in Chapters 4 and 5, lays the groundwork for my consideration of how an 
emancipatory literacies education might be understood which I set out in the concluding 
chapter.  
I explore the distinction between empowerment and emancipation in three stages. 
Firstly, addressing research question xii, I summarise the reconstruction of an 
empowering and emancipatory education that I presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and 
review it to make some initial distinctions between the two. I then consider the broad 
characteristics of an empowering education in relation to the problems I raised about the 
practice of an empowering literacies education at the end of Chapter 4. Here I suggest 
that the idea of an empowering education is inherently problematic as it encourages 
practices that can be understood to socialise students, the corollary being that 
empowerment must be distinguished from emancipation if the possibility of an 
education that does not serve to slot students into society is to be upheld. 
 
Secondly, I explore the historical criticism of Freire’s ideas, addressing research 
question xiii by contrasting the criticism raised by researchers from empowerment and 
emancipatory traditions. I describe how Freire’s work is typically discussed by 
researchers who utilise a terminology of empowerment and how Freire’s theoretical 
work shares some of the assumptions associated with understandings of power. I 
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attempt to disentangle the ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ aspects of Freire’s work 
by considering criticism of Freire from an empowerment perspective separately from 
that of researchers who take the possibility of an emancipatory education as a starting 
point. This allows me to demonstrate that a distinction can be made between the types 
of criticisms each makes and the sorts of questions that they each ask. It allows me to 
further distinguish between empowerment and emancipation with implications for how 
understandings of education, including its research and practice, might be questioned 
and criticised if researchers assume the possibility of emancipation as a starting point. 
There are also repercussions for my own critical engagement with the literature as part 
of this research project and so I come back to some of this discussion when I discuss the 
question of methodology in the concluding chapter. 
 
Thirdly, I take criticism of Freire raised by researchers who assume the possibility of an 
emancipatory education and use this to drill down further into the distinction between 
empowerment and emancipation, attempting to detail how an emancipatory education 
might be understood as a process of subjectification. In so doing, I tackle research 
question xiv and here I rely predominantly on the work of Rancière, in part as 
developed by Biesta. I also introduce some of the ideas of Ilan Gur-Ze’ev as a theorist 
of emancipatory education who shared some of Freire’s assumptions whilst engaging 
directly in the critique of Freire’s work. However, it is here that I reach the boundaries 
of my exploration and in Chapter 7 I begin the process of passing on the torch, 
addressing the title of this thesis by exploring the possibilities for emancipation in the 
context of adult literacies education. 
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6.2 Empowerment and emancipation – a review 
 
In this section I briefly review how empowerment and emancipation are understood as 
functions for education, drawing upon the reconstruction of the work of Bourdieu, Gee, 
Freire and Rancière that I set out in Chapters 4 and 5. I then begin to distinguish 
between empowerment and emancipation as functions or purposes for education and 
suggest that an empowering education can be understood as one that serves to socialise 
students.  
 
To recap, both Bourdieu and Gee make assumptions about the character of language 
and power, allowing them to describe how discourse operates as ideology. This means 
that the starting point for both is to describe societal processes that replicate inequality. 
Here they both assume that ideological processes are perpetually in operation that 
impose or exclude meanings in ways that the participants of a discourse cannot 
recognise or detect, so replicating power hierarchies in society. For Bourdieu, language 
is a consequence of a dynamic relationship between the structure of the economic 
system of capitalism and individuals’ symbolic productions, where discourse results 
from peoples’ attempts to position themselves favourably within existing power 
relations. The ‘truth’ is that people are always unaware of or ‘misrecognise’ some of the 
linguistic decisions they make, resulting in the imposition of meanings that serve to 
replicate existing social hierarches. For Gee, discourse inevitably privileges some 
meanings whilst excluding others, a consequence of how most meanings are historically 
derived and are relied upon by people because it would be an impossible task to 
examine the meaning of every word before uttering it. Again, this makes discourse 
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production a process that serves to replicate existing power hierarchies in ways that the 
speakers of a discourse are unable to detect.  
 
Bourdieu and Gee both define power as a process of discourse production that replicates 
inequality, where inequality is in turn associated with the uneven distribution of ‘goods’ 
or money within society. For Bourdieu, linguistic practices are taken to be woven into 
the structural operation of the exploitative economic system of capitalism, whilst Gee 
understands capitalism as discourse, again linking discourse to the system of work and 
economic production. Discourse reproduces power relationships, where for Bourdieu, 
power is understood as a degree to which meanings are imposed through undetectable 
symbolic productions, allowing the accumulation of ‘symbolic capital’ which operates 
as a currency that can be exchanged for status or money in symbolic and economic 
markets. According to Gee, power is a degree of ability to control discourse, or to put it 
another way, a degree of ability to recognise or exclude some identities over others, 
linked directly to the possibility of acquiring goods. This means that exercising power 
means drawing upon the qualities necessary to the production of discourse and ‘cashing 
them in’ for goods or money. 
 
Starting from the assumption of defining power as an ideological process of discourse 
reproduction implies that an empowering education might involve students taking 
control of such processes. For both Bourdieu and Gee discourse cannot be critiqued 
from the inside, necessitating a requirement for researchers positioning themselves on 
the outside of discourse so that they might identify how power is operating. In the case 
of Bourdieu, discourse production is so tightly woven into the structural operation of 
capitalism it is seemingly impossible to extrapolate how any escape might occur. It 
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seems that processes by which identities are instituted, where an identity is ‘having a 
name’ (LSP, pp. 120-122) are ultimately driven by the structural functioning of the 
capitalist system. However Gee describes how the knowledge required for this task 
might be formally taught to students so that they too might analyse discourse and start 
to take control of it and author their own identities, linking empowerment to the 
assertion of identity where students take control over the processes by which they are 
identified. This ties students into processes of discourse production where they too must 
exercise power, but to their own advantage. Teachers who do not take these ideas on 
board and put them to work can be assumed as colluding in the replication of existing 
power relations, whilst those who take Gee’s ideas as the truth and act upon them can 
consider themselves to be empowering teachers. 
 
Instead of starting with definitions of language, discourse and power, Freire and 
Rancière make the assumption that an emancipatory education is possible and attempt 
to distinguish between education that socialises and education that might encourage 
emancipation from society as it stands. To undertake this endeavour they both take the 
starting point of defining equality in terms of human qualities and describe 
emancipation as the enactment of equality. The definitions of equality that they take 
follow on from their assumption that humans must be demarcated from other living 
creatures if responsibility is to be taken for and judgements made about the continued 
existence of humanity. According to Rancière, if decisions are made about people under 
the assumption that humans are no different from another other species of animal, for 
example as might the biologist or chemist, then no judgement can be made about either 
the preservation of the species or the needs of existence (IS, p. 78). For Rancière, only 
individuals giving attention to their intellects can engage with such questions and so he 
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defines equality in terms of individual intellects and the quality of the human 
relationships that drive them. Equality is so defined by the opinion that all people have 
equal intelligence, or that all people are equally predisposed to give attention to their 
own intellect whilst assuming everyone else is their intellectual equal. If this assumption 
of intellectual equality is enacted then people might create their own opinions instead of 
relying upon the opinions of others, so equality is reliant upon a ‘process of difference’ 
(Rancière, 1995, p. 68) but this activity is predicated on trust as it is understood to be a 
risky undertaking. 
 
For Freire, animals are creatures of pure activity and never reflect on their nest building 
or fruit gathering whilst humans are aware of a past, present and future, identifying 
challenges and making plans. To consider people as any other animal would amount to 
assuming that humanity were a group of inanimate objects and so Freire defines 
equality in terms of people socially reflecting and acting upon the social and physical 
situations they find themselves in as ‘historical beings’. For Freire, equality is defined 
by the notion of praxis, where all people are assumed to be equally predisposed towards 
socially enacting a simultaneous reflection and action upon the physical and social 
world. Praxis is inherently social in character, driven by human qualities of love and 
trust and predicated upon dialogue between people whilst they co-intend upon the 
problems that challenge them.  
 
Both Freire and Rancière understand oppression as a dichotomising of the human 
qualities that might enact equality. For Freire, oppression is the dichotomising of people 
from the world; the separation of reflection from action as the breaking down of praxis. 
As love and dialogue are integral to praxis, this disruption of humanity’s innate ways of 
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being results from human activity that blocks dialogue, described by Freire as an 
educational process of ‘banking education’. Similarly, Rancière describes oppression as 
a dichotomy of intelligence dividing people into a world of ignorant minds and knowing 
ones. This is taken to be enacted by processes of explanation, where educators 
encourage students to believe that some are more intelligent than others, so weakening 
the attention that they give to their own intellects and the intellects of others. Both 
Freire and Rancière describe these oppressive processes as forms of knowledge 
transmission which are understood to be replicated throughout society. 
 
Freire and Rancière describe emancipation as an educational process that enacts 
equality by disrupting or weakening processes of knowledge transmission. Both 
emphasise the quality of human relationships as part of an emancipatory education, 
including people’s relationships with symbolic productions such as speech or text. For 
both, a process of symbolic production is necessary to emancipation as it plays an 
integral role in processes that might disrupt knowledge transmission. For Freire, the role 
of the emancipatory teacher is to re-instigate praxis by encouraging dialogue and love 
between students and teachers as they co-intend upon symbolic representations of the 
social world. Here, the representations must incorporate problematic aspects of 
students’ lives so that students might reveal the problems for themselves and then 
attempt to solve them, but ultimately it is human love that drives emancipation. For 
Rancière, it is the intelligence to intelligence relationship, driven by the belief that some 
are intellectually superior to others that encourages knowledge transmission. This 
relationship is weakened by the strengthening of a will to will relationship, where the 
role of the emancipatory teacher is to demand that students attend to their wills and to 
their own intellect, whilst acknowledging the intellect of others. 
210 
 
 
From this summary of the broad understandings of the four theorists I begin to make 
some distinctions between empowering and emancipatory education. Firstly, 
emancipatory education takes the assumption of equality as its starting point, where 
emancipation is understood as the enactment of equality in the present as educational 
activity. In contrast, empowerment understandings take inequality as a starting point by 
commencing with the definitions of discourse reproduction as oppressive processes 
which are related ultimately to the distribution of material goods in society (Bingham 
and Biesta, 2010, p. 31). This allows empowerment to be understood as a situation to be 
worked towards and achieved in the future, accompanied by a redistribution of ‘goods’. 
In Bourdieu’s case, the concern is that empowerment is forever over the horizon and so 
unachievable. In contrast, the enactment of emancipation can only be manifested in the 
present, suggesting that emancipation is temporary and fleeting, described by the quality 
of active relationships between teachers, students and the educational materials that they 
use. 
 
Secondly, emancipatory education is understood as the enactment of the assumptions 
that have been made about humanity, where educational relationships are understood to 
encourage the dismantlement of processes of knowledge transmission between teachers 
and students. In contrast, empowerment understandings of education are predicated 
upon revealing ‘the truth’ about how power operates as an ideological process to 
privilege some groups over others in the context of social hierarchies (in line with 
Rancière, 2010, pp. 10-11). This makes empowering education reliant upon the passing 
down of understandings about the social world and how power operates from 
researchers and teachers to students. The repercussion is a need for researchers or 
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teachers to determine whether empowerment is necessary or has taken place. In 
contrast, assuming the possibility of an emancipatory education means assuming that 
emancipation is a normal state of affairs, where every day human relationships might be 
educational and where there is no need for researchers to diagnose if emancipation is 
needed or has taken place. What’s more the enactment of emancipation requires 
students to express their own understandings of the everyday social world. But this is 
not a free for all where to be free means students expressing themselves in any fashion. 
Expressions integral to the enactment of emancipatory educational relationships 
incorporate relationships with symbolic artefacts, where students understandings are a 
revelation of ‘the truth’ of the challenges that face them (Freire) or opinions that express 
the equality of intelligence (Rancière), but where there is no reliance upon an outsider to 
reveal these understandings on the students’ behalf. Here, as with empowerment 
understandings, Freire’s emancipation remains predicated upon the revelation of ‘the 
truth’ and the understanding that ideological processes are in operation. I explore the 
consequences of this when I consider some of the historical criticism of Freire’s work 
below.  
 
Thirdly, emancipation is understood as an enactment of human qualities, making the 
quality of active human relationships integral to emancipation. For Freire these qualities 
are defined by notions of love, trust and dialogue, whilst Rancière describes the 
qualities of trust, intellectual activity and the human will. For both, this links 
understandings of education as emancipation to questions about what it means to be an 
active and speaking human subject
16
, described as a process of subjectification (See 
                                                          
16
 This has invited criticism, eg aimed at Biesta (see Munday, 2011), that his ideas fail to break with 
‘humanism’ (which I discuss later in this chapter). However, the contribution that both Rancière and 
Biesta make (as does Gur-Ze’ev) is to elaborate upon why humanist theories matter educationally. They 
describe the educational problems associated with humanist theories (e.g see Biesta, 2006, p. 5; Gur-
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Biesta 2010, p. 5, p. 21 and Rancière, 1995, p. 65) which Biesta understands as the 
quality of how people act and respond to each other’s actions (See Biesta, 2006, p. 137). 
In the latter part of this chapter I consider how education as subjectification might be 
understood. But the point here is that in contrast, an empowering education is predicated 
upon the relationship between individual people and their identifications in the form of 
symbols or ‘material goods’, where other human qualities are neglected or ignored. 
 
By summarising some of the broad distinctions between empowerment and 
emancipation it seems that the characteristics of an empowering education that I have 
described correspond with the problems I have already raised about it in Chapter 4 (see 
Section 4.4). This suggests that the broad characteristics of an empowering education 
are inherently problematic if I work under the assumption that an emancipatory 
education might be possible, which is the intention that underpins this thesis (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
The problems follow from the underlying assumption that discourse is inherently 
ideological, where meanings are imposed on people through undetectable processes of 
symbolic production. This makes an empowering education reliant upon revealing ‘the 
truth’ about how power operates, so that students are dependent upon teachers and 
researchers for understandings of the social world, seemingly replicating existing social 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ze’ev, 1998, pp. 468-469) which I describe in later sections. Biesta, Gur-Ze’ev and Rancière all acknowledge 
and attempt to tackle these problems in their theoretical work, which is integral to their assumption that an 
emancipatory education is possible. This seems to require a demarcation to be made between humanity and other 
creatures, the issue being that emancipatory education can only be for humanity. Psychologists, sociologists and 
anthropologists are not necessarily precluded from giving attention to the needs of dogs. But dogs are not the domain 
of education. There are two repercussions. Firstly, given that emancipatory education is concerned with issues of 
oppression, equality and emancipation, it seems that these concepts cannot be understood in the context of debates 
about animal welfare, which may be significant. Secondly, it also demonstrates nicely that theories of emancipatory 
education provoke questions and debates about the limits and boundaries of education, and what makes education 
possible, which I demonstrate below. This includes discussing how education might be demarcated from training (or 
learning), or empowerment from emancipation, allowing theses such as the one you are now reading to emerge. 
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hierarchies. However, even if students take control of discourse to author their own 
identities there is no means to make judgements about whether new discourse disrupts 
existing social hierarchies or whether new social hierarchies are more desirable than 
those they replace. Having an explanation of how power operates does not in of itself 
provide a set of criteria for judging whether a new discourse and its associated 
identifications is more or less desirable than that which it replaces.  
 
Students are left with just one option, which is to become more involved in the 
exercising of power, i.e. become empowered. This requires the creation of new 
identities and discourse, where people must identify or label themselves or be identified 
as either similar or different in relation to existing individuals or groups. Where the idea 
of social identity does come into play, this suggests that the grouping together of people 
who carry similar characteristics might somehow be beneficial, perhaps, in Bourdieu’s 
terms, so they might be more easily ‘orchestrated’. Again, this is indicative of how 
empowerment understandings of education are reliant upon relationships between 
individual people and symbols and human qualities such as trust, love, equality or 
responsibility have no consequence.  
 
In the broadest of terms, empowerment understandings of education imply educational 
practices that can be understood to overlap with Biesta’s domain of socialisation (See 
Biesta, 2010, 5, 21 or Section 1.4) as the handing down of understandings of the social 
world is integral to the teacher student relationship, so replicating existing social 
hierarchies. It seems that empowering education is predicated on the idea that excluded 
people must participate in existing social hierarches and work them to their advantage in 
terms of the receipt of ‘goods’ and describing what counts as ‘goods’ and in this sense 
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the aim is to redistribute the existing social system rather than create alternatives. In 
contrast, the possibility of an emancipatory education relies upon the assumption that 
there might be a release or break from the current social order which is taken to be 
inherently oppressive, where new ways of being and doing are enacted that encapsulate 
human qualities that counter and disrupt processes of knowledge transmission. 
 
It is this process that is understood as a process of subjectification which I explore 
further in the last part of this chapter. How this process is understood relates to the 
assumptions that are made about humanity and what it might mean to be or become an 
active human subject. These assumptions also allow judgements to be made about the 
desirability of educational outcomes as well as ways of understanding education. I 
explore this further below when I consider the historical criticism of Freire’s work, and 
in so doing, further demarcating between empowerment and emancipation in the 
context of education.  
 
6.3 Questions to Freire  
 
 
Demarcating between empowerment and emancipation need not just take the form of a 
comparison of how each is understood, of the type that I undertook above. In this 
section I also consider the questions and problems empowerment and emancipation 
understandings raise when they are engaged in the criticism of the theory or practice of 
education. This allows me to explore how empowerment and emancipation might also 
be distinguished by the types of questions and lines of inquiry each understanding 
raises. Of course there are implications here about how I have made my own 
judgements in the conduct of the research I have done for this thesis including my 
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approach to reviewing the literature and the analysis that I have so far presented, so I 
will return to such questions in Chapter 7 when I re-engage with a discussion about the 
methodology and methods that have underpinned this project.  
 
In this section I consider Freire’s work as a theory of emancipatory education that is 
entwined with empowerment understandings of education. Freire’s ideas have been 
described and criticised by researchers who take a perspective of exposing and 
understanding power. As a consequence, much of the discussion pertaining to his ideas 
is articulated using terminology associated with empowerment and power. But more 
than this, though Freire outlines how education might emancipate, his main theoretical 
work makes an assumption that is in keeping with understandings of empowerment. 
Like Bourdieu and Gee, Freire relies upon a notion of ideology or to use Freire’s terms, 
a ‘false’ or ‘naïve’ consciousness that education must overcome by functioning to 
reveal ‘the truth’ that oppressive processes have obscured (Biesta, 2012). It is in relation 
to this feature of Freire’s work that problems might be raised by researchers who 
assume the possibility of an emancipatory education.  
 
Given the propensity for Freire’s ideas to be discussed in the context of power, my 
attempt to disentangle empowerment and emancipation whilst exploring the historical 
criticism of Frere’s work could be taken as an attempt to rediscover his endeavour to 
describe and practice education as emancipation. However, my exploration also 
describes fundamental problems with Freire’s understanding of emancipation and what 
it implies for the practice of education, implying that a conversation about the 
emancipatory potential of education must continue. As I drill down deeper into Freire’s 
work, addressing the central question of how empowerment and emancipation might be 
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distinguished, I begin to discuss the idea of education as subjectification around which 
such a conversation might orientate.  
 
Freire and empowerment 
 
 
Freire is frequently cited as being associated with empowerment as a purpose for 
education (e.g. see Scribner, 1988; Hamilton and Hillier, 2006; Oughton, 2007; Rocha-
Schmidt, 2010; Tagoe, 2008; Stromquist, 2006; Brookfield, 2005; Barton, 1994; Luke, 
1992; Ellsworth, 1989; Archer & Costello, 1990; Hamilton, 1996; Macedo, 1998, pp. 
xxix-xxxi; Biesta, 2010a; Inglis, 1997).  However, even in much of his later writings 
(e.g. Freire, 1998) Freire continues to avoid the employment of a terminology of 
‘empowerment’ in the context of education. One exception, it seems, is Freire’s work 
with Donaldo Macedo (Freire and Macedo, 1987) where the terminology of 
empowerment manifests. Here ‘critical’ and ‘emancipatory’ literacies are referred to as 
a re-appropriation of ‘cultural capital’ and Bourdieu is cited (Freire and Macedo, 1987, 
p. 145). However, in his conversations with Shor about wider educational contexts 
(Freire and Shor, 1987, pp. 108-110) Freire expresses a fear that the notion of 
empowerment might encourage individualistic educational practices. He agrees with 
Shor’s analogy which describes how ‘empowerment’ understandings situate the teacher 
as a kind of lamp-lighter where: 
 
‘The teacher walks into a classroom, provokes some illumination, like turning on a 
light switch, and walks out, mission accomplished. On to the next class, where 
once again the teacher lights some lamps and calls it ‘empowerment’’ 
(ibid, p. 108) 
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It seems to me that this analogy could apply to the teacher who delivers meta-
knowledge about discourse to students. Freire’s theory both acknowledges and asserts 
against the problems inherent to the idea of an empowering education that I described 
above. Importantly, Freire acknowledges that knowledge transmission serves to 
socialise students into an oppressive society, emphasising that the central function of an 
emancipatory education should be to dismantle processes of knowledge transmission 
between teachers and students which he considers to as an enactment of inequality, 
described by the term ‘banking education’. His work can be taken as an attempt to break 
any dependency between teachers and students for knowledge, so that students and 
teachers ‘read the world’ for themselves without the help of researchers operating from 
a third person stance.  
 
Unlike understandings of empowerment which suggest no criteria for judging 
educational outcomes, integral to Freire’s work is the possibility of making such 
judgements. He attempts this by commencing with a definition of equality described by 
Freire’s notion of praxis. If education is understood to encourage praxis it is 
emancipatory; if it does not, then it is serves so socialise. In this sense, a central feature 
of Freire’s work is its attempt to distinguish between education that socialises and 
education that might raise emancipatory alternatives. Finally, Freire’s understanding of 
education attempts to avoid the privileging of individualistic practices which limit or 
ignore aspects of what it means to be an active human subject. Freire describes 
education as an inherently social activity; a process of being and becoming a human 
subject, where the process of subjectification is defined by the concept of praxis that in 
turn is reliant upon the human qualities of love, trust and hope. 
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However, as mentioned above, many researchers identify Freire’s work as an attempt to 
counter power in an educational context and so it can come as no surprise to find that 
Freire’s ideas are most frequently criticised from the perspective of power and 
empowerment. Such criticism is typically contextualised within a discussion of how 
Freire does not take account of relationships of power in his work (e.g. Taylor, 1993; 
Coben, 1997; Ellsworth, 1989; Luke, 1992; Orner, 1992; Jackson, 2008). But perhaps 
this can be expected from researchers who utilise understandings about power and its 
operation as a yardstick, though not necessarily those of Bourdieu or Gee.  
 
In his main theoretical work (Freire, 1970, 1972), Freire doesn’t define power in terms 
of discourse reproduction, but he does describe processes of symbolic production which 
researchers might consider from the perspective of the operation of power. For example, 
Freire assumes that ‘codifications’ (texts, photographs or other symbolic productions), 
along with social dialogue, are necessary to educational relationships that might 
emancipate. Researchers could consider these activities as processes of discourse and 
identity formation and criticise them from the perspective of their implications for 
power relationships between teachers and students. From the stand point of Gee or 
Bourdieu, relationships of power are always attendant to discourse production 
necessitating research conducted from the stand point of an observer who sits outside of 
discourse and explains its operation. But in Freire’s seminal theoretical works (Freire, 
1970, 1972) he does not consider either the existence or consequences of power 
understood in these terms.  
 
Bourdieu and Gee both argue, albeit in different ways, that any researcher or educator 
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that does not take account of power and symbolic production is in effect colluding with 
it. As I stated earlier in this chapter, the problem with this notion is that it allows 
educators and researchers who do not take the critique of power as a starting point to be 
dismissed on the basis that their activity will encourage or collude with existing social 
hierarchies. This criticism can be thrown at theories of emancipatory education 
including Freire’s work. However, it can also be stated that theories that take 
understandings of power as an ideological process of discourse production as a starting 
point exclude any role for education as emancipation or subjectification (see Rancière, 
2005, p. 179) and I further illustrate this possibility below.  
 
The premise of Freire’s work is to distinguish between education that socialises or 
oppresses and education that might emancipate. It is not an attempt to describe how 
power operates and in this sense it can be understood as a theory of emancipatory 
education rather than a theory with implications for empowerment. What’s more, 
Freire’s major theoretical work (e.g. 1970, 1972) pre-dates that of Bourdieu and Gee, as 
well as the ‘social turn’ associated with New Literacies Studies when emphasis came to 
be placed on the operation of power in the context of literacies research (see Section 
2.2). Both Freire in some of his later writings (see Roberts, 2003 or Freire and Macedo, 
1987) and those who draw upon Freire’s work (e.g. Giroux, 1988) have attempted to 
renegotiate Freire’s ideas in the context of discussions about power or empowerment, as 
well as discourse and identity (e.g. Lankshear and McLaren, 1993; Tett and Maclachan, 
2008). I would argue that such projects have encouraged some confusion where Freire’s 
understanding of an emancipatory education has become further associated with the 
idea of empowerment. An example of this can be found in the way that Lankshear and 
McLaren seem to merge the idea of identity with the notion of the human subject as if 
220 
 
they were equivalent (e.g. see Lankshear and McLaren, 1993b, p. 386)
17
. I discuss how 
identification might be distinguished from subjectification in the latter part of this 
chapter.  
 
But the point here is that I have already made the argument that understandings of 
education as empowerment imply educational practices that socialise students into 
existing society. This suggests that a clear demarcation must be made between the 
notions of empowerment and emancipation if the possibility that education might not 
always serve to socialise is to be raised.  
 
Disentangling empowerment and emancipation 
 
The untangling of empowerment and emancipation in the context of Freire’s 
understandings of education that I present here not only reclaims Freire’s work as an 
endeavour to describe an emancipatory education. It is also a springboard for continuing 
to raise the possibility of an emancipatory education as a project that must continue if 
education is understood as anything other than a socialising machine. 
 
By attempting to distinguish between empowerment and emancipation, my research 
seeks not to follow a pattern of bringing emancipation and empowerment together by 
attempting to re-contextualise Freire’s ideas within understandings of empowerment. 
Rather, I am attempting to disentangle the two in the context of examining what this 
implies for education, so that the possibility of emancipation as a function of education 
might continue to be raised and explored. So next I continue the process of 
disentanglement by criticising Freire’s ideas from the starting point of assuming the 
                                                          
17
 As does Janks (e.g. Janks, 2010, 55) though not specifically in relation to Freire’s work 
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possibility of emancipation as a function or purpose for education.  
 
Here I rely on the work of three theorists who assume that an emancipatory education is 
possible; Biesta, Gur-Ze’ev (with help from Holloway) and Rancière. Biesta raises 
higher level questions about the purpose, function and possibility of education and 
problems associated with traditions in critical education where emphasis has been 
placed upon exposing the operation of power (Biesta, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2006). In 
describing possibilities for education as subjectification Biesta asserts that the notion of 
identity is not a useful one (Biesta, 2010, p. 86, see Section 4.4). However Rancière’s 
work can be read as a specific response to Bourdieu’s work (e.g. see Rancière, 2005), 
considering questions of identity, power and discourse head on in the context of 
exploring emancipatory education as a process of subjectification (e.g. see Rancière, 
1995). Gur-Ze’ev is a theorist of emancipatory education who has responded 
specifically to Freire’s work (Gur-Ze’ev, 2010, 1998) and raises fundamental problems 
about how Freire understands emancipation, drawing upon the concept of negative 
dialectics described by Theodor Adorno. My interpretation of Gur-Ze’ev’s ideas is 
supported by the work of Holloway (2003) who explains negative dialectics to a lay 
audience in the context of critiquing anti-capitalist politics.   
 
Taking the assumption of emancipation as a starting point, at least four problems arise 
from Freire’s understanding of emancipatory education. The first is that Freire fails to 
achieve his declared goal of removing the dependency of students on teachers for 
knowledge about the social world. Secondly, and relating to this, Freire associates acts 
of ‘objectification’ with a distortion of human love toward necrophilia, yet 
‘objectification’ remains integral to his understanding of emancipatory education, with 
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alarming consequences. Thirdly, a question has been raised over whether the 
emancipatory relationships that Freire describes can be understood to be educational. 
Finally, that Freire’s definition of praxis as humanity’s species being might imply 
educational relationships that serve to socialise students, again suggesting that Freire 
fails in his attempt to distinguish between a socialising and emancipatory education. 
 
Freire, love and ‘the truth’ about ideology 
 
Taking each of these problems in turn, firstly, Freire assumes that ‘the world’ must be 
codified in symbolic form, so that teachers and students might co-intend upon these 
symbolic productions. This is necessary because Freire insists that banking education 
distorts people’s perception of the world so that they are no longer able to accurately 
read it for themselves. Freire sets himself the task of describing how the truth might 
come to be revealed to students without an educator revealing this for them, so 
replicating ‘banking education’. However, the codifying of the world upon which his 
understanding of emancipatory education relies seems to recreate at least some degree 
of dependency between students and teachers for understandings. For example, Freire 
describes how psychologists and sociologists might be involved in establishing the 
validity of the codified representations (PO; p. 89).   
 
The central problem here is that for Freire, like Bourdieu and Gee, the purpose of 
education is to reveal ‘the truth’ to students. This means that for Freire the emancipatory 
teacher is at least in some way responsible for ensuring that the ‘correct’ truth is 
revealed and so some aspect of knowledge transmission and its associated relationships 
of dependency must remain integral to Freire’s emancipatory education (Biesta, 2012). 
In this respect, Freire’s work can be seen to replicate a problem I have already 
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associated with empowerment understandings of education, a paradox where students 
are made dependent upon teachers for their own emancipation. The difference is that 
Freire states an intention to break any such dependency, insisting that processes of 
identifying ‘the truth’ are driven by relationships of love in praxis. For Freire, education 
is inherently social and driven by human qualities. It is not an individualistic 
relationship between people and symbols implied by Bourdieu or Gee.   
 
However, Freire’s claim that emancipation is reliant upon love and trust opens his ideas 
up to more criticism. Not only does Freire claim that emancipatory education results in 
students identifying ‘the truth’, this revelation is driven by love between teachers and 
students. To summarise Freire’s theory in a single sentence, Freire is asserting the idea 
that true love reveals ‘the truth’, perhaps reducing the quality of human love to an act of 
identification (see Gur-Ze’ev, 1998, pp. 468-469), or in Freire’s terminology, an act of 
objectification.  The fundamental issue here is Freire’s insistence that objectification is 
the enactment of necrophilia or a love of death (PO, pp. 50-51), yet paradoxically, 
identification of an objective ‘truth’ remains integral to Freire’s emancipation.  In 
practical terms, Freire’s work encourages teachers and students to believe and act upon 
‘the truth’ as it has been revealed. Emancipatory teachers might take the understandings 
of particular groups of students as ‘the truth’ even if they incorporate expressions of 
hatred or violence, whilst the ideas, opinions and understandings of other students might 
be ignored (Gur-Ze’ev, 1998, 2010).  
 
Like Freire, Gur-Ze’ev associates processes of identification with a love of death in the 
context of education. Gur-Ze’ev describes how this assumption is integral to traditions 
in Jewish thought (e.g. Gur-Ze’ev 1998, 2005; Gur-Ze’ev and West, 2010) and argues 
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that the later writings of Adorno encapsulate aspects of this spiritual tendency (Gur-
Ze’ev 2010). Drawing upon Adorno’s understanding of negative dialectics (see 
Holloway, 2003, pp. 150-155), Gur-Ze’ev understands emancipation as a process of 
‘anti-identification’ or the negation of identity18, also driven by human love (Gur-Ze’ev, 
2010 or see Holloway, 2003, p. 68). This implies an alternative understanding of 
ideology as a form of ‘identity thinking’ that can be countered by difference and 
heterogeneity rather than the revelation of the ‘truth’ (see Eagleton, 1991, p. 126).  
 
Rancière concurs with Gur-Ze’ev in that the revelation of ‘the truth’ cannot be integral 
to an emancipation that relies upon individual’s intellectual freedom, suggesting that 
identity is ‘first about fear’ (see Rancière, 1995, p. 70). If individuals’ opinions solidify 
around an identified truth, then people’s intellects and the products of their intellects 
will converge, so destroying intellectual emancipation. Instead, taking the assumption of 
intellectual equality as a starting point, Rancière describes an emancipatory education 
that is reliant upon students attending to their own intellects whilst acknowledging the 
intellect of others and in this sense emancipation is reliant upon difference. Like Gur-
Ze’ev, he details this in relation to processes of identification, describing emancipation 
as a process of ‘dis-identification’ (see Rancière, 1995, p. 67) but Rancière dispenses 
entirely with a notion of ideology and I return this when I explore education, 
identification and subjectification below. 
 
Freire and ‘the truth’ about humanity 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Or perhaps more accurately, as the negation of the negation of anti-identity 
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Closely connected to the problem of identification, Freire’s understanding of education 
is reliant upon an ultimate definition (or identification) of what it means to be a human 
subject, encompassed by his notion of praxis. This also ties his understanding of 
emancipatory education to the ‘truth’ in terms of a definition of the innate character of 
human beings. Biesta defines ‘humanist’ theories, of which Freire’s could be taken as 
an example, as theories that define the human subject and use these definitions to 
further human endeavours such as education (Biesta, 2006, p. 5). The problem Biesta 
raises here is that by predetermining ‘the truth’ about what it means to be human, the 
function of education is then predefined as a process that might replicate a model of 
humanity that has already been identified. Biesta argues that in this sense, on a deep 
level, humanist theories will suggest educational practices that can only be understood 
to socialise students into a predefined society, rather than raising possibilities for 
emancipatory alternatives.  
 
The outcomes of education are pre-determined and the task of education is to enact 
practices that might achieve these by slotting all students into a preconceived formation 
(ibid, p. 7). Rancière and Gur-Ze’ev do not rely upon a pre-conceived notion of what it 
means to be human, in keeping with their shared understanding that emancipation 
cannot be aimed at identifying a ‘truth’. Rancière describes his assumptions about 
intellectual emancipation as just ‘opinions’ (e.g. see IS, p. 73), where emancipation can 
only be destroyed by the belief in a collective ‘self’ encapsulated in a single 
identification of humanity (see Rancière, 1995, p. 65). Rather, emancipation is 
predicated upon difference and understood as a process of ‘dis-identification’.  For Gur-
Ze’ev the only assumption that can be made about humanity is that humans refuse 
identification or being pinned down. The problem is not to have an understanding of 
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humanity, but to hold to the idea that humanity ‘already exists positively’. Instead the 
starting point is understanding that humanity, or the human subject, ‘exists only in a 
form of being denied’ (see Holloway, 2003, p. 153) raising the idea that processes of 
‘anti-identification’ might be integral to subjectification and an emancipatory education, 
described by Gur-Ze’ev as a ‘counter-education’. 
 
However, in Freire’s case the outcome of emancipatory education is predetermined by 
his notion of praxis which in turn defines the tasks that the teacher must undertake.  
Freire acknowledges this by the way he refers to emancipatory education as a 
humanising process (e.g. see Freire, 1972, p. 21). Some of the historical criticism Freire 
has received reflects Biesta’s concerns that I described above. For example Freire’s 
praxis is reliant upon what he terms as ‘critical thinking’ as part of an educational 
process that might overcome students’ distorted consciousness, suggesting a need for 
educational practices that encourage students to think in specific ways (see Freire, 1998, 
p. 41-42). The problem here is that these educational practices might prevent or ignore 
other ways of thinking, or encourage teachers to treat some students’ thinking as 
incorrect or irrational whilst taking others’ as examples of ‘the truth’ (see Gee, 1996, 
pp. 37-38; Ellsworth, 1989; Luke, 1992). 
 
Related to this is the way that Freire presents a clear cut demarcation in the 
identification of ‘oppressors’ and ‘the oppressed’. Freire does acknowledge the 
complexity of oppressive relationships (PO, p. 25, pp. 50-59, pp. 66-68) implying that 
well-meaning educators cannot make easy assumptions that they themselves are not 
enactors of oppression. His notion of praxis also links his theory to the social and 
physical world where there are endless possibilities for liberated people to think and act 
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together to transform material reality. However, Freire’s theoretical work (Freire, 1970, 
1972) also refers to ‘the oppressed’ as a distinct group that might be readily identified 
by teachers, who themselves are not oppressors.  From an empowerment perspective, 
this could be taken as indication of Freire’s inadequate understanding of power 
relationships between teachers and students. But assuming the possibility of 
emancipation, this aspect of understanding of education can also be understood to create 
a dependency between teachers and students where part of a teacher’s role is to identify 
oppressed people and whether emancipation is required. In contrast, for both Gur-Ze’ev 
and Rancière the very possibility of emancipation relies upon fluctuation where 
individuals can be both oppressed or oppressor, emancipated or emancipator and 
emancipation is not directed towards a particular group of people: 
 
‘intellectual emancipation means that there is no specific pedagogy of the 
oppressed, that there is no specific education for poor people or oppressed people 
etc. If there is a specific pedagogy of the oppressed, then it must be thought of as a 
specific case in the general idea of intellectual emancipation, because basically the 
idea of emancipation is the same for rich people and for poor people.’ 
(Rancière in Liang, 2009) 
 
As implied above, Freire’s reliance upon understandings about the inherent character of 
human beings might also lend his ideas to the production of sets of instructions for 
achieving emancipation. If the outcome of education is to achieve a predefined human 
state then programs might be developed aimed at realising this, so continuing the very 
paradox which Frere sought to avoid, of the ‘emancipated’ being made dependent upon 
228 
 
‘emancipators’ for their own emancipation. However, it seems to me that in addition, 
the notion of praxis might in itself encourage the generation of educational programs.  
 
Freire describes how an emancipatory literacies education might be enacted in practical 
terms as part of his theoretical work (e.g. Freire, 1970, p. 38, 1986, PO), in keeping with 
the notion of praxis as the bringing together of reflection and action, where theorising 
without practice is considered as ‘verbalism’ or sloganeering and other forms of 
intellectual elitism (PO, p. 98). It is perhaps unsurprising then that Freire’s work has 
been utilised to create educational programs (e.g. as described by Archer and Costello, 
1990 or Archer and Newman, 2003), as well as courses in ‘critical thinking’ (see Dale 
and Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 73), although once again I wish to make it clear that I 
make no judgements here about how such programs have been enacted by teachers and 
students on the ground.  
 
But Freire is also clear that an emancipatory education cannot be systemised. The idea 
is that praxis as emancipation is enacted by teachers and students, not just by Freire the 
theorist, or there would be an inevitable reversion to banking education (see PO, p. 31, 
or Dale and Hyslop-Margison, 2010, pp. 73-74). Here again, Freire demarcates himself 
from Bourdieu, who utilises the notion of praxis to inform his own research, where 
praxis resembles a technique for achieving ‘objectivity’ rather than a intersubjective 
quality that may be enacted by all people (see Section 5.4). In conversation with 
Macedo, Freire states that ‘“I don’t want to be imported or exported. It is impossible to 
export pedagogical practices without re-inventing them. Please tell your fellow 
American educators not to import me. Ask them to recreate and rewrite my ideas”’ 
(Freire in Dale and Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 74, also, see Freire and Macedo, 1987, p. 
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134). Giroux attempts to develop this sentiment in the context of Freire’s ideas and how 
they might contribute to a ‘critical literacies’ education that does not resort to the 
passing down of knowledge or skills (Giroux, 1988). But the problems remains that 
whilst Freire’s notion of praxis describes the possibility of humans socially engaging in 
a continuous reflection and action upon the ‘world’, it also represents the ultimate 
definition of ‘the truth’ about what it means to be human, with all the attendant 
problems that I have described above.    
 
Rancière is emphatic that emancipation cannot be turned into a policy or program as 
part of a formal system of education because by definition this would destroy the 
enactment of the equality of intelligence. This raises the question of how emancipatory 
education might be understood as educational practice and what the boundaries of that 
practice might be, which I turn to in Chapter 7 when I finally consider the potential for 
emancipation in the context of adult literacies education. But the main point here is that 
understandings of emancipatory education place doubt over the possibility that 
programs of instruction might function other than to socialise students into the current 
social order. This sentiment is expressed by Freire and his work undoubtedly 
contributes to that discussion, but his ideas also seem ripe for conversion into programs 
and policies for education, at least in part because they are underpinned by an ultimate 
and ‘true’ definition of what it means to be human.  
 
Freire and the possibility of education 
 
The final problem with Freire’s ideas, as described by those who have assumed the 
possibility of emancipation, is that Freire understands an emancipatory student-teacher 
relationship to be a non-dominatory relationship between co-subjects, where students 
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and teachers co-intend upon the world together as if for the first time (PO, pp. 86-87). 
The issue here is whether this can be understood as an educational relationship (e.g. 
Biesta 2010b), the problem being that if a teacher-student relationship could be a non-
dominatory there might no longer be a clear demarcation between the student and 
teacher. This brings into question whether an emancipatory situation continues to be an 
educational one rather than, say, one where people are working co-operatively together 
on a shared project. It would also undermine Freire’s argument that praxis is an 
inherently educational process, the problem being that this might leave emancipation 
with no role in education, where education might only be enacted as a form of 
socialisation.  
 
Biesta (2010b, p. 544) describes the possibility of this situation as one where ‘education 
dissolves into learning’, where the teacher’s role becomes that of a facilitator and the 
student to that of ‘learner’. Whilst Freire understands emancipation to be inherently 
social, his work often refers to ‘cultural action’ rather than ‘education’ (Taylor, 1997, p. 
63), for example in the title of his book Cultural Action for Freedom (1970). In contrast, 
Rancière maintains a clear distinction between teachers and students as emancipatory 
education is driven by the will of the teacher who demands that students pay attention to 
their intellect and the intellect of others, though it remains unclear to me what Gur-
Ze’ev implies for student teacher relationships19. 
 
                                                          
19
 I have not attempted a detailed analysis of Gur-Ze’ev’s ideas of the type I undertook with the work of Bourdieu, 
Gee, Freire and Rancière and his work does not represent a fully set out description of an emancipatory education as 
found in the writing of Freire and Rancière. My inability to discern what his ideas imply for educational relationships 
may just be indicative of the boundaries of my project. However, Holloway (see 2003, pp. 204-215), who considers 
Adorno’s work for the lay reader in relation to what it might imply for political activity declares a difficulty in 
finding ways to describe what this might mean in practical terms. On the other hand, Holloway’s conclusions, 
broadly, do not seem to contradict Rancière’s understandings of ‘policing’ and ‘politics’ and this should be apparent 
in the discussion I present in this chapter 
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Empowerment, emancipation and criticising ideas about education 
 
Before drawing conclusions about what this detailed criticism of Freire’s work implies 
for understanding emancipatory education, I summarise some further possibilities for 
distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation. From an empowerment 
perspective  problems raised in relation to Freire’s work focus on his understanding of 
power and how he takes account of power hierarchies in the context of the practical 
enactment of education (e.g. Coben, 1997;  Jackson, 2008, Ellsworth, 1989; Luke; 
1992; Taylor, 1993; Gee; 1996). For example, the idea of Freire’s ‘false consciousness’ 
might be criticised (e.g. Ellsworth, 1989) but in the context of understanding power in 
the classroom. Assuming that an emancipatory education is possible, the issue with 
‘false consciousness’ is the follow on implication that students might not be able to 
understand without the help of their teachers, which Rancière and Biesta both raise as a 
problem in their work (e.g. Biesta, 2009, 2010a). But from an empowerment 
perspective, ‘false consciousness’ is problematic because it suggests that students might 
be able to understand at all. Power can never be escaped and so people can never 
understand each other. ‘The truth’ is that power reproduces through undetectable 
processes which can never be dismantled, so that relationships between teachers and 
students can only be understood in terms of ‘moving about’ or shifting between various 
identities and their associated knowledge (see Ellsworth, 1989, p. 321) with no 
possibility it seems for education as emancipation.  
 
It follows that, from the perspective of empowerment, researchers and educators such as 
Freire who do not take account of power are assumed to be in collusion with its 
reproduction and are criticised for doing so. Criticism from an ‘empowerment’ 
perspective has a tendency to take this form and in so doing the very idea of an 
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emancipatory education is dismissed (see Rancière, 2005, p. 179). This further justifies 
my argument that empowerment and emancipation must be demarcated as purposes for 
education if the possibility of an emancipatory education is to be raised and not lost. 
 
Criticism of Freire from those who assume that an emancipatory education is possible 
can be contrasted with that taken from an empowerment perspective. From the above 
discussion, it seems that assuming the possibility of emancipation means posing 
questions that interrogate the grounds of the possibility of education itself. Biesta’s 
concern that educational relationships might necessitate a clear demarcation between 
students and teachers questions what makes education possible with implications for the 
critique of Freire’s ideas. Questions to Freire taken from the assumption that 
emancipation is possible, orientate towards attempts to understand education and what 
these understandings imply about the quality of human relationships. Emancipation 
relies upon the enactment of human qualities, such as love, trust, responsibility or 
intellectual freedom. Criticism from those who make these assumptions is an expression 
of concern for the continuation of such qualities as integral aspects of human 
relationships. This is found in the criticism of Freire, for example in Gur-Ze’ev concern 
about how Freire understands love in the context of educational relationships. These 
types of criticism have the capacity to delve deep into the assumptions that Freire 
makes, raising further problems pertinent to the possibility of distinguishing between 
empowerment and emancipation and which empowerment perspectives neglect or 
ignore. 
 
For example, the above critique of Freire has raised two more distinctions between 
empowering and emancipatory education. The first of these is that an emancipatory 
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education cannot be enacted through a program or policy, again raising questions about 
the boundaries and limits to which an emancipatory education might be possible. In 
contrast, researchers who refer to understandings of power do not question the existence 
of educational programs (e.g. see Janks, 2010; Gee, 1996; Crowther, Tett and Hamilton, 
2003; Tett and MacLachlan, 2007; Luke and Freebody, 1997) or education policy (e.g. 
Tett and MacLachlan, 2008). Instead, discussion orientates towards what the content of 
programs or policy should be or how programs might be designed and developed.   
 
Related to this, the second distinction is that an emancipatory education cannot be 
understood as the grouping or congregating around existing ways in which people are 
identified, or to use Bourdieu’s terminology, people’s ways of ‘having a name’ (LSP, 
pp. 120-122). Emancipation is not predicated upon processes of identification as these 
deny the possibility of an active human subject by encouraging the practical enactment 
of relationships that maintain a dependency between teachers and students for 
understandings about the social world. In contrast empowering education is reliant upon 
processes of identification as part of discourse production that might serve to alter 
power relationships. But I further justify these two claims in the final part of this 
chapter. Both Rancière and Gur-Ze’ev attempt to describe an emancipatory education as 
a process of subjectification that counters identification, or in Rancière’s terminology 
‘encounters’ processes of identification (Rancière, 1995, p. 62, p. 64). Gur-Ze’ev 
understands emancipatory ‘counter-education’ as one of ‘anti-identification’, whilst 
Rancière describes a process of ‘dis-identification’. In the next section I attempt to 
describe Rancière’s understanding of subjectification as dis-identification before 
summarising how empowerment and emancipation might be distinguished in the 
context of education.  
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6.4 Education as subjectification 
 
Rancière does not recognise ideology as ‘the truth’ of how power operates to distort or 
exclude through undetectable processes. For Rancière, there is no concept of Freire’s 
false or naive consciousness, Bourdieu’s ‘misrecognition’ or Gee’s notion that 
discourses cannot be critiqued from within. Rancière acknowledges that it is important 
to understand how the social order, or as he terms it, the ‘police order’ is reproduced, 
but it is equally important to understand how emancipation from it might be possible 
(Rancière, 1999, p. 32). According to Rancière, a situation isn’t emancipatory, or as he 
terms it, ‘political’, just because power relationships are understood to be at work in it, 
indeed emancipation has got nothing to do with relationships of power and the 
revelation of ‘the truth’ (see Rancière, 1999, p. 42 or Section 5.3).  
 
For Rancière, only individual human intellects can take responsibility for the needs of 
humanity or consider the continued existence of humanity as a species and so equality 
and emancipation are understood as an enactment of intellectual freedom. This doesn’t 
mean that there is no ‘truth’, just that its revelation is not integral to the possibility of 
emancipation. What matters are individuals’ relationships with each other and the truth, 
where the possibility of emancipation is reliant upon each individual creating their own 
orbit around the truth (IS, p. 78), where flight paths fluctuate, ascending and descending 
in accordance with the attention individuals give to their wills and the degree to which 
they enact the equality of intelligence. Such enactments might create new identifications 
which are significant, but not because they are inscribed with ‘the truth’, rather because 
they are assumed to be inscribed with ‘equality’. But this does not mean that 
emancipation is a process of identification or authoring new identities. For Rancière, 
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identification is ‘policing’ (Rancière, 1995, p. 68) and emancipatory education as an 
enactment of equality is a process of ‘disidentification’ (Rancière, 1991, Bingham and 
Biesta, 2010)
20
. 
 
Rancière’s describes subjectification or dis-identification when he discusses the process 
of emancipation in more detail in the context of defining ‘politics’ and the ‘political’. 
Rancière’s description of politics corresponds with that of both ‘education’ and 
‘emancipation’ in his own terminology.  The ‘political’ is an encounter between the two 
processes of policing and equality (Rancière, 1995, p. 63), understood as processes of 
identification and disidentification, which correspond with the Rancière’s 
understandings of oppression and emancipatory education that I described in Chapter 5.  
 
To recap, the process of identification that Rancière understands is not Freire’s 
‘objectification’, where people are prevented from intending their consciousness 
                                                          
20
Aside from how I haven’t engaged in a detailed interpretation of Gur-Ze’ev’s work,  there are difficulties that 
prevent me from providing an adequate brief summary of how ‘anti-identification’ might be understood in the context 
of education. To explain ideas predicated on the notion of ‘negative dialectics’ would first require defining ‘positive’ 
dialectics as a starting point. However, popular understandings of dialectics as a Hegelian concept have a tendency to 
mis-represent Hegel’s work (See Bernstein, 1991), perhaps as a consequence of the legacy of popular explanations of 
Marxism. What’s more, as I have already hinted at in my comparison of Bourdieu and Freire’s understandings of 
praxis, there are divergences in understandings of praxis and dialectics amongst those who draw upon these concepts 
in their understandings of education. All of this makes me wary of providing a brief explanation of dialectics that can 
be satisfactory in the context of this thesis without embarking upon a significant additional piece of research. 
However, for any reader who is interested and already clings to some understanding or interpretation of ‘dialectics’, I 
offer the following: Gur-Ze’ev’s understanding of ‘anti-identification’ has some correspondences with Rancière’s 
‘anti-disidentification’ but starts from a different set of assumptions. The starting point is the understanding of 
humanity as refusing or denying identification, where this refusal is an inherent aspect of humanity; bees don’t refuse 
to build hives and monkeys don’t refuse to climb trees. So, as with Rancière politics is in the name of an 
identification being denied, dismissing the idea of it taking the form of asserting a cultural identity. The concept of 
dialectics is turned upside down, so that the synthesis integral to the notion of a dialectical movement has no ‘happy 
ending’. Instead the start point and end point is negativity, as a refusal to be identified, where the negation is a 
process of identification that negates anti-negativity. The ‘negation of the negation’ takes the form of a temporary and 
fleeting process of anti-identification or subjectification (Holloway refers to subjectification whilst Gut-Ze’ev refers 
to de-subjectification, but the concept of negative dialectics entails potentially confusing sign swapping, so this may 
not be significant). This ‘negation of the negation of anti-identity’ is understood as a form of transcendence, a kind of 
explosion of humanity’s love of life. The synthesis, as a new identification, is inherently oppressive – it is not the 
’synthesis’ associated with popular understandings of dialectics - and so the end point is negativity and refusal. Gur-
Ze’ev understanding of identification differs from both Rancière and also Freire, which also means a different 
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towards the world, with its associated notion of ‘false consciousness’ and ‘banking 
education’. Rather, the logic of policing is the logic of explication or explanation as this 
encourages people to congregate around shared understandings and identifications 
instead of giving attention to their intellects and the intellects of others (see Section 
5.3). Processes of identification are integral to the possibility of any social institution, 
no matter its function, be it the courts of law, media organisations, universities or 
parliaments. Groups of people must hold to common understandings, goals and 
characteristics if institutions are to exist (IS, p. 57) and so the existence of any social 
order is reliant upon explanatory processes for its continued operation and can be 
understood to be inherently oppressive (IS, p. 17). Group consensus is necessary to the 
continuance of organisations, predicated upon policing activity (Rancière, 1995, p. 63). 
Societal institutions purport to act as the ‘self’ of the community, to incorporate 
characteristics which are understood to be representative of a group. To take part in the 
community, people must form allegiance with these identifications and so the social 
order by definition must encourage processes of identification or it would fall apart.  
 
Rancière describes how much of the activity that we would commonly consider to be 
politics can be understood to enact a policing function that replicates processes of 
explication or identification. For example, most oppositional activity within the social 
order takes place through expressions that counter the prevailing values or 
characteristics of a ruling law or culture by setting out support for an alternative rule, 
law or culture and arguing for it through the same explicatory processes (ibid, p. 64). 
Groups of people, big or small, might make a claim for identity on the part of ‘so-called 
minorities’ whilst expressing disapproval of the current law (ibid, p. 64), or groups 
                                                                                                                                                                          
understanding of praxis, but I cannot elaborate on this in the context of understanding educational relationships 
without further research 
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might accuse each other of ‘barbarism or tribalism’ (ibid, p. 65) in reference to each 
other’s characteristics. Similarly, there might be an assertion of the ways and 
characteristics of particular groups, perhaps the working classes or women, undertaken 
by exerting their distinctive cultural forms and perhaps positing that these hold an 
inherent value. For Rancière, equality is not understood or enacted as a set of 
characteristics or existing identifications which can be appealed to or worked toward. 
All this activity is assumed to rely upon explication and so amounts to ‘policing’ that 
replicates intellectual inequality (ibid, p. 65, see Section 5.3).  
 
As I described above, the enactment of equality cannot be what Rancière describes as an 
enactment of the ‘self’ in the sense that it cannot take the form of the identification or 
explanation of the characteristics that have been denied. For example, to state ‘the 
workers united will never be defeated’ or ‘we are women, we are strong21’ can be 
understood to encourage further policing activity as it encourages people to unite 
around common identities and rely upon common understandings, so destroying 
intellectual freedom. Though these slogans might be posed as arguments with the 
intention of opposing dominant groups or asserting against oppressive social structures, 
they actually serve to replicate them. 
 
Similarly, asserting the culture of a dominated group can be understood as policing. For 
Rancière, ‘narrative and culture entail the reversion of subjectivization to identification’ 
(ibid; 68). There are implications here for Freire’s (1970) description of education as 
‘cultural action for freedom’ and description of how transcriptions of peoples’ stories 
are of ‘unquestionable’ value in adult education (Freire and Macedo, 1987, p. 45). Also 
                                                          
21
 These slogans are my examples, not Rancière’s 
238 
 
for legacy of Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart in the UK tradition of adult 
education that I mentioned and drew upon in Chapter 2, which attaches inherent value 
to working class culture (e.g. Willams, 1993b; Hoggart, 1957, see Steele, 1997, pp. 176-
198). Williams considered working class culture to encapsulate a form of democratic 
politics that gave rise to trade unionism and the co-operative movement in Britain. He 
understood cultural activity as a form of Public Education that might assert against 
education orientated towards the requirements of the workplace and the deference of the 
elite culture upheld by universities, referred to as Industrial Training and Old 
Humanism (1993a, 1993b, see Steele, 1997, pp. 183-184 and Section 2.3).  Williams’ 
Public Education project is problematic in the context of Rancière’s understanding of 
an emancipatory education as it encourages grouping around sets of identifications (i.e. 
‘working class culture’) in opposition to others (i.e. market generated ‘mass’ culture, or 
the university culture of Old Humanism), which could only serve to replicate existing 
explicatory processes, or ‘police’ logic. In this sense, amongst others, Williams’ idea of 
Public Education cannot be taken to be educational and is indistinguishable from Old 
Humanism or Industrial Training in its enactment. 
 
Whilst understanding social hierarchies to be replicated through the enactment of 
explicatory or ‘police’ logic, Rancière posts the possibility of an alternative 
emancipatory logic that might counter it. This logic of equality ‘consists of a set of 
practices guided by the supposition that everyone is equal and by the attempt to verify 
this supposition’ (see Rancière, 1995, p. 65). For Rancière, emancipation (or politics) 
takes place when the logic of policing or policy as explication encounters the logic of 
emancipation in an enactment of equality, when a temporary ‘stage occurs when we 
take the political to be the place where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into 
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the handling of a wrong’ (see Rancière, 1995, p. 62, p. 64) or ‘tort’, understood as a 
form of ‘twisted logic’ (Bingham and Biesta, 2010, p. 159).  
 
In a circular argument, Rancière also describes how ‘Wrong is simply the mode of 
subjectification in which the assertion of equality takes its political shape’ (Rancière, 
1999, p. 39). Subjectification is a manifestation of a ‘wrong’ and enacting emancipation 
in the handling of a wrong might reconfigure the existing police order incorporating an 
inscription of equality (Rancière, 1999, pp. 39-40). But, to reiterate, Rancière is not 
referring to a ‘wrong’ that has previously been identified, so, for example, it will not be 
accounted for under existing governmental law, or understood in terms of the 
relationships between groups that have already been named.  It cannot mean appealing 
to a collective self in the form of an existing set of characteristics. Instead, Rancière 
describes how a ‘wrong’ establishes or institutes a logic of emancipation that 
necessitates an impossible or wrong identification, understood as a process of dis-
identification (Rancière, 1995, p. 67). 
 
The idea that an impossible or wrong identification follows the enactment of 
emancipation suggests that there may be inherent difficulties encountered by those 
attempting to describe such a possibility, including myself, as it seems to require 
identifying an impossible identification. Rancière himself attempts a ‘special dialect that 
carries no identification with any group’ in the understanding that ‘the act of thinking is 
primarily an activity of translation, and that anyone is capable of making a translation’ 
(ibid, p. 62) for all people have equal intelligence. Perhaps, in a sense, the onus is not 
just on me to explain the counter logic of emancipation – it is also on you as my 
intellectual equal to translate it.  
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The logic of emancipation disrupts processes where people come to hold common 
understandings and identifications. Instead of identifying with a ‘self’, the first task of 
‘politics’ or emancipation is to struggle against ‘selfishness’ (Rancière, 1995, p. 65). 
The logic of the equality of intelligence is always enacted in the name of a category 
denied, either in principle, or as a result of the consequences of its denial. Emancipation 
is a logic of ‘the other’, enacted to demonstrate the supposition of equality. It must be 
enacted and verified in the name of all people rather than a particular group already 
identified, which means an identity which is unknown or not yet (Rancière, 1995, p. 
68). It must be enacted in the name of anyone, not only the injured party, which means 
in the name of an anonym (or pseudonym) (ibid, p. 65).   
 
Because equality cannot be an identification that people appeal to or achieve in the 
future, it can only be repeatedly assumed, supposed and verified in individual 
emancipatory acts in the present. It is in this sense that it is the enactment of a logic; an 
emancipatory logic described as a ‘polemical universal’. 
 
‘Equality is not a value to which one appeals; it is a universal that must be 
supposed, verified and demonstrated in each case. Universality is not the eidos of 
the community to which particular situations are opposed; it is, first of all, a logical 
operator.’  
(ibid, p. 65) 
 
So what is important here is the logic of emancipation and its encounter with 
explicatory logic. The only ‘truth’ being tested is the truth of the logic of emancipation, 
as the enactment of the opinion that all people have equal intelligence. Emancipation is 
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a demonstration of this logic, a test of the line of argument that enacts equality by 
demonstrating the logical consequences of a wrong that oppressed groups set out to 
cope with (ibid, p. 65). Instead of identifying, the logic of emancipation specifies a gap 
between identifications (ibid, p. 66) and it is this process that Rancière understands as 
one of subjectification or ‘dis-identification’, or ‘politics’ rather than ‘policing’. 
 
To enact equality in the name of a denied identification means asking questions that do 
not serve to reinforce existing identifications, rather they demonstrate the logic of 
emancipation. It is this demonstration, enacted by following lines of argumentation that 
point at gaps between identifications, or an ‘impossible identification’ as ‘an 
identification that cannot be embodied by he or she who utters it’ (ibid, p. 67). Rancière 
describes an example from his personal experience, recalling when Algerians were 
murdered by the French police in Paris in 1961. 
 
‘We could not identify with those Algerians, but we could question our identity as 
“French people” in whose name they had been murdered. That is to say, we could 
act as political subjects in the interval or gap between the two identities, neither of 
which we could assume.’  
(ibid, p. 67) 
 
Rancière describes how such an impossible identification or gap is also pointed at by 
asking nonsensical questions, such as ‘does a French woman belong to the category of 
Frenchmen?’ (ibid, p. 66) posed in a situation where a woman is denied rights within 
the French state. Such a question articulates a gap where an emancipatory argument 
might be developed. Another example is the articulation of a ‘wrong’ identification, 
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encompassed by the statement ‘We are all German Jews’ (ibid, p 67) which Rancière 
describes as ‘an identification in terms of the denial of an absolutely essential wrong’ 
(ibid).  
 
But what is important is what follows from a wrong identification. In the demonstration 
of equality, the ‘syllogistic logic of either/or (are we or are or we are not citizens or 
human beings?) is intertwined with the logic of “we are and we are not.”’ (ibid, p. 68). 
Subjectification or ‘disidentification’ as a space between identifications emerges when 
the logic of emancipation is enacted and verified. The staging or demonstration of this 
space is a process of subjectification, or ‘coming into presence’ – of a way of being that 
had no place and no part in the existing order of things’, that has yet to be identified 
(Bingham and Biesta, 2010, p. 33).  So for Rancière, politics, or equality, as the 
enactment of emancipation ‘is not made up of power relationships: it is made up of 
relationships between worlds.’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 42). 
 
‘A political subject is not a group that “becomes aware” of itself, finds its voice, 
imposes its weight on society. It is an operator that connects and disconnects 
different areas, regions, identities, functions, and capacities existing in the 
configuration of given experience – that is the nexus of distributions of the police 
order and whatever equality is already inscribed there, however fragile and fleeting 
such inscriptions may be.’  
(Rancière, 1999, p. 40) 
 
The enactment of emancipation as subjectification is sporadic and fleeting, solidifying 
into a new identification, but one that is engrained with an inscription of equality (ibid, 
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p. 37), so reconfiguring the social order. But Rancière doesn’t downplay its 
significance, for ‘at the moment when society is threatened to be shattered by its own 
madness, reason performs a saving social action by exerting the totality of its own 
power, that of the recognised equality of intellectual beings’ (IS, p. 97). However, 
Rancière is also less optimistic, describing how emancipatory logic is falling out of 
play, where the consequences are found in the manifestation of racism in France. 
Similarly, Gur-Ze’ev, who likens identification with death, describes the emergence of a 
‘new anti-Semitism’. For Rancière, humanity has been pedagogised with society 
likened to an enormous machine that enacts explicatory logic (IS, p. 134). But the point 
here is that for both, the idea of an empowering literacies education might serve to fuel 
the pedagogical machine, further demonstrating the importance of enacting 
emancipatory alternatives. Though my attempt above to elaborate upon subjectification 
as ‘dis-identification’ has probably raised more questions than it answered, I endeavour 
to demonstrate its relevance in the final chapter when I explore emancipation in the 
context of adult literacies education. 
 
6.5 Some conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have explored the distinction between empowerment and emancipation 
in the context of education. From reviewing the understandings of empowerment and 
emancipation described by Gee, Bourdieu, Rancière and Bourdieu, addressing research 
question xii, I have described how understandings of power as ideological processes of 
discourse production. These processes imply educational practices that can be 
understood to socialise students into the existing social hierarchy. This makes the notion 
of an empowering education inherently problematic, emphasising the importance of 
distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation in the context of education. In 
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considering the historical criticism of Freire’s work, addressing research question xiii., I 
have shown how taking understandings of empowerment as a reference limits the 
exploration and criticism of educational ideas and practices. Criticism is limited to 
concerns about the accounting of power where power is understood from the standpoint 
of an observer, in so doing dismissing the idea that an emancipatory education might be 
possible.  
 
Tackling research question xiv, I have also drilled down into the question of how an 
emancipatory education might be understood, suggesting that emancipation cannot be 
understood as a process of identity formation. Rather it can be understood as a process 
of being and becoming a human subject, in other words, it is a process of 
subjectification. This implies that education for emancipation might counter processes 
of identification, raising the possibility of understanding subjectification as an 
enactment of ‘dis-identification’ or ‘anti-identification’. Here the possibility of an 
emancipatory education relies upon enacting human qualities that counter and disrupt 
processes of knowledge transmission, undermining the idea that people need help to 
understand the social world.  
 
Not only can empowerment and emancipation be distinguished from each other, they 
are also linked. In other words, emancipatory education counters education that takes 
understandings of ideology as a starting point. Emancipatory education serves to 
counter empowering education, which can be understood to be oppressive. Again, this 
further emphasises the importance of distinguishing between the empowerment and 
emancipation in the context of education.  
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If I assume that an emancipatory education might be possible, empowering education 
seems to be defined by a series of problems that serve to underline how it can be 
understood to socialise students. It is predicated upon the transmission of knowledge as 
empowerment is reliant upon revealing ‘the truth’ about how power operates, making 
students’ dependent upon teachers and researchers for understandings whilst 
simultaneously replicating existing social hierarchies. Understandings of power offer no 
means to make judgements about whether new discourse disrupts existing social 
hierarchies, or whether new social hierarchies are more desirable than those they 
replace. The idea of an empowering education also seems to ignore human qualities 
such as love or trust, limiting educational relationships to those between students and 
symbolic productions.  In summary, empowerment understandings take a starting point 
of defining inequality as a process of discourse production ultimately linked to the 
distribution of ‘goods’ in society. This makes empowerment a situation to be worked 
towards in the future, perhaps indicated by a ‘goods’ redistribution, but where outside 
observers decide what is ‘good’ about ‘goods’ and whether the redistribution is fair, 
perhaps making the possibility of empowerment forever over the horizon.  
 
In contrast, the possibility of an emancipatory education means taking the assumption of 
‘equality’ as the starting point (Bingham and Biesta, 2010, p. 31), where emancipation 
is understood as the enactment of equality that can only take place in the present. 
Emancipatory education is predicated upon understandings of humanity, where a 
demarcation must be made between people and other living creatures if the needs and 
continued existence of humanity are to be considered. Theories of emancipatory 
education make assumptions about the qualities of human relationships that are integral 
to humanity, from which equality is defined, where emancipation might be predicated 
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upon the assertion of love, trust, or intellectual freedom where questions and 
discussions might orientate towards how to understand such qualities and preserve their 
continuance.  The assumption is that the enactment of these human qualities disrupts 
processes of knowledge transmission, raising the possibility for new ways of being and 
becoming a human subject that have not yet been identified.  This makes the enactment 
of emancipation predicated upon students expressing their own understandings of the 
everyday social world, rather than relying on the existing understandings of teachers or 
researchers. But this is not a free for all where emancipation means students expressing 
themselves, as emancipatory education relies upon students’ expressions incorporating a 
social enactment of equality. It also means that emancipation cannot be about processes 
of identification and so cannot be reliant upon understandings about power, further 
underwriting the importance of demarcating emancipation from empowerment in the 
context of education.  
 
To take understandings of empowerment as a starting point might mean accepting the 
idea that education might only serve to socialise students into society as it stands. For 
Rancière it also means accepting that there can be no politics, only activity that serves 
to reinforce the social order. To assume the possibility of an emancipatory education 
means refusing to accept this, which means raising a range of problems that question 
what makes education possible whilst taking responsibility for the existence of 
humanity and its needs
22
. 
 
This is demonstrated by how taking the assumption of emancipation as a starting point, 
as I attempted in my criticism of Freire, raised questions and problems that do not arise 
                                                          
22
 I hope that my thesis can be now be understood as sitting within this context, as a demonstration of this 
refusal. 
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from the perspective of empowerment. For example, questions about the bounds of 
educational programs and policy, about what makes an educational relationship, about 
whether culture can be educational and about how to justify and undertake a research 
project such this one. As promised, I shall return to the question of methods and 
methodology, but in the concluding chapter I also reengage with how emancipatory 
education might be understood through addressing the title of this thesis as an 
exploration of the possibility for emancipation in the context of adult literacies 
education.  
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7 Conclusion – the possibility of an emancipatory adult literacies education 
 
In the last chapter I distinguished between education for empowerment and education 
that might raise possibilities for emancipation. In so doing I reclaimed Freire’s work as 
a project that attempts to describe the possibility of an emancipatory education, arguing 
that this orientation in his work has been neglected whilst the idea that education might 
empower has come to hold great sway. I also claimed that educational practices 
associated with understandings of adult literacies for ‘empowerment’ encourage the 
socialisation of students, again neglecting the possibility of emancipation, which I 
attempted to describe as a fleeting process of being and becoming a human subject that 
is understood to enact equality. In this chapter I contextualise these claims by describing 
emancipation in the context of adult literacies education, as well as discussing the 
implications for the methodology that underpins this project, addressing research 
questions xv and xvi.  I then make a final claim which is that the notion of emancipation 
must continue to be questioned and explored if educators, students and academics are to 
take responsibility for the practices associated with adult literacies education and their 
consequences.  
 
It should by now be clear that the creation of educational methods and programs that 
might emancipate is illogical in the sense that there can, by definition, be no blueprint or 
instructions for emancipation. This means that this concluding chapter cannot take the 
form of recommendations for educational programs or policy. But it does not mean that 
the implications of this project are in any way irrelevant or impractical, just that they 
must be articulated in a different way.  Neither does it mean that I cannot explore the 
emancipatory potential of literacies education. Rather, it suggests that there are 
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boundaries to what the activity of analysis can bring to a project of this type. I have 
engaged the analytical skills of reading, interpreting and reconstructing in my 
engagement with the work of Bourdieu, Gee, Freire and Rancière, but have reached the 
limit of what this might achieve in the context of an exploration of emancipatory 
education. I cannot continue with my analysis in order to construct what Rancière’s 
work infers about methods, practices and policies for achieving emancipation. To take 
the exploration of emancipation in the context of literacies education further I must 
change gear, or perhaps change vehicle and take it in a different direction.  
 
To accomplish this shift I return to the central problem that has come to my attention in 
the conduct of this research, that an empowering education relies upon notions of 
ideology that seem to negate the possibility of emancipation. It is this same problem that 
Rancière counters in his own work when he describes the logic of ‘ideology’ as ‘the 
truth of the false’ (Rancière, 1999, 85). Understandings of empowerment in the context 
of education are predicated upon the idea that there are undetectable and illusory 
processes that are integral to discourse production and the replication of power. 
People’s understanding of the social world is taken to be inherently ‘false’ and 
empowerment is predicated upon revealing the ‘truth’. Understandings of an 
empowering literacies education make these assumptions, whether they are informed by 
Bourdieu (e.g. Luke and Freebody, 1997; Gee, 1996; Janks, 2010) or Gee (Lankshear, 
1997; Crowther, Tett & Hamilton, 2003; New London Group, 1996) or Freire (e.g. 
Lankshear and MacLaren, 1993; Giroux, 1988).   
 
In the remainder of this chapter I conclude my investigation by considering 
emancipatory literacies education as one that goes beyond understandings of power. 
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This means exploring the possibility of an emancipatory literacy education, in the 
context of enacting a social response to societal oppression, which is not based upon the 
assumption that ideological processes are in operation. It breaks with how the question 
of distinguishing between empowerment and emancipation has been addressed 
previously (e.g by Inglis, 1997), where the focus has been on formulating appropriate 
knowledge for delivery to students. Instead, as suggested by the analysis presented in 
Chapters 5, emphasis is placed on understanding the character of the educational 
relationships between teachers, students and the materials that they use. But before I set 
this out, I commence by examining the implications for the methodology of this thesis 
raising wider questions about how research in education is justified. 
 
7.1 Methodology  
 
Bourdieu and Gee back up their assumptions about the ideological character of 
discourse with ethnographic and observational data.  But in circular fashion, the 
methods they employ are informed by the assumptions that they make. They assume 
that the operation of power can only be revealed by researchers who sit outside of 
discourse to observe and analyse it and so this positioning is replicated in the design and 
deployment of research methods. Gee argues that theory, as generalised discourse, 
should wherever possible be constructed from primary or direct sources, so emphasising 
the need for researchers and research (SL, pp. 18-19). From the stance of an observer he 
describes how African Americans are less able to speak about texts in a detached, 
rational and objective fashion than their white counterparts (SL, pp. 173-175) and in an 
in depth study of stories told by an African American child called Leona, he argues that 
‘There is a great deal of similarity between the structures we have found in Leona’s 
stories and those that have been found in oral structures from oral cultures around the 
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world’ (SL, p. 113) and claims that ‘This little girl’s apprenticeship in the social 
practices of her community, ways of making sense of experience that, in fact have a 
long history going back thousands of years.’ (SL, p. 115). Meanwhile, Bourdieu also 
places emphasis on directly linking his theory to empirical research, describing theory 
as a ‘temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical work’ (Bourdieu in 
Wacquant, 1989, p.50). On this basis Bourdieu uses ethnographic data to claim that 
working class people have a tendency to be happy, even though their lives by all 
accounts are mediocre (HA, p. 167). What’s more, bourgeois children are more able to 
manipulate symbols in relation to abstract concepts than their proletarian counterparts 
who are orientated towards understanding concrete situations (RE, p. 50). 
 
Paradoxically, these kinds of statements seem to back up the idea of their being a ‘Great 
Divide’ in ways of thinking and behaving resulting from differences in people’s literate 
practices, suggesting a failure to break with the ‘literacy myth’ that the New Literacies 
Studies project set out to dispel (see Section 2.2). Given that the practice of an 
empowering literacies education can be understood to socialise students into existing 
society, it seems that far from breaking with the notion of ‘functional literacies’, an 
empowering literacies education might be considered as a more complex and all-
pervading form of functionalism that goes well beyond the remit of the first literacies 
programs which were limited to the teaching of reading and perhaps writing. 
 
But the main point here is that the research findings revealed by Bourdieu or Gee utilise 
research methods and tools which have been designed in the assumption that some 
people (researchers) are more able to understand the world than others (the researched). 
The justification for such research is that it might attempt to discover how people are 
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being oppressed, for the ideological character of discourse cannot be internally critiqued 
necessitating researchers sitting outside of discourse so that its workings might be 
revealed. The possibility of empowerment is linked to the revelation of true knowledge, 
where ‘If only people could be made aware of the real circumstances of their lives, so 
the argument might go, then they will naturally seek to make appropriate changes’ 
(Schostak, 2009, p. 2). The knowledge revealed can then be taught to students, passing 
them down the knowledge required for empowerment. However, as I have argued in 
Chapters 4 and 5, this process can be understood to reinforce the power relationships it 
seeks to dismantle. A ‘circle of inequality’ (IS, p. 87) is replicated where research 
findings back up the assumptions that underpin their generation, justifying a need for 
more research that utilises similar methods. In this way, notions of ideology can be 
understood to stimulate research which serves to encourage socialising education, so 
replicating inequality. 
 
Freire, Bourdieu and Gee all assume that the central problem that research must address 
is that ‘the truth’ is distorted and must be revealed for equality in the distribution of 
‘goods’ to be achieved. What’s more, they all take this understanding about people’s 
false understanding of the world to be ‘the truth’. Indeed, the understandings of praxis 
offered by Freire and Bourdieu’s, as well as Gee’s understandings of language and 
discourse, are taken to be facts by those who make reference to them (e.g. Janks,  2010; 
Crowther, Tett and Hamilton, 2003; Lankshear and Maclaren, 2003). But the analyses I 
presented Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that these understandings are not the ‘truth’, 
rather they are theorists’ assumptions. For Rancière they are mere opinions which 
assume the inequality of intelligence, where acts underpinned by these assumptions 
deny the possibility of politics or emancipation.  
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Rancière suggests that an alternative assumption can be made that denies the opinion 
that people need help to understand. The alternative is to take the assumption of 
intellectual equality as a starting point, to assume that all people are intellectual equals 
and not in need of help from teachers and researchers in order to understand the social 
world. But this does not mean that equality is enacted by people expressing themselves 
in any fashion, regardless of the process by which their expressions or opinions arise. 
Freire describes how people’s expressions or dialogue must be driven by relationships 
where qualities of love and trust are manifested so that ‘the truth’ might be revealed. 
For Rancière the quality of people’s expressions is also understood to be integral to the 
possibility of emancipation. Rancière argues that the enactment of emancipation is 
reliant upon the expression of opinions which incorporate the belief that all people are 
intellectual equals, requiring students to give attention to their own intellects whilst 
acknowledging the equality of intellect of all others (see Section 5.5). Freire’s linkage 
of love and dialogue to emancipation suggests that emancipatory education is an 
inherently social activity. Similarly, Rancière’s emancipation, through reliant upon 
individuals, is inherently social because students must speak and in so doing connect 
with shared concerns and I explore this further in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
There are repercussions here for research methodology in the broad sense that 
researching education might orientate away from attempting to account for power in the 
context of educational relationships and towards making the assumption that an 
emancipatory education is possible and that a socialising (or empowering) education 
might be distinguished from one that might emancipate.  My PhD project does not 
involve empirical research and on the basis of this project alone I am not in a position to 
speculate about specific research methods or research questions that might follow if 
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researchers take the assumption of emancipation as a starting point. However, in the last 
chapter I have already described how assuming the possibility of emancipation has the 
potential to raise a breadth and depth of questions and problems that probe the 
boundaries of what makes education possible, suggesting the possibility of a multitude 
of research questions and aims. I would argue here that a reorientation away from 
discussions about empowerment and towards understandings of emancipation does not 
mean pulling researchers, educators and students towards an impossible and therefore 
an impracticable and irrelevant possibility. .Rather it might both expand and give depth 
to discussions and explorations, taking them into unforeseen and novel directions whilst 
firmly rooting them in real problems and shared concerns. 
 
However, outstanding questions remain about the relationships between theories of 
emancipation and research methodologies. For Bourdieu and Gee, the purpose of 
research in the context of an empowering education is to reveal how power operates. 
This knowledge about power might then be passed to teachers and students, as it is 
assumed that knowing about power will help to overcome it, furthering the aim of social 
justice, with the attendant problems that I have described above. 
 
Freire’s work implies a different purpose for research in the context of an emancipatory 
education, where the process of knowledge transmission (‘banking education’) between 
teachers and students is assumed to be oppressive. Emancipatory education is reliant 
upon dialogue between teachers and students, so that they might reflect and act upon the 
problems that they face. Symbolic artefacts such as films or texts are integral to this 
relationship because they are understood to encourage dialogue and praxis (see Section 
5.4). Here the content of these artefacts must incorporate the everyday experiences and 
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problems of students, or banking education will continue, necessitating a requirement 
for research in the context of an emancipatory education. This means that for Freire, 
research is aimed at understanding the everyday experiences of students so that these 
might be incorporated into the content of educational materials. Freire details the 
associated research methods for undertaking this type of project (see PO, Chapter 5).  
 
The ideas of other theorists who have assumed the possibility of an emancipatory 
education suggest that limitations might be placed upon the purpose of empirical 
research. For Rancière (IS, pp. 14-15), emancipatory education is not reliant upon the 
transmission of particular knowledge content, or educational materials formulated to 
incorporate particular types of knowledge. For Biesta (2010a),  Gur-Ze’ev (1998, 2005) 
and Holloway (2002), emancipation cannot be reliant upon researchers diagnosing the 
need for its enactment, or detecting that it is in occurrence or has taken place. In 
Chapter 6 I demonstrated that theories of emancipatory education are important in the 
generation of more and different understandings (Biesta, Allan and Edwards, 2011) and 
might stimulate the emergence of new questions and problems for researchers to attend 
to. But perhaps these same theories are limited in what they might contribute to the 
creation of methods for the empirical investigation of these new objects of study 
(though I must restate that I cannot claim definitive conclusions about this on the basis 
of my research). I raise similar issues when I attempt to describe an emancipatory 
literacies education in the latter part of this chapter, so I shall reengage with this 
potential problem again below.  
 
Returning to my own research, as I outlined in Chapter 3, both the premise of this 
project, its central aim and objectives, as well as its design are informed by two 
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assumptions. Firstly, that an emancipatory education might be possible and secondly 
that socialising education might be distinguished from emancipatory alternatives. I 
selected and organised the literature review by making decisions as to whether literature 
expressed the possibility of an alternative to education that functions to socialise 
students and it was from the exploration of such literature that I was able to select 
theoretical works for analysis and formulate research aims, objectives and the questions 
that I have sought to address. These two assumptions correspond with my refusal to 
accept that education can achieve no function or purpose other than socialisation which 
underpins the premise of my research.  
 
I have relied heavily upon insights and help from theorists who make these assumptions 
– Biesta, Gur-Ze’ev, Rancière, Freire and Williams, though in the case of Freire and 
Williams I have turned some of their assumptions against them in my concluding 
discussions in Chapter 6. Whilst Freire and Williams undoubtedly raise problems and 
questions arising from the assumption that an emancipatory education is possible and 
contribute to pertinent debates, they also rely upon notions of ideology which orientates  
their work back into the realm of empowerment. My research can be taken as an attempt 
to re-orientate attention towards the problem that Freire and Williams first gave 
attention to, but considering other ways of addressing them. In this sense, I hope my 
work reclaims and continues Williams’ project of raising the possibility of a Public 
Education that might counter the shotgun marriage between Old Humanism and 
Industrial Training that might describe the history of adult education in Britain. 
 
About the consequences or repercussions of my research, to reiterate, the result of 
research that explores emancipation cannot be translated into new methods or policies 
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for teachers and students to follow. This implies a break with how theory or ideas are 
presented for the engagement of educators, students and researchers and raises 
questions about how these readers might engage with understandings about education. I 
shall take the work of Brookfield (e.g. 2005) as a perhaps typical example. Brookfield 
describes the ideas of influential thinkers in education, such as hooks, Freire or 
Foucault, presenting them as elements in an array of resources from which adult 
educators might make selections to support their work of empowerment in the 
classroom.  
 
For Rancière, emancipation is predicated upon the making of impossible, wrong or 
nonsensical identifications, whilst for Gur-Ze’ev, it is a refusal to be identified, where 
for both, emancipation is always a response to, or following, an encounter with 
oppressive processes as they understand them. It seems to me these notions are 
expressed in the work of Rancière (e.g. 2005, 1999) and Gur-Ze’ev (e.g. 1998, 2005, 
2010) when they also,  like Brookfield, discuss a range of philosophers and theorists, 
but whilst upholding the possibility of emancipation as they each understand it. The 
consequences are texts which might challenge readers’ own understandings and 
assumptions with the expectation of a more complex engagement rather than an easy 
translation into ‘practice’.  
 
Rancière (1991) describes how the emancipated produce symbolic works (perhaps 
including theory) that recognise the equality of all people (IS, pp. 69-70). Such works 
need to be figured out, encouraging the exercising of the will and intellectual powers. 
Unlike empowerment understandings which are taken as ‘the truth’ and expected to 
reveal ‘the truth’, symbolic productions that arise from an enactment of emancipation 
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are assumed to be inscribed with ‘equality’. In contrast, the product of stultified minds 
doesn’t recognise the equality of intelligence in others. Such works explain and 
sloganise requiring the reader to listen and be commanded to, for it is assumed that they 
might not be able to understand. This sits with the idea that this type of symbolic 
production might be translated as a method, instruction or policy, so that ‘the truth’ as it 
has been revealed might be followed by others
23
. I do not intend to enter a debate about 
the expressions incorporated in this thesis. But as I embark on the problem of how to 
describe the possibility of an emancipatory education, I am hoping that the reader will 
seek to meet me by endeavouring to figure out and translate for themselves what this 
might mean. 
 
7.2 Emancipatory adult literacies education? 
 
The question remains as to how an emancipatory literacies education might be 
understood. To tackle this question I start by considering briefly Freire’s work in the 
context of literacies. This brief re-engagement with Freire’s legacy serves to 
demonstrate pitfalls that must be avoided if an emancipatory literacies education is to be 
described, so that my initial account of an emancipatory literacies education takes the 
form of what it is not and cannot be. I then take up the work of those who assume the 
possibility of an emancipatory education (Biesta, Rancière and Gur-Ze’ev) and face the 
challenge of stating positively how an emancipatory literacies education might be 
                                                          
23
 In her defence of Freire, bell hooks (1994) describes how educators are more than capable of taking on 
board the problems with Freire’s understandings and interpreting and translating their value in 
educational contexts. Likening theory to water, in circumstances where ‘thirsty’ students and educators 
encounter oppression, ‘dirty water’ theory such as Freire’s is readily ‘filtered’ by them, whilst researchers 
who position themselves outside and above such challenges can dismiss Freire and demand their ‘bottled 
water’ theory regardless of the resources expended in the process (and here I would add, so that teachers 
and students can be made by them to drink it).  
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understood. 
 
Freire and literacy 
 
I have argued that empowering education can be understood as a form of socialisation 
for students, so emphasising the importance of disentangling understandings of 
education for empowerment from those which make the assumption that education 
might emancipate. In Chapter 6 I attempted such a separation in the context of Freire’s 
work and legacy, the problem being that much of the discussion of Freire’s work is 
presented from the perspective of power and empowerment. In addition, Freire’s 
understanding of an emancipatory education is underpinned by a notion of ideology 
which has some correspondences with how empowering education is understood. This 
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for Freire to succeed in describing an 
emancipatory education that does not revert to encouraging the socialisation of students 
into society as it stands. These difficulties seem to come to a head when Freire’s theory 
is considered in the context of adult literacies education, as I demonstrate below.  
 
Freire designed, co-ordinated and taught literacies programs for adults in the 1950s and 
60s and in 1963 he was appointed head of the Brazilian National Literacy Program. The 
Program attempted to organise the teaching of reading and writing to upwards of two 
million adults before a military coup led to its seizure and Freire’s imprisonment and 
exile the following year (Archer and Costello, 1990; Dix, 2010, p. 82). Perhaps this 
aspect of Freire’s work encourages the assumption that Freire considered reading and 
writing to be integral to emancipation (e.g. as found with Esteva, Prakesh and Stuchul, 
2008, Archer and Costello, 1990 or Inglis, 1997). 
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However, for Freire, emancipation means ‘reading the world’ as enacted by students 
and teachers participating in dialogue and critical thinking whilst co-intending upon 
symbolic representations, so that they might be more fully conscious of the challenges 
that face them (Freire, 1972, see Chapter 5). By this definition, the reading and writing 
of text cannot be prerequisite to emancipation and Freire falls short of making such a 
claim (Taylor, 1993). Freire uses the term ‘literacy’ to refer exclusively to reading and 
writing, clearly stating that there can be no direct link between reading, writing and 
emancipation:   
 
‘One must not think, however, that learning to read and write precedes 
‘concientization’, or vice versa. Concientization occurs simultaneously with the 
literacy or post-literacy process. It must be so.’ 
(Freire, 1970, p. 42) 
 
Freire also describes how learning to read or write cannot be a mandatory or 
compulsory aspect of adult education and counters claims of their being functional 
outcomes that follow learning to read and write such as increased success in obtaining 
employment (Freire, 1970, p. 25, 1986, pp. 399-400). This sentiment is encapsulated in 
the Freirian inspired ‘REFLECT’ projects designed by the charity ACTIONAID 
(Archer & Newman, 2003), where reading and writing is offered as a non-compulsory 
component in educational programs which many of the students choose to opt out from 
(Abadzi, 2003). Similarly, the only large scale Freirian project undertaken in Scotland 
was not aimed at teaching reading and writing (Kirkwood & Kirkwood, 1987).  
 
However, it is when Freire elaborates upon how an emancipatory literacies education 
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might be understood that emancipation and empowerment seem to become irrevocably 
confused in his work. There are two main problems. Firstly, though Freire states clearly 
that emancipation cannot be systemised or take the form of a recipe, he gives guidelines 
as to how reading and writing might be taught, drawing heavily on his understanding of 
emancipatory education. As I discussed in the last chapter, the concept of praxis that is 
central to Freire’s understanding of education seems to encourage the translation of 
Freire’s ideas into practical methods (e.g. PO, pp. 32-34 or Freire, 1970, pp. 85-86), as 
‘theory’ or ‘reflection’ must be inseparable from ‘practice’ or ‘action’.  
 
Though reading and writing are not integral to emancipation, Freire describes how his 
understanding of emancipatory education might inform their teaching. This involves 
selecting and utilising single ‘generative’ words that encapsulate aspects of students’ 
lives and the problems that challenge them, so that teachers and students might de-code 
them whilst engaging in dialogue, (Freire, 1970, pp. 85-88, 1986). He stresses the 
importance how ‘generative’ words are selected (see Freire, 1970, p. 38), where the 
selection processes might follow the methods he outlines for the production of 
‘codifications’ (see PO, pp. 32-34 or Section 5.4). Using this method, Freire claims 
success in teaching people to read utilising only seventeen three syllable words (see 
Freire, 1970, p. 38).  At the same time, Freire appeals to educators not to adopt his 
methods, but to create their own, because emancipation cannot be a recipe (e.g. Freire 
and Macedo, 1987, p. 134). But to me, this is an inadequate response given Freire’s 
understanding that emancipation cannot be systemised. What’s more, the implication is 
that methods for emancipation created by a student’s own teacher might be 
emancipatory whilst those borrowed from another student’s teacher are not. But 
presumably the existence of any method implies that emancipation is something 
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students are having done for them or to them, aside from whether the methods and 
programs are a consequence of dialogue and love between students and their teachers. 
 
Secondly, Freire assumes that the consequences of ideological processes must be 
overcome by teachers and students as part of any literacies education. This means that 
the idea of literacy or of being literate can be widened from learning to read and write to 
the wider notion of becoming conscious of the world (see Freire & Macedo, 1987, p. 
156) or becoming a ‘knowing subject’ (Freire, 1986, pp. 401-402), hence the 
description of literacy as ‘Reading the Word and the World’ (Freire & Macedo, 1987).  
This implies that dominating groups are no more capable of ‘reading the world’ than 
anyone else, with Giroux (1988) describing how for Freire, formally educated middle 
classes might also participate in literacies education. This contrasts with Gee’s 
empowering literacy education which seems to place all the responsibility on ‘excluded 
people’ to become literate. However, it is here that Freire’s understanding of literacies 
education becomes inextricably woven with empowerment understandings as I 
demonstrate below.   
 
Perhaps Giroux hits the nail on the head when he argues that understandings of literacy 
education as reading and writing are about power and can only be about power and not 
emancipation (Giroux, 1988, p. 65). For Giroux, learning to read and write is about 
people gaining the capacity to operate more successfully within society as it stands, 
including gaining access to ‘goods’. 
 
‘Literacy [as reading and writing] in these terms is not the equivalent of 
emancipation, it is in a more limited but essential way the precondition for 
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engaging in struggles around both relations of meaning and relations of power. 
To be literate is not to be free, it is to be present and active in the struggle for 
reclaiming one’s voice, history and future.’ 
(Giroux, 1988, p. 65) 
 
However, as Freire’s starting point is to assume that ideological processes are in 
operation, attempts to describe any wider notion of an emancipatory literacy as ‘reading 
the world’ by either himself or Giroux (1988) cannot seem to break out of describing 
literacies education as anything other than a form of empowerment. In Freire’s later 
writings Freire even draws upon Bourdieu (Freire and Macdedo, 1987, p. 145) 
describing ‘emancipatory literacy’ as ‘the reappropriation of cultural capital’ (ibid; 
159). Freire’s ‘emancipatory literacies’ are described in terms of dominated groups 
asserting their own literate practices and cultural identities (see Freire and Macedo, 
1987, pp. 149-159), reminiscent of Williams’ notion that ‘culture is ordinary’ but 
inherently valuable to democracy (Williams, 1993b), perhaps illustrative of how 
William’s writings on the UK traditions in education can be interpreted as a precursor 
or anticipator of Freire’s work (see Dix, 2010, p. 81). Here I would claim, in the light of 
the analysis that I have presented so far, that ‘emancipation’ and ‘empowerment’ are 
inextricably confused if Freire’s work is interpreted in the context of adult literacies 
education.  
 
What emancipatory literacies education cannot be 
 
In exploring an emancipatory literacies education there are three conclusions I can draw 
from the brief consideration of Freire’s legacy for adult literacies education that I 
presented above. Firstly, an emancipatory literacies education cannot take the form of 
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gaining a particular literate skill; secondly that it cannot be presented or understood in 
the form of a method, recipe or policy; and thirdly, that it cannot take the form of 
students’ story telling or exerting a cultural identity. I discuss these aspects in more 
detail below. 
 
An emancipatory literacies education is not predicated on the gaining of a particular 
‘literate’ skill. The possibility of emancipation cannot be reliant upon learning a skill or 
particular knowledge as this would encourage teaching that takes the form of handing 
down knowledge to students, creating the paradox where students are reliant upon 
teachers for their emancipation. As I described above, Freire makes clear that reading 
and writing cannot be pre-requisite to emancipation. But if a wider understanding of 
discourse is employed, this also means that emancipation is not dependent upon 
following a particular line in clothing and footwear, learning to play computer games, or 
mastering social networking media such as smartphones or web applications like 
Facebook. It also means that emancipation isn’t predicated upon being associated, 
labelled or identified with groups of people who are linked with these discourse 
preferences. There are implications here for how researchers in education approach the 
study of new digital media in the context of education (e.g. Knobel and Lankshear, 
2010; Lankshear and Knobel, 2008; Gee, 2006, 2009) where it seems to me that 
possibility of either empowerment or emancipation is falling out of play. This suggests 
that the discussion contained within this thesis is timely, as it raises the importance of  
researchers, educators and students taking  responsibility for the purpose and function of 
literacies education and its research. 
 
Secondly, emancipatory literacies education cannot take the form of students telling 
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their stories in their own vernacular and promoting their existing cultural history or 
traditional ways of behaving, in the assumption that these are inherently valuable. 
Emancipation is not the creation of stories or appealing to existing characteristics and 
identifications through promoting one cultural tradition over another. This may seem 
counter intuitive within the UK tradition of adult literacies education with its 
longstanding practices associated with encouraging students to voice their own stories, 
informed by the work of Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart and Paulo Freire. 
 
Finally, an emancipatory literacies education cannot take the form of a prescribed 
method, recipe or education policy. Adult literacies education cannot be a translation 
into a program for achieving emancipation in the context of Rancière’s understanding of 
emancipatory education. Such a strategy would serve to encourage educators and 
students to congregate around particular understandings and ways of working so 
replicating intellectual inequality.  
 
This means that the analytical skills that I put to work in Chapters 4 and 5 cannot be 
further utilised in a meaningful fashion. I could continue my analysis in order to 
reconstruct in tangible terms how the process of ‘dis-identification’ described by 
Rancière might be practised by teachers and students. For example, I could produce 
methods for how to stage an encounter between ‘explicatory logic’ and ‘emancipatory’ 
logic (see Section 6.4), alongside formulations for the articulation of an impossible, 
wrong or nonsensical identification. I could endeavour to set out emancipatory 
syllogisms for use in particular contexts, perhaps following Toulmin’s example when he 
sets out an analysis of how arguments are made with supporting diagrams and example 
narratives (Toulmin, 1964). I could call it the literacy practice of ‘emancipatory speech’ 
266 
 
and recommend that it be passed down to teachers, perhaps even through policy, so that 
they might emancipate their students.  
 
Alternatively, following Freire, I could consider Rancière’s understandings of teacher, 
student relationships in detail (see Section 5.5) alongside the implications for 
relationships with symbolic artefacts such as books and make recommendations for an 
‘emancipatory’ method for learning to read.  But such instructions were followed by 
teachers and students, this could not be understood as an emancipatory education. 
 
It seems to me that this tension is found in Rancière’s own expressions. Rancière’s 
emancipatory education is enacted by a teacher student relationship that ‘assumes 
equality’ as a starting point, but in Section 6.4 I have also described and given examples 
demonstrating equality as the enactment of a logic of dis-identification. I described this 
as a process of being and becoming a human subject that is understood as fleeting and 
temporary that might bring to presence the human subject that has yet to be identified; a 
process of subjectification that incorporates expressions of equality which might leave 
an imprint in a reconfiguration of the social order.  
 
This process is perhaps referring to an ‘assertion’ of equality (Rancière, 2007, p. 51) 
that follows the ‘staging’ of an encounter between the logic of explication and the logic 
of equality or emancipation ‘where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the 
handling of a wrong’ (see Rancière, 1995, p. 62, p. 64) or ‘twisted logic’ (Bingham and 
Biesta, 2010, p. 159). However, teachers cannot take on the role of ‘staging’ encounters 
that might result in emancipation, for this would constitute a situation where students 
are reliant upon teachers for orchestrating their emancipation or on receiving knowledge 
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pertinent to understanding how emancipatory encounters might be managed. I cannot 
define an emancipatory teacher as a kind of events organiser
24
. However, this leaves the 
emancipation described by Rancière’s understanding of politics as manifesting only 
rarely and fleetingly, where its staging might be accidental.  
 
It seems that illustrating the notion of emancipation as an enactment of dis-
identification invokes the idea that there could be a method or blueprint for 
emancipation with the attendant problems I have already raised. If Rancière describes 
emancipation in the contexts of political activity as a ‘staging’ of particular encounters 
and provide illustrative examples (eg Rancière, 1995, p. 65-67, see Section 6.4) this 
invites criticism that his understanding of emancipation includes a prescribed method 
(like Freire). However, not providing such examples might invite criticism that 
Rancière’s ideas (or those of Biesta, Gur-Ze’ev, and Holloway) are impractical and 
therefore irrelevant. This issue sits with the potential implications for methodology and 
empirical research I discussed above in this chapter, though again, as this is a theoretical 
research project, I come to no definitive conclusions.  
 
It is also significant that this tension in Rancière’s work rears when he attempts to 
describe emancipation as a social endeavour. It seems that emancipation is destroyed 
when attempts are made at its social enactment, denying the possibility of anything 
other than an individual emancipation. However, Rancière himself does not share this 
pessimism (Rancière, 2010). Perhaps the strength of Rancière’s theory is that it draws 
attention to how theories of social emancipation must surely also be concerned also with 
the individual, and assume that individuals’ lives, concerns and judgements might be as 
                                                          
24
 Interestingly, Holloway (2002, 214), who like Gur-Ze’ev, draws upon Adorno’s negative dialectics, also describes 
political activity as a kind of events organisation 
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important and valid as those of any policy maker, researcher or educator. Else why the 
necessity for emancipation? This orientates discussion towards how we relate to and 
utilise theory rather than what the content of the theory is. After all, social theory is ‘just 
opinions’, and in this thesis I have demonstrated how the assumptions that theorists 
make about people can influence educational practice.  
 
By drawing attention towards the tension between the individual and the social in the 
context of emancipation, no one escapes responsibility for humanity. What we do as 
individuals matters. We are all responsible for refusing methods and techniques that 
enact societal oppression and for the consequences of our engagement with theories and 
ideas. This also means that, by definition, the possibility of an emancipatory education 
is an ongoing question that must continue to be addressed and cannot be ignored. 
The above descriptions of what an emancipatory literacies education cannot be, do not 
preclude its possibility. However, the problems that I have just set out do illustrate the 
challenge of describing an emancipatory adult literacies education, which I now 
attempt. 
 
Literacies and emancipation 
 
An emancipatory literacies education can still be assumed and for Rancière, it means 
starting from the assumption of equality. Rancière describes how ‘ordinary pedagogical 
logic’ is supported by two ‘fundamental axioms’. Firstly that ‘one must start from 
inequality in order to reduce it’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 4), which seems to correspond with 
my description of how an empowering literacies education is defined by the assumption 
that discourse is inherently oppressive and serves to perpetuate inequality.  The second 
fundamental ‘axiom’ is that ‘the way to reduce inequality is to conform to it by making 
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it an object of knowledge’ (ibid), in other words, that inequality can be addressed and 
narrowed by researching and producing knowledge about inequality and passing it 
down as knowledge to students. Again, I have described how understandings of an 
empowering literacies education sit with this by suggesting that knowledge about 
discourse be taught to students. For Rancière, it is this particular knowledge, as 
‘knowledge of inequality’ that an emancipatory or ‘ignorant schoolmaster’ refuses.  
 
According to Rancière, equality and inequality are not states that can be achieved, rather 
that they are just two ‘opinions’ and education can operate on the basis of assuming 
either. If a teacher assumes inequality, then they aim to achieve equality in the future 
supposedly by abolishing their own privileged position. To do this they explain 
inequality to the student in the assumption that they cannot understand it without 
teachers’ help, so that one day they might be the teacher’s equal (ibid, pp. 4-5). 
Alternatively, assuming the opinion of equality requires a teacher-student relation that 
cannot conform to ‘the promise of an equality-to-come that will never come, but to the 
reality of a basic equality’ which can only be enacted in the present (ibid, p. 5). It 
cannot be assumed that the student needs help to understand what the teacher says, 
instead, there must be an ‘equality of speaking’ described as an enactment of the  
‘equality of intelligence’, where everyone can attend to their intellects and acknowledge 
others as their intellectual equals. It seems to me that exploring this ‘equality of 
speaking’ could describe how an emancipatory literacies education might be understood 
and I make a limited attempt at this endeavour below, ultimately leaving it as an open 
question.  
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In the context of the teacher student relationship, enacting the equality of intelligence 
means assuming that all people are capable of understanding each other’s thoughts, 
emotions or opinions (see Section 5.5). It is here that demands are made on the students 
to express such thoughts and to understand those of others. Rancière expresses ‘the idea 
that the activity of thinking is primarily an activity of translation, and that anyone is 
capable of making a translation’ (Rancière, 1995, p 63), making the argument that in 
terms of emancipatory intellectual activity there might be equality as there are no 
especially gifted intellects: 
 
‘Meaning is the work of the will. This is the secret of universal teaching. It is 
also the secret of those we call geniuses: the relentless work to bend the body to 
necessary habits, to compel the intelligence to new ideas, to new ways of 
expressing them: to redo on purpose what chance first produced, and to reverse 
the unhappy circumstances into occasions for success.’  
(IS, p. 56) 
 
For a student to attend to their intellect and the intellect of all other people requires acts 
of translation, repetition and imitation, driven by the will, where students express 
opinions that propel their own orbit around ‘the truth’ (IS, p. 78) enacting an individual 
emancipation which might connect with shared concerns’ (Rancière, 2007, p. 51). It is 
in this sense that students can be understood as speakers in the context of an 
emancipatory literacies education, where the role of the teacher is to refuse students the 
satisfaction of believing that they are less able intellectual inferiors who need help to 
understand the social world (Rancière, 2010, p.6): 
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‘Such a teacher forces the student to prove his or her capacity, to continue the 
intellectual journey the same way it began. This logic, operating under the 
presupposition of equality and requiring its verification, this logic deserves the 
name “intellectual emancipation.”’ 
(ibid)  
 
Rancière describes a particular role for symbolic artefacts, but where the knowledge 
content of texts, photographs etc is not important in the context of an emancipatory 
education (IS, pp. 27-28, IS, p. 32). Though explicatory acts are understood to 
undermine emancipation, inequality cannot be unwound merely by teachers stopping 
explaining, though symbolic artefacts are understood to support this function. The 
teacher’s role is to reveal students’ intellectual power (IS, p. 17), verifying that students 
have attended to their wills and the power of their own intellects and it is here that there 
is a role for texts or other symbolic artefacts; what Rancière describes as ‘the book’ (IS, 
pp. 14-15). 
 
The purpose of such artefacts in the educational relationship is to allow teachers to 
enforce and strengthen the will of the student, encouraging the repetitive acts of 
translation, imitation and so on required for opinions to be formed, where teachers no 
longer present texts incrementally so that their contents can be explained bit by bit to 
students (IS, 10,66). In their demands for students to speak, teachers are dismantling 
relationships of knowledge transmission in the context of the teacher student 
relationship, which means dismantling (Rancière, 2010, p. 2) the relationship that 
creates the deficit between their own intellect and that of the student.  
 
272 
 
For Rancière it is the ‘will against will’ relationship that drives the possibility of 
emancipation. The possibility of an emancipatory education is reliant upon the will of 
the teacher which is understood to drive the will of the student towards emancipatory 
intellectual acts whilst verifying that students have paid attention
25
. In this relationship 
of will to will, the teacher demands that students speak and ‘In the act of speaking, man 
[sic] doesn’t transmit his knowledge, he makes poetry; he translates and invites others 
to do the same’ (IS, p. 65). To reiterate, this does not mean students voicing their stories 
or expressing themselves in any fashion. Students’ speech expresses the belief in 
intellectual equality, acknowledging the intellect of all people, including their own. 
 
‘Emancipation’ cannot be considered as a distinct method of instruction for there can be 
no emancipatory literacies programs or policies and if such a program were constructed 
no ‘social emancipation’ could follow. There can be no ‘emancipatory school’ 
(Rancière, 2010, p. 9). It follows that students do not require a literacies education in 
order to be able to ‘speak’ in the future after they have learnt the required skills or 
gained knowledge pertaining to literate practices. In the context of emancipation, speech 
is not a skill reliant on particular proficiencies in elocution, language acquisition or 
                                                          
25
This seems to raise questions about what is meant by ‘the will’. Rancière describes the notion of the will as directly 
equated to reason, just as ‘intelligence is synonymous with equality’ (IS, p. 73), implying that emancipatory 
education is an education of the will. If the will is synonymous with ‘reason’ this is reminiscent perhaps of the 
Hegelian notion of human ‘Geist’ understood by Freire as ‘consciousness’, discussed in the context of humans as 
historical beings moving history forward (see Section 5.2). Whilst I cannot explore this further here, Rancière’s 
description of human reason expressed in emancipatory acts, in the context of changing the configuration of the 
explicatory machine that is the social order suggests to me that there may be some association between Rancière’s 
work and that of Hegel. This would have implications for understanding concepts such ‘dialectics’ and ‘praxis’. 
Bingham and Biesta claim that the concept of the dialectic is absent in Rancière’s work, for example when Rancière 
describes emancipatory logic being employed in the meeting of a ‘wrong’ or ‘tort’ (Bingham and Biesta, 2010, p. 
159). However Gur-Ze’ev and Holloway’s work implies that there is more than one possibility for understanding 
dialectics and praxis (see footnote pp235-236). In this chapter I have demonstrated that the concept of praxis might 
serve to encourage the easy translation of ideas into methods or blueprints for teachers to replicate (e.g. PO, pp. 32-34 
or Freire, 1970, pp. 85-86).Taking the assumption that an emancipatory education is possible implies breaking with 
this, suggesting new ways of understanding how theory is used and what theory is for, as well as new possibilities for 
critique. I do not develop this in my research, so cannot pass judgement about the extent to which Rancière, Gur-
Ze’ev or Biesta have taken up this challenge in their work. However, I can conclude that this is an area that requires 
addressing on an ongoing basis. 
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enunciation that must be learnt. Instead, the assumption is that students can already 
speak as an expression of the equality of intelligence, where the teacher’s role is to 
encourage or demand such speech, strengthening the will of the student (IS, p. 26, 
Biesta, 2010b, Rancière, 2007, p. 51). ‘The emancipatory teacher’s call forbids the 
supposed ignorant one the satisfaction of what is known, the satisfaction of admitting 
that one is incapable of knowing more’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 6), for ‘It is essentially as a 
speaking being that he [sic] discovers his equality with all other human beings’ 
(Rancière, 2007, p. 51).  
 
‘The democratic man is a being who speaks, which is to say a poetic being, a 
being capable of embracing a distance between words and things which is not 
deception, not trickery, but humanity; a being capable of embracing the unreality 
of representation. A poetic virtue, then, and a virtue grounded in trust. This 
means starting from a point of view of equality, asserting equality, assuming 
equality as a given, working out from equality, trying to see how productive it 
can be and this maximising all possible liberty and equality. By contrast, anyone 
who starts out from distrust, who assumes inequality and proposes to reduce it, 
can only succeed in setting up a hierarchy of  inequalities, a hierarchy of 
priorities, a hierarchy of intelligences – and will reproduce them ad infinitum.’ 
(Rancière, 2007, p. 51) 
 
Students speaking whilst enacting the equality of intelligence are not speaking to 
reconfirm or align themselves with existing labels or identifications. Rather, 
emancipation is understood as an act of subjectification where the student’s speech 
might be as yet unidentified in the existing social order, introducing a new aspect 
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(Bingham and Biesta, 2010, p. 140). It is this speech that can be understood to 
reconfigure the existing social or police order incorporating an inscription of equality 
(Rancière, 1999, pp. 39-40), when speech ceases to be ‘noise’ and exists as ‘voice.’ 
(Bingham and Biesta, 2010, pp. 140). That idea the quality of students’ speech might 
have the power to inscribe equality is an important understanding.  
 
But this notion seems to be associated with an unresolved tension in Rancière’s work 
where emancipation is described in terms of the relationships between teachers and 
individual students as speakers as well as the idea of dis-identification as 
subjectification in the context of describing political activity that might reconfigure the 
social order (Pelletier, 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The possibility of an emancipatory literacies education must remain  an open question, 
for any claim to answer it definitively would have the consequence of setting out a 
blueprint could only destroy the possibility of emancipation. ut this is not a failing, 
rather an invitation to join a conversation that must continue if teachers, students and 
researchers are to take responsibility for the purpose and function of adult literacies 
education.  
 
‘this does not mean that all is lost, nor that all is relative in that naïve sense of 
saying that one person’s opinion is just as good as another because there is no such 
thing as ‘facts’ or objective Truth. What it does is place an onus on individuals in 
relation to each other: it means that no one can flee the need to deal with each 
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other and the disputes that arise over how the world is to be managed by people. It 
also means that there can never be an exhaustive, once and for all solution’.  
(Schostak, 2009, p. 4) 
  
Rancière’s work is just ‘opinions’ and cannot be taken as the last word on the subject of 
emancipation andmy research implies other possibilities for understanding an 
emancipatory literacies education.  I have already touched upon the work of Gur-Ze’ev 
who also assumes that an emancipatory education is possible. He describes 
emancipation as a process of ‘counter education’ which could be explored further. In 
Chapter 3 I described how assuming that an emancipatory education is possible might 
mean making the assumption that people other than academics are part of a discussion 
about how education for emancipation might be understood (see Section 3.2). In the UK 
tradition of adult education I have mentioned the existence of archives of students’ 
writings, such as those of the journal of the Plebs’ League which dates to 1909 (Waugh, 
2009, Young, 1983) and those that came out of what has become known as the Student 
Publishing Movement in the 1980s (Woodin, 2008). Perhaps in their writings some 
students have also assumed the possibility of an emancipatory education and the 
archives could be explored on this basis.  
 
This raises the question as to who gets to speak and here again I return to the central 
problem that my research has brought to attention; that understandings of empowering 
literacies education are reliant upon assumptions made about the ideological character 
of discourse which negate the possibility of emancipation. The UK tradition of adult 
literacies education that I have described in Chapter 2 may have assumptions about 
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ideology inextricably woven into its understandings and perhaps its practices as well
26
, 
perhaps encapsulated in idea of an empowering literacies education that is associated 
with social practice understandings of literacies education. It seems that much of the 
research in literacies education is orientated towards the assumption that students need 
help from teachers in order to understand the social world. In the context of 
empowerment, students must gain or master literate practices before they can participate 
in activity that might address inequality. 
 
On the other hand, there is also a tradition in UK adult education, perhaps found in the 
production of students writings, and associated with the legacy of Williams or Hoggart, 
where culture might be educational and students’ voices or cultural heritage are deemed 
to hold intrinsic value. Here again my research suggests that appeals to cultural 
identifications or grouping around existing cultural forms or characteristics cannot be 
assumed to contribute towards achieving equality or understood as an enactment of 
social emancipation. What I do suggest is that if teachers, researchers and students are 
to take responsibility for the purpose and function of literacies education and its 
outcomes the possibility of emancipation must be assumed and a conversation about 
this possibility must be continued. This means assuming equality as a starting point and 
understanding that in the context of emancipation, students might already be speakers in 
such a conversation and the role of literacy teachers might be to demand this speech. 
 
It also means moving beyond the ‘functional’ versus ‘social practice’ paradigm that I 
described in Chapter 2, where much of the discussion amongst educators and 
researchers in adult literacies educators revolves around defending understandings of 
                                                          
26
 Though this research does not place me to judge this 
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literacies as social practices, often in the context of policy. My exploration of 
emancipatory education in the context of adult literacies cannot recommend either 
methods or policy for education cannot be understood as the following of instructions. 
But this cannot be understood as a failing. Rather, it highlights the importance of 
understanding and discussing the relationships between teachers, students and policy, 
rather than orientating towards judging what the content of policy should be. It also 
emphasises the importance of individual speakers connecting with shared concerns, 
instead of relying on the speech and ideas of others.  
 
Adult literacies education is more than the trinity between researchers, policy-makers 
and tutors. Ultimately, adult literacies education in Britain has been largely driven by 
grass roots activism (Hillier, 2009) from which approaches to teaching have emerged, 
as well as the writing of its history. By emphasising the importance of distinguishing 
between emancipation and empowerment in the context of an adult literacies education, 
I hope I have also stressed the significance of the contribution of individuals and 
individual intellects in the context of education, where the opinions of students, 
researchers and teachers cannot be underplayed if responsibility is to be taken for the 
purpose and function of adult literacies education. For both Freire and Rancière the 
possibility of an emancipatory education is a question that by definition should not be 
ignored and which can only be addressed in the present. 
 
But I finish by returning for the last time to the central problem that my research has 
raised, that an empowering education relies upon notions of ideology that seem to 
negate the possibility of emancipation.  Though they make different assumptions, utilise 
different terminology and draw from different philosophical traditions, both Freire and 
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Rancière describe how oppressive education operates under the assumption that people 
are unable to understand their own oppression without the help of experts. This is the 
‘education’ that is replicated by schools, political parties and institutions throughout 
societies, and it is associated with processes of knowledge transmission. 
 
Empowering literacies education is understood and practiced under the assumption that 
ideological processes are always in operation. But this assumption cannot be taken as 
the truth. In the context of understanding and enacting a social response to societal 
oppression, what kinds of educational relationships and educational materials are not 
underpinned by this assumption? This is the question that Rancière and Freire both 
attempt to answer. However, the question remains an open one, not just because it 
hasn’t been answered fully or successfully in this thesis. My research has also 
demonstrated that the question of an emancipatory education must continue to be 
addressed, if education is to manifest as something other than a series of socialising 
techniques. My research aimed to develop a conversation with the potential to continue. 
Such a conversation must orientate around this question, if teachers, students and 
researchers are to take responsibility for adult literacies education and its practice. It is a 
question that we all have a responsibility to address.  
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